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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to investigate the question: How can the formal gap between 
strategic decision and execution be reduced? It starts with an explanation of the relevance of 
such a question in a world characterized by accelerated change and complexity. 
Predominantly, the intention is to explain how the work of the philosopher Henri Bergson 
might be of help to managers and members of academia, particularly regarding intuition and 
duration, and how Bergson might help them appreciate why there is a need to combine both 
the building (or architectural) and dwelling (or practical) world views during the dynamic 
formulation and formation of strategy. To comprehend how concepts belonging to both the 
building (thought, intelligence, and decision) and dwelling (action, intuition, and execution) 
world views can be jointly reinforced during strategy formation, this work also turns to the 
Strategy-as-Practice literature and its main focus: what managers do while strategizing. 
Contrary to the commonly held idea that analytic decision is followed by implementation at 
the mercy of individual discretionary intuitions, this project holds that not only is intuition 
present during the decision process, but that it also culminates in a vital requisite to i) digest 
huge amounts of information, ii) bring the strategic decision closer to the field of action, and 
iii) create “truly new” strategies capable of surprising clients and competitors, thus helping 
generate the potential to gain strategic advantage. 
In order to investigate these topics, and taking a constructionist stance, twenty-three 
qualitative interviews, comprising both single and triple interviews, were conducted among 
fifteen CEOs, all of whom belonged to different sectors in different countries and faced 
different business challenges. 
As its major contribution, in a context where strategic action seems more relevant than 
strategic models, the research highlights the importance of Bergson’s duration ‒ a qualitative 
time measured in creation that departs from movement ‒ to understand how the idea of the 
above-mentioned gap between strategic decision and execution might be replaced by a 
geometrical idea that measures strategy formation using a line whose thickness equals 
strategic quality. 
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1. Introduction 
Having worked in the professional services sector for a strategy consulting firm and 
investment bank since the early 1990s, the author has frequently found himself in the position 
of “the detached transcendent observer looking from atop the building” (Chia & Rasche, 
2011, p. 38): 
[A building worldview presupposes that] cognition and mental representation precede meaningful 
action. (Chia & Rasche, 2011, pp. 34–35, my italics) 
This stance is taken, since, from a “pre-cognitive separation between the actor [consultant] 
and the world [client]” (p. 38), the researcher has been tasked with recommending a certain 
course of action to companies for which “purposeful ‘interventions’ into the flow of reality to 
affect a desired outcome” (p. 38) have been developed. This expresses both the pre-eminence 
of explicit knowledge and the importance of taking a building world view toward 
management. 
On the other hand, as a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for more than fifteen years, the 
researcher’s major challenge has been to speed up deployment of strategic decisions and 
maximize corporate capacity for absorbing and solving the emergent challenges of a 
competitive and fast-changing business ecosystem. Thus, it is also true to state that the author 
has dwelled as someone “intimately immersed and inextricably intertwined with [her/his] 
surroundings in all its complex interrelatedness” (Chia & Rasche, 2011, p. 38). Equally true is 
that the researcher has carried through a modus operandi that reflects both the importance of 
tacit knowledge (Collins, 2010; Mutch, 2008; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and also intuition as 
a “quasi-identification with the object” (Kolakowski, 2001, p. 32): 
[A dwelling worldview assumes that] both the individual and society are viewed as mutually constitutive 
[…] [and] that individual agents [strategists] are so constituted by everyday social practices that they act 
and interact. (Chia & Rasche, 2011, p. 35, my italics) 
The author, therefore, has had to combine both the building and dwelling views of the world 
in which he works while also remaining committed to results, considering his responsibilities 
as CEO of a national segment of a multinational consulting firm. This has led him to explore 
the (dis)connections between building actions “guided by predefined goals” (Chia & Rasche, 
2011, p. 39) and dwelling actions “directed towards overcoming immediate impediment” (p. 
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39) during everydayness (Dreyfus, 1991). In short, he has always had to bear in mind the 
enactment/execution of a certain goal/decision, either i) regarding the object of professional 
service, as a consultant, or ii) regarding financial performance, as a CEO of a company 
belonging to a multinational organization listed on the stock exchange. 
In 2012, the author’s interest in execution/implementation started to acquire a decisive edge. 
He published two books that focus on the pragmatic facets of professional life: 
Fazer (Morgado, 2012a) – To Do in English – in which 200 heuristic implementation tactics are applied 
directly (although not exclusively) to the business context. These identified and illustrated with concrete 
situations in which paralysis should be overcome; and 
Gerrir (Morgado, 2012b) – “Gerrir” is a fusion between “Gerir” and “rir” ‒ in English to Manage and to 
Laugh, respectively. A study of the consciousness (reflection) of comic language/performance through 
eleven interviews, conducted among some of Portugal’s most popular comedians, illustrates how 
professional an artist must be ‒ namely by mastering the use of comic writing (building) and 
performance (dwelling) techniques – to deliver a spectacle that causes the most critical impact in terms 
of communication: to raise a laugh. 
Before the publication of these two volumes, another important book had already been 
launched and put on sale in bookshops in 2011. Titled O Riso em Bergson – mecanismos do 
cómico1 (Morgado, 2011), this volume explained the interaction between the building 
(mechanical), and the dwelling (living) worlds, through analysis of the mechanisms of 
laughter brought to light by Henri Bergson in 1900. 
This book, which resulted from the researcher’s Master’s dissertation in the Philosophy of 
Language, allowed an interest to develop in studying both the chasm and the link between 
thinking and acting, and particularly allowed an interest in the work of Henri Bergson to 
ripen: 
Henri Bergson was born in Paris on 18 October 1859 and died 3 January 1941. He was a philosopher who 
is best known for his work on intuition (a concept that endured throughout his entire oeuvre, but which 
was specially treated in Creative Mind, published 1934); duration (explained in Time and Free Will and 
Duration and Simultaneity, published 1889 and 1922, respectively); bodily (mechanical) and pure 
(pictorial) memories (differentiated in Matter and Memory, published 1896); Élan vital (a central 
element of Creative Evolution, published 1907); and laughter mechanisms (described in Laughter, 
                                                          
1 In English, Laughter in Bergson – Mechanisms of the Comic. 
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published 1900). All of these publications, amply applied throughout this project, are compiled in one 
volume entitled Oeuvres (Bergson, 2001) even while, hereafter, they are referenced separately. 
Maybe one of the most famous aphorisms of Bergson and certainly the most important 
regarding the current research is, “one must act like a man of thought [building] and think like 
a man of action [dwelling]” (Bergson, 2014, p. 461). 
In fact, “both ‘dwelling in’ and ‘stepping back’ are equally important in getting […] a 
cognitive dance going” (Ackermann, 2001, p. 447). This is because, “building [deciding] is 
not merely a means and a way towards dwelling [to execute] – to build [for executing] is in 
itself already to dwell [while deciding]” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 144). What is meant here, for 
example, is that there is decision in execution, since people do not act as automatons; and 
there is execution in decision, since to reach the latter ‒ in order for it to become compulsory 
‒ people have to interact during a decisional process and this includes overcoming the 
immediate impediments referred to above. 
The statement about the interwoven-ness between building and dwelling, and between 
decision and execution, is of the utmost importance. This is in order that the dynamic concept 
which underlies this project goes beyond corporate strategy as just a thing, like a strategic 
plan, and also in order that it reaches a point that embraces the idea of strategizing – “the use 
of the verb strategizing, meaning ‘to do strategy’” (Freedman, 2013, p. 563), or the practice of 
designing or implementing a strategy, as a verb, as action, which includes thinking. 
In an attempt to deal with the difficulties resulting from the dualities of strategy described 
above, this project has been built around a conceptual framework – in which “you put the 
concepts together as in a jigsaw puzzle [and] you work out how all the concepts fit together 
and relate to one another” (Fisher, 2010, p. 141) – that, on the one hand, i) builds a 
comprehensive interconnection between complementary notions extracted from all of 
Bergson’s main works, compiled in the volume Oeuvres (Bergson, 2001) – for which, for the 
sake of clarity, chapter titles have been translated from French to English and been included 
in the References – and, on the other hand, ii) relates these concepts to strategic managerial 
concepts. Figure 1, below, illustrates these links. 
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INTELLIGENCE
Strategic Tools
INSTINCT
Timely (Re)action
MEMORY
Corporate Culture
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Reflected Experience
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ÉLAN VITAL
Strategic Leadership
IMPROVISATION
Reflexive Solutions
LAUGHTER
Ruling Bureaucracy
“ INTERTUITION”
Frame-worked Rituals
Non BergsonianConcepts
 
Figure 1 ‒ Bergsonian concepts applied to strategy 
 
Although this work focuses on intuition and duration, being the two Bergsonian concepts 
chosen to cast light on the production and course of strategic action respectively, some brief 
comments about the overall framework are appropriate in order to do justice to the whole of 
Bergson’s oeuvre. Leadership and culture, in particular, are touched upon briefly in this 
overview. They have been extensively covered in the organizational and business literature 
and so their place in the overall framework is only discussed to the extent that they offer 
further understanding of intuition and duration. 
In the literature review, after an overview of the framework, the bulk of the chapter 
concentrates on elucidating intuition and duration, in order to frame the empirical exploration 
of these two concepts in strategic practice. 
Furthermore, given the “particular interest in the concept of intuition [that] has arisen in the 
field of strategic management” (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 400) and that “Bergson’s concept of 
duration and the nature of time remains to be applied to most areas of organizational studies” 
(Linstead, 2014, loc. 6426), in the current context, therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge the 
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importance of intuition and duration while strategizing, these being two of Bergson’s most 
emblematic concepts in grasping the relationship between thinking and acting and, as will be 
explained below, between decision and execution—for to think intuitively is to think in 
duration, which departs from movement2 [action3] (Bergson, 2001e, p. 1275). 
 
(1.1) Research topic 
The strategic question underlying the current research is: How can the formal gap between 
strategic decision and execution be reduced?  
And while the strategic question departs from the trivial “practice of analytically separating 
implementation from formulation and decision making […] that occurs in conventional 
studies of business strategy” (Sproull & Hofmeister, 1986, p. 44), the research aims to lessen 
this formal separation, namely by encouraging managers to acknowledge the importance of 
action that takes on a more responsive, humanized – and thus less bureaucratic and more 
easily implemented – and innovative way of thinking, by means of intuition that surges 
through the course of action. By doing so, the incentive might encourage managers to 
sympathize with this course of action by means of duration, a complex Bergsonian concept 
that hopefully will contribute to dissolving an artificial and very simplistic idea of strategy as 
i) a rigid and immobile plan followed, after a certain chronological moment, by ii) inflexible 
and long-lasting implementation. 
As noted by Simpson (2014), changing the focus to “novelty and creativity in the flow of 
experience leads to a distinctive conceptualization of duration in terms of continuity and 
change rather than the mere elapsing of time” (loc. 7651). In this new milieu, managers as 
strategists are invited to change their perspective from i) comparing a thing – a strategic plan 
– with its execution after a certain “elapsing of time”, which implies a comparison of realities 
                                                          
2 Movement: “The activities and whereabouts of someone during a particular period of time.” See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/movement (accessed 26/11/2016). 
3 Action: “The way in which something works or moves.” See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/action (accessed 
26/11/2016). 
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of different natures, to ii) trying to place the observer in the flow of strategic formation itself; 
as this work will try to explain. This shift is essential in order to understand how strategy is 
formed rather than adopted. 
 
(1.2) What is new about this project? 
In addition to a comprehensive and practical application of Bergson’s work to corporate 
strategy, and partially because of it, this research will explain the fusion between pairs, 
usually considered opposites during strategizing, and their contribution to reducing the above-
mentioned formal gap between decision and execution: 
• Building vs. dwelling: the pair of opposites which inspired and motivated the project; 
• Decision vs. execution: the pair which informs the strategic question; 
• Thought vs. action: the pair that symbolizes one of Bergson’s most famous aphorisms; 
• Intuition vs. intelligence: the pair that represents one of Bergson’s major contributions to 
reconciling the apparently opposing modes of decision making and knowledge creation. 
In other words, a specific research question will be formulated in order to understand how 
concepts, which are often considered as being separate during strategizing, such as decision 
vs. execution, are after all entangled in order to form strategy. By doing so, the researcher will 
try to reunite words that must be considered as if each of them had never been separated by 
analysis, taking us back to an old idea of Bergson around the colour orange: 
Let us take an example of a colour like orange. Taking it as a mixture of red and yellow, we can consider 
the orange-colour as yellow in one way and as red in another, and affirm that [orange] is a composite of 
yellow and red. But let us suppose that orange existing as such, neither yellow nor red had ever existed 
in the world: orange would then be a combination of these two colours? Obviously, not. (Bergson, 
2001g, pp. 1266–67) 
Of particular importance in gaining an understanding of how managers make strategic 
choices, is to reunite the concepts of intuition and intelligence; the former being of the utmost 
importance for this project – along with the illuminating concept of duration – the latter 
(intelligence) considered the rational, and maybe the most common mode of coming to a 
decision. The researcher will try to demonstrate that intelligence, as a tool (building), also 
intervenes before intuition in order to foster the utilitarian use of this faculty during action 
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(dwelling); a perspective that reverses and complements the most common direction, whereby 
intelligence intervenes almost exclusively at some subsequent stage – when intuition must be 
tested by analysis and calculation. 
The interwoven nature of intelligence and intuition, which Bergson helped establish, and 
which implies an uncommon convergence between typically opposite concepts, can be 
represented by the following diagram (Figure 2) and baptized by the neologism “intertuition”: 
INTUITION
Additive
Adjective
Incomplete
Mechanic
Rigid
IN
TE
R
TU
IT
IO
N
Processual
Multiplicative
Substantive
Complete
Living
Flexible
Material
INTELLIGENCE
 
Figure 2 ‒ “Intertuition” as the bridge between intelligence and intuition 
 
The concept of “intertuition”, which reunites sub-concepts that usually belong to opposite 
worlds/natures, as illustrated by Figure 2, although not used extensively throughout this 
project, will be explained in more detail below in the literature review. There, it will be 
integrated with a comprehensive analysis of Bergson’s work to suggest, as Johnson (2013) 
notes, that “the intuitive and logical sides of your mind are two-and-two” (loc. 44): that they 
are tools to foster intuitions that will be tested by analysis. 
The reunification of opposite pairs within corporate strategy is adjacent to Mintzberg (1987), 
who thirty years ago, had already pointed to this perspective when he wrote the following: 
Formulation and implementation merge into a fluid process of learning [intelligence] through which 
creative strategies evolve. […] In my metaphor, managers are craftsmen [intuition] and strategy is their 
clay. (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 66) 
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Nevertheless, Mintzberg, who metaphorically developed this view in his article Crafting 
strategy, pointed more to i) an exemplificative what instead of a comprehensive how, and to 
ii) strategy as a thing (clay) and not necessarily as a practice or as an immersion in the 
concept of duration, which as mentioned, casts light on what the course of action might mean. 
In fact, as noted above, being that duration is a time “experienced rather than measured” 
(Linstead, 2014, loc. 6176), and that “real duration is that duration which gnaws on things, 
and leaves on them the mark of its tooth” (Bergson, 2005, p. 576), use of this Bergsonian 
concept introduces a new perspective to strategic practice. This perspective replaces the 
distance between formulation and formation, measured after a certain period of chronological 
time, with a notion of the interplay between the two concepts. And this might be expressed as 
experiencing strategic progression, not as a thing followed by its execution, but as an activity 
– strategizing – that leaves the “mark of its tooth” in the strategy being created. 
Considering that the current work endeavours to bring the elusive philosophical perspective of 
intuition and duration closer to practice, it is expected that this combination of a Bergsonian, 
integrative, and dynamic view, applied to corporate strategy, might be considered an 
innovation brought to both business and academia by the current research. 
 
(1.3) Expected contributions of this project 
The potential beneficiaries of this research are managers as strategists, and members of 
academia. Some of the outcomes that might be of benefit to both parties are addressed below. 
The reference to the potential benefits will be proposed again in the Conclusion (see section 
5.2), where further development of this project’s new vision will be put forward. 
 
(1.3.1) Managers 
Managers may possibly reach an understanding of why decision and execution are not two 
separate entities through a better understanding of Bergson’s concepts – in particular intuition 
and its fusion with intelligence in duration. Strategists may also reach an understanding of the 
concept of strategy as a practice, where each step, and not only the final strategic plan, ought 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 13 
 
to be considered as a creator of strategy in itself, along a “time of consciousness (duration) 
[which] is inner, and immediate, experience—qualitative, heterogeneous, and dynamic” 
(Linstead, 2014, loc. 6178). 
To acknowledge this dynamism in strategizing is to be prepared to accept the condition of a 
dweller-reflective practitioner who faces a world definitely marked by the digital era, which 
almost certainly will bring the immediacy and instantaneity of a decision into the centre of 
everyone’s life. 
 
(1.3.2) Academia 
In fact, in an increasingly turbulent, complex, global business world that has witnessed the 
onset of the so-called digital era and is beginning to see its enormous potential impacts, 
academia may benefit from the theorization of the practical aspects of managerial life brought 
to light by the current research. 
The extensive managerial experience of the researcher, built on previous studies at both 
undergraduate and Master’s levels in management, law, and philosophy, as well as experience 
honed from having previously published seven volumes, will cast fresh light on existing 
views of professional life. The research will also make mention of the dual role the researcher 
himself assumes as both advisor/builder and CEO/dweller of a management and information 
technology consultancy – enlightening, and in some ways embodying, or representing, the 
very idea of a fusion between building and dwelling. 
As an additional and interrelated benefit, academia may also take advantage of an all-
inclusive and comprehensive application of Bergson’s theory in the field of management. As 
will become clearer in the literature review, Bergson’s work has only been used selectively in 
management literature; it is frequently deployed at an abstract theoretical level, making it 
difficult to see the practical application. In this respect, this research makes an original 
contribution in various ways that will become self-evident in Chapter 4, when the practice of 
strategizing is analysed and described through a Bergsonian lens. 
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(1.4) Relevant results from previous research 
Two pieces of research were developed during the earlier stages of this project. A brief 
summary of the qualitative and quantitative studies already undertaken that contributed to 
some of the content of the current document, is given below. 
 
(1.4.1) Qualitative Research 
Previous research (Morgado, 2015) utilized qualitative research interviews to examine and 
develop the suitability of Bergson’s concepts for strategizing: fifteen telephone interviews 
were conducted during March and April 2015. These were carried out among the most senior 
executives of a knowledge-intensive multinational company and included the following 
questions: 
• What moments/activities, either during a formal decision process/plan (building) or 
during execution/practice (dwelling), are recognized as strategizing? 
• What tools/artefacts and routines/rituals, if any, are used to assist the process of 
strategizing in each of its different moments/activities and what are their origins? 
• At which moments/activities are i) intelligence (strategic tools), ii) intuition (reflected 
experience), and iii) improvisation (reflexive solutions) highlighted? 
The main conclusions of the previous qualitative research highlighted i) the suitability of 
Bergson’s ideas for strategizing and ii) the importance of two topics for orienting further 
research. These topics are Strategy-as-Practice – for which several micro-strategizing 
practices were illustrated – when compared with a model-based “classic view” of strategy; 
and creative intuition, which, directly or indirectly, most interviewees admitted to using. 
Although duration was not in itself included as part of the aide-mémoires that supported the 
semi-structured interviews undertaken during the initial qualitative research phase of this 
thesis, the author felt it was necessary to further investigate this Bergsonian concept that 
seemed to promise reconciling or reuniting, in dynamism, the pairs presented above that are 
usually considered opposite or disparate. The motivation to further investigate the concept of 
duration and the seemingly opposite pairs arose from the interviews. The researcher detected 
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some “fluffiness” and an interchangeability of meaning during the interviews when talking 
about thinking, deciding, and intelligence on the one, hand and acting, executing, and 
intuition on the other; the latter sometimes used as a substitute for the word “experience”. 
In this context, and bearing in mind the requirements for i) going beyond intuition and also 
embracing duration and ii) clarifying the nature of the pairs belonging in the building and 
dwelling world views and to understand their possible relationships, the researcher felt 
compelled to develop an additional in-depth study of these concepts in the literature review, 
and also to extend the range of qualitative investigation. 
 
(1.4.2) Quantitative Research 
In precedent Quantitative Research (Morgado, 2016), a survey was carried out between 
October and November 2015, in which fifty-five people from the same knowledge-intensive 
company as the qualitative research mentioned in the preceding section, answered the 
correspondent questionnaire. 
It is usually accepted that with an option for a “self-completion questionnaire [a survey] is 
more or less simultaneously and inevitable to select an objectivist world view” (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011, p. 619), which somehow seems paradoxical when considered alongside the 
qualitative (constructionist/interpretivist) stance this project has adopted. Nevertheless, 
considering that “survey-based studies are often more exploratory than this view implies” (p. 
620), a constructionist approach, namely by including open questions in the questionnaire, 
was tied to the survey administered among those taking part. This was meant predominantly 
to generate new ideas about the topic under research, particularly by providing some open text 
boxes, although not intended to completely exclude the challenging of concepts already 
generated during the qualitative research. 
In the quantitative study, the following research questions, among others, were addressed: 
• What constitutes strategizing (a journey that leads to the definition and execution of a 
strategic vision)? 
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• What is the relationship between leadership, intuition, and organizational culture, and 
how important are these axes to strategizing? 
Interestingly, the results drew attention to the suggestion that even for a knowledge-intensive 
company (where intelligence is the current currency) – functioning in a very unpredictable 
and challenging environment – the persistence of easy-to-eliminate barriers for optimizing 
strategy is taken as a “fact of life”. Managers have to cope with the existent culture, maybe 
needing to manage a short-term focus based on monthly results that systematically postpone 
more structural changes – a management paralysis posture, which is well reflected in the 
French word “attentisme”,4 meaning remaining attentive while waiting, and represents a sort 
of refusal to act, a kind of obstruction to strategic duration. 
Additionally, through the open question: “In less than ten words, please name (up to) three 
possible sources of intuition in a business context”, valuable indications as to the sources of 
intuition were collected. The word cloud below extracts words in answer to the question about 
the sources of intuition, whereby the relative size of the words positively correlates to the 
number of references made by participants in the survey: 
 
Figure 3 – Word cloud for sources of intuition extracted from previous research 
                                                          
4 “Attentism” is a political practice or one taken by a union, or a personal attitude that consists of refusing to take the 
initiative and to determine oneself according to circumstances. See 
http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/attentisme/6250 (adapted, assessed 29/11/15). 
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The word cloud illustrates the words that survey participants linked most saliently to sources 
of intuition. These are “customers”, “competition”, “experience”, and “behaviour” (of people, 
of employees), while other clusters of salient words also centre around the follow-up of 
innovative market trends as well. This is a topic that will be examined in more depth over the 
course of the research. 
 
(1.5) Structure of this document 
Besides the Introduction, this document consists of four main chapters comprising, Literature 
Review; Methodology and Methods; Research Findings; and Conclusions. 
Chapter 2, Literature Review, starts with an exploration of the texts on Strategy-as-Practice, 
focusing on the differences and complementarities between i) decision and execution, in 
accordance with the strategic question, and ii) building and dwelling views of the world, a 
comparison that permeates this work (2.1). After centring the context in practice, the literature 
by Bergson is analysed in a comprehensive manner, giving rise to the conceptual framework 
underlying this project (2.2). Returning to the more modern literature, and drawing again on 
the writings of some Strategy-as-Practice thinkers, a section is devoted to complementary 
views of what are thought vs. action and intelligence vs. intuition, completing the context for 
analysing the interviews (2.3). To conclude, Chapter 2 will offer a comprehensive explanation 
of the concept of duration, based on six constituents, or components, that bring additional 
clarity to this complex topic by drawing on the idea of capturing and holding attention 
towards a strategic course of action (2.4). 
Chapter 3, Methodology and Methods, begins to express the methodological implications of 
using Bergson’s theories, clarifying why qualitative research was selected as the approach of 
natural choice for a project that deals with a question that is eminently social – since 
strategizing comprises a series of (subjective) conversations among managers and their 
stakeholders (3.1). Secondly, Chapter 3 justifies why qualitative interviewing, based on single 
and triple interviews, conducted among fifteen CEOs belonging to various sectors in different 
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geographic regions and facing different business challenges, was elected as the method for the 
project. Here, some of the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of this option are elucidated, 
and a description is given on how the interviews were administered (3.3) and subsequently 
analysed and interpreted (3.3). 
Chapter 4, Research Findings, summarizes the results of the conduct, analysis, and 
interpretation of the qualitative interviews carried out, and signals the limitations of the 
current research. The findings are divided into two parts: an analysis of how participants deal 
with the concept of intuition in their practical lives while strategizing; and a complementary 
view of strategizing as a sequence of decision/action loops along which strategy is formed in 
duration, namely by paying close attention to the business ecosystem and organizational 
politicking, both of which are seen as crucial constituents of strategizing (4.2). 
Chapter 5, Conclusions, synthesizes the major contributions of this project (5.1), and, building 
on it, highlights its major benefits to both managers and academia, identifying possible areas 
for further research (5.2). 
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2. Literature Review 
The literature review is structured as follows: first (in section 2.1), in order to contextualize 
the importance of action in corporate strategy as mentioned earlier, the first section presents 
the contribution of the more recent Strategy-as-Practice literature in order to provide an 
understanding of what constitutes strategizing: i.e. the actors, practices, and activities that 
form it. This section will be divided into two sub-sections: one casting light on the decision 
vs. execution pair; and the other illuminating the building vs. dwelling pair, as applied to 
Strategy-as-Practice. 
The second section (2.2), draws on a much older corpus of literature that has not previously 
been adequately explored in this context and which it is felt might have important insights for 
Strategy-as-Practice, as well as for a better understanding of how a dynamic view of 
strategizing has the potential to reconcile the usually disconnected elements of the building 
and dwelling world views. This section of the literature review will present the most salient of 
Bergson’s concepts and look into their relationship with different components of corporate 
strategy. Why the researcher turned to Bergson and his philosophic concepts has already been 
presented briefly in the introduction and the reasons will be made clearer below. Nevertheless, 
there is one overriding reason, more important than any of the others in this context, which 
should be clarified from the outset in this literature review. This is the implicit exploration of 
connections between the Bergsonian concepts applied (presented in Figure 1) and the 
potential parallel connections with managerial/strategic concepts that have been interwoven 
with philosophical ones. Put in another way, Bergson’s concepts will act as “the mechanisms 
that drive events in the world” (Fisher, 2010, p. 21, my italics) of strategizing, as a critical 
realist5 might argue, although not all of these connections are treated in the current work 
because the intention in the here and now is to focus on Bergson’s concepts of intuition and 
duration. 
                                                          
5 “Critical realists argue that there is a level of reality below the everyday levels of events and our experiences of them. It is 
at this level that the mechanisms that drive events in the world exist” (Fisher, 2010, p. 21, my italics). 
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Thirdly (see section 2.3), drawing on the literature review related to the theoretical work of 
Bergson, as well as on more recent literature, the focus will be on intuition, considered a pillar 
of this project, and on adjacent concepts that examine that concept both in its interactions with 
intelligence and throughout the dialectic of thought vs. action. 
The final section in this chapter (2.4) will address the concept of duration, considered the 
second Bergsonian pillar of this project. This section will leverage additional perspectives 
brought by authors other than Bergson and will notably establish, in effect, a communication 
channel that opens the way for research into duration – usually captured through 
experience/intuition and not through language/intelligence. This in-depth study of duration is 
pivotal to an understanding of strategy formation: how strategizing evolves over a certain 
period of time, and the changes that may occur through emergent strategies with regard to the 
initial strategic intent. This section will point to duration, regarded as strategic intensity or 
thickness, as something that can fail during strategizing; and not the difference, the gap, 
between something that has been thought out/decided and activated/implemented. At the end 
of this section a framework will be presented depicting the different constituents of duration 
that have arisen from the fusion between the literature review and the research work. 
For Strategy-as-Practice and for intuition – but not for duration, for which, as mentioned, a 
specific and separate framework was developed – and with the intention of clarifying some 
potentially elusive concepts, the researcher adopted an analytical scheme based on the 
apparently opposite pairs mentioned in the introduction. This relational scheme, which 
naturally will be explained in more depth in the following pages, can be represented as 
follows: 
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BUILDING (Architectural)
Intelligence
(Analytical)
Thought
(Reflective)
Decision
(Deliberative)
DWELLING (Practical)
Intuition
(Experiential)
Action
(Experimental)
Execution
(Emergent)
  
Figure 4 ‒ Connections with apparently opposite pairs from building and dwelling perspectives 
Naturally, several research questions will emerge from the literature review, namely one that 
specifically addresses these pairs. These will be positioned just after this chapter, serving as 
the bridge and context for the chapter on methodology and methods (Chapter 3). 
At this stage a remark is due regarding the main “theoretical approaches” (Seidl & 
Whittington, 2014, p. 1407) underlying this work. Concerning Strategy-as-Practice, a special 
focus is put on the Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009) perspective, which defends the position 
that: “in their micro-level activities, strategists make use of general strategizing practices such 
as particular techniques and tool-usages” (Seidl & Whittington, 2014, p. 1410). Jarzabkowski 
and Spee (2009) also draws on Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens, 2013), which explains 
the dialectic between structure (macro) and agent (micro). These views are complemented by 
Herepath’s (2014) contribution “to rethink the interplay of structure and agency in strategy 
formation and strategizing” (p. 858), namely by acknowledging that although that there are 
“structural and cultural features which characterize the strategic arena [structural 
conditioning]” (p. 869), agents, who have the “potential to live ‘contradictory lives’” (p. 873), 
have the liberty to … 
Identify the forms of strategic negotiation and exchange which characterize the strategic arena, focused 
upon power induced compliance, reciprocal exchange, and the harmonization of desire, and determine 
how these shape the ensuing strategic direction. (Herepath, 2014, p. 869, my italics) 
In other words, and as will be clarified during a presentation of the framework of duration, 
agents/strategists are at liberty to choose certain courses of action while dwelling in certain 
(structural and cultural) buildings. What is more, agents/strategists have the capacity to “give 
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rise to structural, cultural and agential elaboration or reproduction” (Herepath, 2014, p. 869), 
i.e. have the capacity to build new buildings or new practices that will shape new dwellings 
and praxes, as section 2.1.2 and 2.4.2 will explain. In addition to these theoretical approaches 
to Strategy-as-Practice, Chia & Holt’s relationalism (Chia & Holt, 2006) and Wittgenstein’s 
language games (Wittgenstein, 2001) will be used, notably to explain the creative power of 
dwelling and building, respectively. 
Finally, the use of Bergson is coherent with a process philosophy (Linstead, 2014) and with 
the interviewing method used in the qualitative research, which was conducted following a 
constructionist stance (see Chapter 3) and follows Bergson’s view that knowledge, as 
strategy, is constructed through the individual contributions of many inventors who create a 
reality rather than discover it (Bergson, 2001e, p. 1447). Furthermore, as this project is 
expected to demonstrate, and in awareness of the danger of any tautological reasoning, it is 
specifically this use of a process/dynamic philosophy that permits regrouping the different 
theoretical perspectives mentioned above, namely through the concepts of intuition, of its 
counterpart intelligence and of duration, which are central to this work. 
 
(2.1) Strategy-as-Practice 
Strategy-as-Practice “is concerned with the doing of strategy; who does it, what they do, how 
they do it, what they use and what implications this has for shaping strategy” (Jarzabkowski 
& Spee, 2009, p. 69): i.e. as Johnson et al. (2003) note, “what managers actually do, and with 
what techniques” (p. 12). These include “SWOT6 or technologies such as flipcharts, 
computers and software” (Whittington, 2007, p. 1579). 
Strategy-as-Practice deals with different aspects of “strategizing: how strategists think, talk, 
reflect, act, interact, emote, embellish and politicize” (Jarzabkowski, 2005, p. 3), while 
“arbitrating, advocating, analysing, and advising” (Whittington, 1996, p. 732). 
                                                          
6 SWOT confronts (a company’s) Internal Strengths and Weaknesses with (the environment’s) External Opportunities and 
Threats. 
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This discipline, and its “growing engagement with activity [which] fits with a wider ‘practice 
turn’ in contemporary social theory, [and has been] gathering momentum since the 1980s” 
(Whittington, 2006, p. 614), shifts the focus of strategic preparedness from the competitive 
company and the correspondent strategy to the competent strategist and strategizing, turning 
attention to “the actors on whose skills and initiative activity depends” (Whittington, 2006, p. 
615): 
The practice perspective on strategy focuses on strategists and strategizing, rather than organizations 
and strategies. […] The practice perspective on strategy shifts concern from the core competence of the 
corporation to the practical competence of the manager as strategist. (Whittington, 1996, pp. 731–32, 
my italics) 
Strategy-as-Practice, by placing emphasis on “people’s actual activity ‘in practice’” 
(Whittington, 2006, p. 615), is related to Bergson’s theories inasmuch as the former centres its 
research on manager’s actions while strategizing – and not just static decision models – and, 
as will be seen later, the latter sets Bergson’s work around the idea of movement (Bergson, 
2001d) and duration, from which derives intuitive thinking (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1275). 
  
(2.1.1) Decision (deliberative) vs. execution (emergent) 
Adopting a dynamic view of the world, and especially when “formal strategic planning has 
been under attack for many years” (Whittington, 2006, p. 618, my italics), it is not surprising 
that the current research considers the real practice of strategy in more depth when compared 
to a classical (Whittington, 2001) and traditional idea of strategy based on decisional, 
deliberative,7 theoretical models, like those developed by Ansoff (Martinet, 2007), Porter 
(1979), and others, and included by Mintzberg et al. (2009) in what these authors call the 
positioning school: strategy formation as an analytical process. “The traditional [classical] 
view is that managers carefully choose a strategy [ex ante], formulate well-specified goals [ex 
ante], establish clear and quantifiable objectives [ex ante], and determine the most effective 
way to reach them [ex ante]” (Wagner, 2002, p. 49). This vision embraces the “idea of 
                                                          
7 Deliberative: “Relating to or intended for consideration or discussion”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/deliberation (accessed 13/5/2017). 
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strategy as a deliberated, top-down process that was the purview of senior management” 
(Freedman, 2013, p. 563). According to this perspective, the process of coming to a decision 
is linked to a “[previously] deliberated conscious set of guidelines that determines [other] 
decisions into the future” (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 935, my italics); or has a focus on 
“deliberation [that in turn] entails consideration or planning” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 
999). In this respect, Mintzberg asks a provocative and somewhat rhetorical question: 
“First we think, then we act. We formulate, then we implement. The progression seems so perfectly 
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Another perspective offers an alternative with emphasis on execution, considered as practice 
and action – or “to do the things that tend towards the mark [a movement toward concrete 
action] that we have set before ourselves” [(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 999) citing 
(Aristotle, 1985)]. The expectation is that by dissecting the strategic question from a practice 
or implementation view, the above-mentioned more theoretical ex ante panorama, which 
places decision and plan first, will be complemented: 
[A panorama in which] implementation, conventionally thought of as what happens after a [ex ante] 
decision has been reached […], has not received the same attention from organizational theory as has 
decision making, […] [even because] decision making is glamorous, exciting, even heroic. 
Implementation is not romantic; it is nuts and bolts, details, and mundane problems. (Sproull & 
Hofmeister, 1986, p. 43) 
Additionally, in order to overcome a perspective in which one moment and what happens after 
that moment becomes paramount – a disconnected perspective that is representative of the 
“classical school” –, an alternative view of strategy that fuses formulation8 and formation,9 as 
the neighbours of decision and execution, will be privileged. In fact, for Mintzberg: 
Mintzberg (1978) contrasts intention (actions) vs. reality (facts), on the one hand, and formulation vs. 
formation, on the other. If reality does diverge from intention, i.e. is non-deliberate, this is because 
during the formation process some strategic directions i) are rejected (unrealized) while some 
unanticipated strategies ii) are elected (emergent). Additionally, as the precedent citation made clear, 
Mintzberg admits that a learning process occurs during strategy formation; that, it may be suggested, 
leads to strategy (re)formulation. In this context, it is acknowledged that execution is no longer simply a 
set of actions that implements what has been decided, but, remarkably, a set of actions that, when 
                                                          
8 Formulation is “the action of creating or preparing something”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/formulation (accessed 20/11/2016). 
9 Formation is “the action of forming or process of being formed”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/formation (accessed 20/11/2016). 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 25 
 
assisted by strategic reflection, decides (formulates) alongside the strategic formation process. 
(Morgado, 2014, p. 12) 
The following section will clarify this idea that strategic decision is emergent10 during 
execution as well, specifically because “as soon as questions of implementation came in, it 
was evident that micro level decisions could influence the macro level performance” 
(Freedman, 2013, p. 563): 
In practice, of course, all strategy walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent. For just as 
purely deliberate strategy making precludes learning, so purely emergent strategy making precludes 
control. (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 69, my italics) 
Furthermore, this view encompasses “conversation [a common feature during strategizing, 
including during execution, which] is the site of organizational emergence” (Weick, 2009, p. 
200, my italics), even because “it is undisputed that when we observe managers/strategists at 
work, what we see is a lot of talk” (Samra-Fredericks, 2003, p. 143, my italics). In other 
words, “strategies are simultaneously co-constructed relationally through direct engagement 
with the world they [managers] inhabit […]” (Chia & Holt, 2006, p. 637). “Conversations 
create organizational [and strategic] reality; they don’t just represent an entity that is already 
there” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015, p. 36, my italics). From this perspective, “acting 
strategically is as much an instinctual, habitual and unthought response to [practical] 
experience as it is a deliberate, planned effort” (Chia & Holt, 2009, p. 112, my italics). 
All in all, considering that “strategy making must above all take the form of [a] process 
learning over time, in which, at the limit, formulation and implementation become 
indistinguishable” (Mintzberg et al., 2009, p. 217), by using a perspective that focuses on 
formation rather than just on formulation … 
[i.e., evolve from a] strategy that involved central direction and control based on an original plan [to] 
one that [is] about learning and adaption. (Freedman, 2013, p. 555) 
… it is expected that “the overarching promise of this practice approach to strategy is a 
societal shift towards better every day strategizing praxis, empowered by more effective 
                                                          
10 Emergent: “Arising as an effect of complex causes and not analysable simply as the sum of their effects”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/emergent (accessed 13/5/2017). 
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practices and a deeper pool of skilled practitioners” (Whittington, 2006, p. 629). It is this 
interplay among practitioners, practices, and praxis (action) that will be analysed below. 
 
(2.1.2) Building (architectural) vs. dwelling (practical) 
As Jarzabkowski and Spee state, the Strategy-as-Practice arena “has defined its broad research 
parameters as studying: practitioners (those people who do the work of strategy); practices 
(the social, symbolic, and material tools through which strategy work is done); and praxis (the 
flow of activity in which strategy is accomplished)” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 70). 
Consequently, having defined the main elements of strategizing, it is important that these be 
placed within the broader context of building and dwelling, considered two crucial 
perspectives of this project. 
Practitioners 
In general, “practitioners are strategy’s actors, the strategists who both perform this activity 
and carry its practices. […] those who do the work of making, shaping and executing 
strategies” (Whittington, 2006, p. 619). Practitioners may belong to the organization in which 
strategizing takes place or be external to it: 
A practitioner could be external […]. External actors include consultants, gurus and institutional actors, 
such as chamber of industry and commerce, regulators, trade unions, media or other interest groups 
(such as environmentalists). (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 72) 
Apart from performing the direct activities related to strategizing while dwelling, analysed in 
praxis, practitioners’ duties involve the building of practices, analysed below … 
Practitioners ‒ people ‒ are central in reproducing, transferring and occasionally innovating strategy 
practices (Whittington, 2006, p. 625) 
… even though it is “hard to separate one particular ‘practice’ from the interwoven fabric of 
practices” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 81). 
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The current research concentrates on CEO’s views about strategizing. Nevertheless, as 
became explicit during the interviews, other levels of the organization are also important 
agents of strategy formulation and formation. In this context, throughout this work, 
practitioners will be called managers, strategists, agents, and leaders, according to the 
function(s) they fulfil. 
After having clarified who will be considered the authors/agents of strategizing – the 
practitioners –, the following text will analyse their practices and praxis. 
Practices (building) 
Considering that “the use of these practices is essential to the doing of strategy” (Stander & 
Pretorius, 2016, p. 3) and that these … 
refer to the routines and norms of strategy work. […] For example, analytical techniques such as SWOT 
or technologies such as flipcharts, computers and software […]. These routines and tools are the stuff of 
strategy, without which strategy work could hardly happen. (Whittington, 2007, p. 1579, my italics) 
… it is inevitable that they are compared to a building-, architectural11 view of strategizing 
that privileges a study centred on “the tools and methods of strategy-making” (Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012, p. 285, my italics), on … 
how the practice of strategizing is being framed by, and framing, the perceptions, views and mental 
models of leaders as they strategize [and] on strategizing methodologies and tools [i.e. SWOT, BCG 
matrices, McKinsey 7’S, Ansoff’s matrix, Balanced Scorecard] that ‘mediate’ (i.e. guide) strategy 
knowledge formation. (Jarratt & Stiles, 2010, p. 29, my italics) 
… and which is particularly concerned with the strategic tools: frameworks, concepts, models, 
and methods (Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2014), suitable for creating strategy and to “support 
[correspondent] collective knowledge production and learning” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, 
p. 297), but also “language [which] is used by strategists to establish meanings and create a 
‘discourse of direction’” (Samra-Fredericks, 2003, p. 142). In fact, apart from Jarzabkowski 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Jarzabkowski, Spee, & Smets, 2013; Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 
2014), Whittington (2006; 2014), or Samra-Fredericks (2004; 2003; 2005) – authors who in 
                                                          
11 Architectural: “Relating to the art or practice of designing and constructing buildings”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/architectural (accessed 14/5/2017).  
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contrast to Mintzberg might, for instance, be considered as belonging to the core group of 
Strategy-as-Practice theorists –, other authors such as Leonardi (2013), Eppler and Platts 
(2009), d’Aveni (1995), Teece et al. (1997), Moisander and Stenfors (2009), and Cabantous et 
al. (2010) sustain the argument of the importance of artefacts or tools to ascribe greater 
professionalism to strategizing. 
Practices can be of various types and different natures, “not just obvious ones such as strategy 
reviews and off-sites, but also those embedded in academic and consulting tools (Porterian 
analysis, hypothesis testing etc.)” (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008, p. 101, my italics):  
In some accounts, influential practices originate almost by immaculate conception. Thus, Michael Porter 
[…] describes his concept of ‘generic strategies’, defining a whole new set of analytical practices, as an 
‘eleventh hour’, logic-driven addition to his famous book Competitive Strategy. (Whittington, 2006, p. 
624) 
Strategy models that are used in everyday strategy jargon, such as a SWOT analysis, the five forces 
model and the Boston Consulting Group […] matrix. (Stander & Pretorius, 2016, p. 3)  
Apart from the “immaculate models” put forward by well-known authors on strategy, and by 
consultants, practices also include material artefacts and technology … 
[Practice] such as PowerPoint presentations and flipcharts, used in performing the action of strategising. 
(Stander & Pretorius, 2016, p. 3); and “PowerPoint and Excel, project management software, the 
analytics of Big Data and the new social media” (Whittington, 2014, p. 90) 
… and “the background knowledge of the specific practitioner” (Stander & Pretorius, 2016, p. 
3, my italics), socially framed by organizational, cultural, or even sectorial buildings 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2015), which Whittington illustrates as follows: 
‘Practices’ will refer to shared routines of behaviour, including traditions, norms and procedures for 
thinking, acting and using ‘things’, this last in the broadest sense. […] Practices might be organization 
specific, embodied in the routines, operating procedures and cultures […] that shape local modes of 
strategizing. […] For example, there may be sectorial practices, such as the routines of environmental 
scanning defined by shared cognitive maps […] or norms of appropriate strategic behaviour set by 
industry recipes. (Whittington, 2006, pp. 619–20) 
Moisander and Stenfors (2009) highlight an aspect of correctness in practices, stating that 
strategy tools that are “introduced in practice through business schools, consultants, popular 
business articles and strategy literature” (p. 228) “impose correct behaviours and foster good 
practices” (p. 230, my italics) capable of creating competitive/strategic advantage: 
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strategic advantage is achieved by providing managers with ‘correct information’, ‘optimal choices’ and 
‘efficient options’ [and that] the role of strategy tools is to foster dialogue, to help to elaborate on new 
ideas and to bring about critical views. (Moisander & Stenfors, 2009, pp. 238–39, my italics) 
In turn, this view of competitive advantage has links to one of the values ascribed to intuition, 
which, as will later be analysed, is the creation of the “truly new”, that Jarzabkowski and 
Wilson (2006) associate with expressions such as “disrupting”, “new areas”, “surprise”, and 
“innovation”: 
competitive advantage is based upon a guerrilla logic of continuously disrupting current positions and 
strategies in order to generate new areas of advantage […] resorting [to] tools and tactics associated 
with speed, surprise, innovation and flexibility. (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006, p. 353, my italics) 
Although this work defends the idea of a strategic need for real innovation (Bergson, 2001e, 
p. 1276), or the “truly new” (Dane & Pratt, 2009), created by intuition, and fosters … 
attention on practices that have a ‘strategic’ role in the sense that they form the basis of organizational 
success or survival – as in the case of routines or capabilities serving to create competitive advantage. 
(Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 313, my italics) 
…, the aptness of specific “strategic” practices to foster competitive advantage is not part of 
the current study. This is because even “competitive advantage” 12 might be considered 
nothing more than an analytical and abstract military metaphor: 
abstract and analytical […] structural perspective […] [that appeals to] military metaphors for strategic 
thinkers […] in which strategists build positional fortresses […] to try and protect their firm from 
competitors. (Cunha et al., 2012, p. 266, my italics) 
Consequently, in the current work, competitive advantage and competitive strategy will 
always be preceded by the word “potential”, since the conceptual cause-and-effect “recipes” 
that could be brought by an immaculate model – sometimes marked by “fads and fashions” 
(Freedman, 2013, p. 562) – may not be as important as studying the contribution i) of intuition 
for strategizing, the correctness of which needs to be “confirmed” by analysis or 
experience/result, and ii) of duration, which, conceptually, does not admit to the causality 
between a specific action and an inexorable result – contradicting “the myth that there were 
                                                          
12 Competitive Advantage is “a condition or circumstance that puts a company in a favourable or superior business 
position.” See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/competitive_advantage (accessed 3/12/2016). 
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reliable rules for success that once discovered could ensure the success of a business” 
(Freedman, 2013, p. 569). 
In addition, the word “practice” is not used with the exact same meaning throughout. It will 
not always, as in this section, be used to convey for example a “method/tool”, but will also be 
used as a word which embraces practices in sensu lato, i.e. also denoting strategic activities in 
the sense of praxis, or “actual activity”. “Practice” only in sensu stricto, i.e. in the sense of 
building, or the sense that “practices shape strategy praxis” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 
83), will be extensively associated with Bergson’s concept of intelligence, explained below in 
later sections. 
Praxis (dwelling) 
Considering that “praxis refers to the stream of activity in which strategy is accomplished 
over time” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 73, my italics), inevitably praxis is linked to action 
and duration … 
This flow of activity is, however, not only in a singular direction, as these actions might run parallel, 
might intersect, might diverge from or depend on each other or even collide. (Stander & Pretorius, 2016, 
p. 3, my italics) 
… and to compare it to a dwelling-, practical13 view of strategizing that puts analysis “at 
levels of the individual or group’s experience of a specific episode, such as a decision, 
meeting or workshop” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 73, my italics) … 
the Greek word ‘praxis’ refers to actual activity, what people do in practice. […] The domain of praxis is 
wide, embracing the routine and the non-routine, the formal and the informal, activities at the 
corporate centre and activities at the organizational periphery. […] Praxis is an artful and improvisatory 
performance. (Whittington, 2006, pp. 619–20) 
The notion that “we build […] because we dwell […] we are dwellers” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 
146) has already been noted, but it is a critical notion that gets to the nub of the challenge of 
combining worlds/pairs of different natures, for when strategizing is grasped processually/ 
dynamically, neither the manager (as if s/he was the painter) nor the strategy (the painted 
                                                          
13 Practical: “Of or concerned with the actual doing or use of something rather than with theory and ideas”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/practical (accessed 14/5/2017). 
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mountain), as noted by Helin et al. (2014), “act upon the world; [but] both are implicated with 
one another, pulled along and mixed within the fluidity of the fact” (loc. 206): 
Actors are conceived of not as atomized individuals, but rather as active respondents within nested and 
overlapping systems (which we prefer to call temporal-relational contexts); the construction of temporal 
perspectives is fundamentally an intersubjective process, constituted by the ability to hold 
simultaneously to one’s own and to another’s viewpoint. Actors develop their deliberative capacities as 
they confront emergent situations that impact upon each other and pose increasingly complex 
problems, which must be taken up as challenges by the responsive (and communicative) intelligence. 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 969, my italics) 
In order to interact with other people, within “an intersubjective process”, practitioners 
develop conversations (Archer, 2003) – “the culmination of sociality in communicative 
interaction, in which social meanings and values develop out of the capacity to take on the 
perspectives of (concrete and generalized) others” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 969) – 
while … 
Planning, Rehearsing, Mulling-over [dwelling upon a problem/situation], Deciding, Re-living, Prioritising, 
Imagining [the future, including ‘what should happen if …’], Clarifying, Imaginary conversations, [and] 
Budgeting [including money, time, and effort]. (Archer, 2003, p. 161, my italics) 
That is to say, managers develop joint activities, including strategizing, “much of which is 
accomplished through talk” (Samra-Fredericks, 2003, p. 141). By doing so, through 
relationalism (Chia & Holt, 2006) – which “acknowledges the latent primacy of relations and 
practices over the individual or organization” (p. 638) –, managers amplify/modify their 
individual strategic will/intention, creating ideas that would not be brought to the strategic 
puzzle if these fruitful interactions were absent (Hayashi, 2001), i.e. if not through collective 
intelligence (Mataric, 1993). This relationalism also embraces what Jarzabkowski et al. 
(2015) call “rationality”, or “relation(s) among practices (patterns of activities) that construct 
a facet of the market” (p. 207) as a whole, i.e. relations with stakeholders. Chia and Mackay 
(2007) explore “a discernible pattern emerging in a stream of actions” when managers 
manage while dwelling (Heidegger, 2001), while being-in-the-world (Dreyfus, 1991). This 
view is coherent with a Bergsonian perspective, since: 
The world is presented as what Bergson calls an extensive manifold, a region of things in relation to one 
another. […] [Something that] can be very complex, and changeable. (Helin et al., 2014, loc. 422) 
According to this view, strategy is seen as process and emergence (Mintzberg et al., 1976; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and not just as some static formula/recipe, in 
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the sense of “procedural strategising” (Jarzabkowski, 2008); a chain of decisions that leads to 
the formation of a response to a strategic problem/opportunity. Throughout this process, 
managers’ activities are all but scientific, since, as Mintzberg et al. (1976) note, social 
routines, such as control, communication, and politics – which Mutch (2013) considers “an 
element of structure […], as setting the conditions for action, as providing logics for that 
action” (p. 2) – and time constraints, like scheduling, feedback, comprehension, 
synchronization, and reiteration, all come into play. This, in turn, creates a potential gap 
between intended and realized strategy (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). 
Moreover, strategies may sometimes be generated by some sort of retroactive baptism – “this 
is strategy” – implicit in the legitimation of, as Baker et al. (2003) note, “past tactical 
improvisations as if they had been parts of a coherent forward-looking strategy” (p. 262). To 
put this in another way, the purpose of a manager’s activities during a strategic process – 
which “can be purposive [actions and not just facts] without the actor having in mind a 
purpose” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 93) – might be found at an ulterior stage. This can include the 
stage of i) unexpected results generated by activities performed on their own: “everyday 
practical coping action can produce unexpected strategically important outcomes” (Chia & 
Holt, 2006, p. 643); but also ii) “inarticulate and even the oftentimes unconscious aspects of 
strategy-making” (Chia & MacKay, 2007, p. 237), which might influence “strategy-making 
on an everyday basis [that] takes place unreflectively, on-the-spot and in the twinkle-of-an-
eye” (p. 238).  
But is this strategy or improvisation? The question could be conceptually dissolved by the 
logical impossibility that impedes the marriage between improvisation and strategy: in fact, 
since strategy is a “future oriented” activity (Jarzabkowski, 2005) and “im-provisation” is the 
negation (“im”) of planning and premeditation (Weick, 1998), then the two terms (strategy 
and improvisation) are (potentially) incompatible. 
Nevertheless, the reactive/improvisational role of managers as disturbance handlers 
(Mintzberg, 1973) exists, and so the potential paradox must be dissolved. Cunha et al. (2012) 
suggest a solution, by comparing improvisation to: 
‘real time foresight’, i.e. the discovery of opportunities and threats still in the making and the translation 
of this discovery to action at the right time. (p. 267) 
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According to a real time foresight perspective, therefore, improvisation can no longer be 
considered as strategic disbanding or dispersion. Rather it ought to be seen as a sort of 
strategic jazz-banding that claims room for enrichment in order to achieve an intended 
strategic performance, anchored on a certain head: a strategic vision (Hatch, 1999). 
To express this point differently, if “strategic ‘intent’ is viewed as immanent [inborn] in every 
adaptive action” (Chia & Holt, 2006, p. 635), due to managers having a top (main theme) in 
mind, and thus, as Parikh et al. (1994) note, “lead[ing] and creat[ing] simultaneously without 
losing the beat or the direction of the overall composition” (p. 20), improvisation, considered 
as adaptation/adoption of a vision, therefore, is compatible with strategy. 
The word “praxis” is not often used in the current work. Instead, to define what managers do 
while strategizing, words like “activity”, “practice”, or “action”, are used. 
In summary, this section (2.1) has seen an unusual perspective adopted regarding the pair 
decision vs. execution. The perspective adopted here focuses on facets of these that previously 
have received less attention from organizational theory: execution, in the sense of practicality, 
as opposed to decision, in the sense of a model, or a plan. Nevertheless, as noted, once the 
Strategy-as-Practice theory is analysed, the idea surfaces that a lot of decision making, 
formulation, emerges out of conversation and its neighbouring concept relationalism. 
Some investigation was undertaken into practices and praxis, used in the sense of building vs. 
dwelling, respectively, in order to understand exactly how practitioners organize this creative 
combination of decision and execution. This investigation led to the conclusion that it is 
through strategic practice that managers create the conditions for purposeful praxis, which is 
quite different from improvisation, management-by-surprise, or an instinctual by-reaction. In 
turn, through praxis, managers also learn how to fine-tune or change practices in an 
informed/educated virtuous circle. 
The ascertainment of a mutually reinforced interaction between building and dwelling is 
developed further below in the next section (2.2), namely in the form of a respective 
interaction between intelligence and intuition. Here it is explained how the philosophical work 
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of Bergson, and its underlying processual/dynamic view of the world, can build on the 
understanding of how apparently opposite pairs can, after all, be reunited. 
 
(2.2) Bergsonian concepts applied to strategy  
The appeal to Bergson in the managerial literature is rather limited, “with only a handful of 
articles making reference to several of his works” (Mutch, 2016, p. 2, my italics). 
In fact, in the majority of literature cited in the current research, only partial aspects of 
Bergson’s work were the focus. For example, Dörfler and Ackermann (2012) appeal to 
Bergson to explain intuition in itself; Chia and Holt (2009) use Bergson to explain practice as 
a “negotiated relationship between the depiction and the depicted” (p. 131) ‒ that is, between 
the act14 and the product.15 Helin et al. (2014) reference Bergson to explain processual 
philosophy and the correspondent dynamism, in duration, of reality – “receiving the situation 
so that one belongs to it, become with the event of ‘painting it’” (loc. 251). This is a concept 
that approaches Shotter’s (2006) thinking about “a relationally-responsive form of 
understanding – or a withness16 understanding – to contrast it with the representational-
referential (or aboutness) understandings” (p. 590, my italics). Lastly, Linstead (2014) 
presents Bergson’s key ideas, but does not make an all-inclusive connection between them 
explicitly. 
The expectation in taking this approach is that two major weaknesses of the current literature 
may be bridged: i) the incomplete and non-interconnected use of Bergson’s concepts applied 
to managerial activity and ii) the limited involvement of these concepts with concrete 
managerial practice, and specifically with corporate strategy. 
 
                                                          
14 As in the act of strategizing. 
15 As in a strategy. 
16 “Withness” with an “h” and not “witness”. 
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(2.2.1) Intuition and adjacent concepts 
In this section, intuition will be treated together with two other Bergsonian concepts: duration 
and memory. 
Intuition 
Intuition penetrates the entire Bergson oeuvre. It is treated in detail in Creative Mind 
(Bergson, 2001g), which dedicates one chapter to “The Perception of Change” and another to 
“The Pragmatism of William James – Truth and Reality”. The same volume also deals with i) 
“Philosophical Intuition” – in a chapter where the essence of philosophy is defined as the 
spirit of simplicity (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1362), which, in duration, lives (in) an intuitive life (p. 
1364) capable of capturing reality in movement (p. 1363) – and ii) in an “Introduction to 
Metaphysics”, which places intuition as something absolute, that penetrates things, 
sympathizing with them, through an effort of the imagination that requires no symbols, rather 
than as something relative, which revolves around objects and just sees them from different 
perspectives, and partial effort (p. 1393): 
Let us consider a character of a romance in relation to which adventures are narrated […]. Description, 
history, and analysis leave me in the relative. Only coincidence with the person her/himself could give 
me the absolute. […] The absolute can only be reached by intuition […]: the sympathy by which one 
places her/himself into the interior of an object, to coincide with it, which is of the unspeakable. 
(Bergson, 2001g, pp. 1394–95) 
In the current work, the idea that is always present is that of intuition. It is the sympathy that, 
through action, is acquired, along with the different challenges/solutions arising across the 
strategizing process, with the strategist placing themself in the interior of it, breaking down 
the barriers with the unspeakable, i.e. going beyond the limits of language. 
Considered by the French philosopher as the self-conscious instinct,17 intuition is what makes 
humans capable of reflection upon a certain object and which gives them the ability to enlarge 
it indefinitely (Bergson, 2001d, p. 645). Through a direct vision of the spirit by the spirit 
                                                          
17 Even though, as will be explained, intuition and instinct are two different concepts. 
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(Bergson, 2001e, p. 1273), obtained throughout a contact/coincidence with the object 
perceived: 
Intuition means above all consciousness, immediate consciousness, a vision that is hardly 
distinguishable from the object seen, knowledge that is in contact with it [the object seen] and that even 
coincides with it [the object seen]. (Bergson, 2001e, p. 1273) 
As pointed out above, intuition requires a certain movement, a specific action game, so to 
speak – to make a parallel with Wittgenstein’s language games,18 a perspective which authors 
like Mantere (2011) brought to Strategy-as-Practice –, or it needs a specific sympathetic 
context, to be shaped: 
Even if one produces thousands of explanations to describe walking, it does not require the same skill, 
nor will it teach the appropriate (re)action on entering water – even if, once swimming, one may deduce 
that both mechanisms are similar. (Bergson, 2001d, p. 659) 
So that, in fact (for instance), out of the context water, it would be difficult to grasp intuitively 
what swimming is. 
As the sections that follow attempt to explain, a strategizing that is capable of creating such 
language games, through use of practices framed by strategic tools and artefacts, may be 
suitable to create “truly new” movements capable of catching competitors off guard, since 
intuition, which (as stated) departs from movement (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1275), constitutes a 
radically new [“truly new”] idea (p. 1276) formed in duration: 
Duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new. 
(Bergson, 2005, p. 206) 
The concept of intuition, defined in the quote above, will be further developed in section 
2.3.2. 
Duration 
Duration is initially approached in Time and Free Will (Bergson, 2001a), where it is notably 
contrasted with determinism (vs. free will), contingency, prediction, and causality, implying a 
                                                          
18 In quite synthetic terms, Wittgenstein’s language games imply that “the meaning of words and propositions depends on 
the context in which they are used” (Morgado, 2009, p. 6). 
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reflection on the extent to which future events are the result of present decisions – something 
vital to strategy. Duration is then woven in to examine how it relates to creative formation, 
both in Creative Evolution (Bergson, 2001d), in which a link to élan vital is predicted, and in 
The Creative Mind (Bergson, 2001g), where a link to intuition is seen as inexorable. 
The creation of intuition, “already presupposes duration” (Deleuze, 2011, p. 13, my italics) 
and promotes a germination and flowering, both of which take place in lived time of a certain 
form (Bergson, 2001d, p. 783). Intuition represents a sort of incubation period, which 
managers embody while strategizing. 
The time, so to speak, associated with duration is neither chronological nor quantitative, but 
rather inventive – either time is invention (creating the “truly new”) or it is nothing at all 
(Bergson, 2001d, p. 784) – and qualitative. Lived time is intensive and qualitative, rather than 
measured, extensive, and quantitative (Bergson, 2001a, p. 71) like “mechanical clock time” 
(Styhre, 2003, p. 17). For example, duration is embodied in a painting and vice versa 
(Bergson, 2001d, p. 783) – we can see lived time passing in the completeness of the picture or 
when “tracing a line [growing progressively longer] […], which is thus movement” 
(Colombo, 2009, p. 262). In duration, time is “constituted through emergent events” 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 968). 
Duration, then, is the opposite of time decomposed into dimensions (past, present, and future) 
or parts (moments, instants, etc.) (Worms, 2000, p. 21). It is not every insignificant stroke on 
a canvas, each tick, or tock, of a clock someone hears before falling asleep, but the painting 
and the melody that are created in duration (Bergson, 2001a, pp. 70–71). It is not each and 
every word that is written, or each word spoken that creates meaning by itself, but the act of 
speech that brings them to life (Chia & Holt, 2009) through conversation. 
Helin et al. (2014) illustrate the distinction between time measured (e.g. a minute) – which, as 
Styhre (2003) notes “is ‘spatial’, i.e., there is an equidistance between all time units” (p. 17) – 
and time experienced, or duration, remembering how qualitatively different a minute of 
boxing time is – a long or short minute depending on how close a knock-out is –, a scuba dive 
– a long minute when coming up to the surface –, or bird-watching – when a minute tends to 
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be quicker. And, again, Styhre complements the vision of Helin et al. (2014) with the 
following remark: 
[Lived] time can be experienced as extremely slow (e.g. when visiting the dentist), while on other 
occasions it can be very swift and momentary (e.g. when having a good time with your friends). (Styhre, 
2003, p. 17) 
While strategizing, managers live in moments of intensive strategy production; this is in 
contrast to indolent moments of non-productivity during which intended and emergent 
strategies seem not to evolve. Additionally, different strategic streams, stages, might have 
different natures of duration. And this, most of the time, is independent of chronological time: 
A mountain exists at a much slower speed than organisms like human beings. A mosquito exists in a 
different duration than a human being or an elephant. All have their own durations that combine with 
other durations to make up a flux of different forms that maintain their shapes at different speeds 
relative to other organic and inorganic lifeforms. (Lorraine, 2011, p. 10) 
What is interesting in this passage is that as nature has different speeds, strategy can also have 
different components acting at different levels of detail, which during the formation process 
should be reunited towards a common outcome. 
The concept of duration will be developed in greater detail in section 2.4. 
Memory 
When language game and context were introduced with reference to intuition, the idea of 
memory implicitly hovered in the air. For Bergson the past, memory, serves in two different 
forms: i) on the one hand, by bodily/motorized mechanisms, or a dwelling based on habitus, 
closely associated with duration; ii) on the other, by independent remembrances, based on 
building, on instant(s)/images(s), which stick in one’s mind (Bergson, 2001b, p. 224), 
created/imprinted during the time while travelling: 
My mental state [and its built images], travelling in time, is continuously dwelling with[in] the duration 
[that incubate intuitions] it accumulates […] like some sort of snowball rolling upon itself. (Bergson, 
2001d, p. 496, my italics) 
Predictably, memory receives the most attention in Matter and Memory (Bergson, 2001b). 
Here other topics are discussed, along with an extensive explanation of the distinction 
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between pure, pictorial, and mechanical memory, or “muscle-memory” (Patton, 2003, p. 993) 
– i.e. one that imagines and another that repeats (Bergson, 2001b, p. 228). These include: i) 
remembrances vs. attention, something highly relevant to the context of culture, understood as 
memory, and of attention alongside duration; ii) remembrances vs. recognition, the act by 
which one acknowledges the past in the present; and iii) remembrance vs. recognition vs. 
movement/action – to recognize an object is to know how to use it …, but to know how to use 
it implies having already envisaged the correspondent movements, driving impulses (Bergson, 
2001b, p. 239) – are approached, giving rise to an idea of an inseparable continuum between 
thinking (image memory) and acting (mechanical memory) and between past and present: 
As just retained from the past, movements intelligently co-ordinated that represent accumulated efforts 
[…] engraved in a rigorous order and systematic character, which characterize current movements. 
(Bergson, 2001b, pp. 227–28) 
In business organizations, mechanical memory is linked to corporate culture; acquired for the 
efficient repetition of the same effort, being embodied in a system of automatic movements – 
actions, practices –, as are “the rites19 and rituals20 of our company” (Schein, 2009, p. 21). 
Becker (2010) uses the word “habit”21 which can be linked to mechanical memory, if taken in 
its psychological definition of “an automatic reaction to a specific situation”: 
Organizational routines [and rites and rituals] capture stable structures in collective action that emerge 
from the interrelating of individual action […] that can itself be patterned in stable ways, as expressed by 
the individual-level concept of habit. (Becker, 2010, p. 5, my italics) 
Naturally, since we pass, by insensible degrees, from i) remembrances kept throughout time 
to ii) movements that design the rising action (Bergson, 2001b, p. 225), corporate culture 
resides in various sites:  
[Embrained] Dependent on conceptual skills and cognitive abilities; [Embodied] Action oriented; 
[Encultured] Shared understandings and meanings; [Embedded] Resides in organizational routines; [and] 
[Encoded] Conveyed by signs and symbols. (Mutch, 2008, p. 59) 
                                                          
19 Rite is “A social custom, practice, or conventional act.” See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/rite (accessed 
27/11/2016). 
20 Ritual is “A series of actions or type of behaviour regularly and invariably followed by someone.” See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ritual (accessed 27/11/2016). 
21 For a definition of “habit” see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/habit (accessed 15/5/2017). 
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Culture has an impact on intuition and vice versa because real intuition, instant intuition so to 
speak, as Bergson states, is of little consequence when compared to all that our memory 
supplements (Bergson, 2001b, p. 213). These intuitions will then be intelligently captured and 
imprinted on a certain strategic vision, which, in turn, through remembrance, will influence 
corporate culture, and so on. Bergson describes this learning process using a splendid 
example:  
I study a lesson, and to learn it by heart I first scan each verse; I repeat this operation several times 
[habitus, mechanic]. In each new reading, a new progress is achieved; words are read better and better; 
they end up linked, organized. At this exact time, I know my lesson by heart; it is said that it has become 
remembrance, imprinted [instant, image] in my memory. (Bergson, 2001b, p. 225) 
Corporate culture might act as the hotbed of practices that, together with élan vital – which in 
turn is linked with leadership and with agency – function seamlessly as ignition for action, by 
creating a living organism that is accustomed to thinking in action while combining agency 
and structure in a nuanced interplay: 
Indeed, structural, cultural, relational, and temporal dimensions are accommodated, together with their 
mediation to the agent via reflexive deliberation or non-reflexive socialization (habitus/habituation), 
thereby depicting social practice as the outcome of such nuanced interplay. (Herepath, 2014, p. 858, my 
italics) 
From a popular point of view, culture is the “how we do things around here” statement 
(Bremer, 2012, p. 31; Schein, 2009, p 27). It can also be “some individual’s [managers’, 
leaders’] own assumptions about what is right or wrong, what will work or not” (Schein, 
2010, p. 25, my italics), which influences, and at the same time is influenced by, “language, 
rituals, stories, myths” (Morgan, 1980, p. 616), and also by “ideals, goals, values, aspirations, 
ideologies, rationalizations” (Schein, 2010, p. 24). 
 
(2.2.2) Intelligence and adjacent concepts 
In this section, intelligence will be treated together with the concept of “intertuition” and with 
laughter – a Bergsonian idea that represents an excess of bureaucracy. 
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Intelligence 
Bergson (complemented by Deleuze) states that our social life gravitates around the 
manufacturing and use of artificial instruments (Bergson, 2001d, p. 612) through intelligence. 
He points out the difference between this form of thought and intuition as follows: 
intelligence, which is based on the static, on things, and on a rearrangement of pre-existent 
elements (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1275), is the analytical, scientific, mode of understanding and 
interacting with the world; it is the attention of the spirit towards matter (Bergson, 2001g, p. 
1319); it is acquaintance with matter, it marks our adaptation to matter, it moulds itself on 
matter (Deleuze, 1991, p. 88). 
Intuition, however, represents the spirit’s attention to itself, which is an act of reflection 
(Bergson, 2001g, p. 1273). 
From the passages just quoted, the idea is retained that, despite being based on the static and 
on rearrangements of the existent, intelligence is the analytical and scientific mode of thought 
that can be used as a tool, in the sense that it moulds the matter in hand. In this regard, 
intelligence – a concept that will be further developed in section 2.3.2 – is linked to a faculty 
for building artificial objects, using particular tools to make tools, and to varying this 
fabrication infinitely (Bergson, 2001d, p. 613); a practice that is connected with “intertuition”.  
“Intertuition” 
In “intertuition”, “inter-” is used in the sense that strategic activities, including the detection 
of problems, are viewed through the lens of a strategic framework (Porter,22 Kotler, BCG,23 
etc.); and “-tuition” is used in the sense of an act of creation that is assisted by tuition, 
teaching, and observation as part of a learning organization. Below is an etymological 
breakdown of the word: 
                                                          
22 Michael Porter (b. 1947) is a reference from the positioning school, namely due to the publication of his best-selling 
books Competitive Strategy (1980) and Competitive advantage (1985). 
23 The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) is a strategy consulting company famous for its BCG Matrix, which relates companies’ 
market share (vis-à-vis their competitors’) and growth potential of the business in order to define a specific positioning in 
the market. 
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• Intelligence: Intelligere = Inter (between) + Leger (choose) – conceptualization (to form concepts, 
analytically, from a detached position in relation to the field of action); 
• Intuition: In (at, on) + Tuition (take care, look after) – creation (to make or to produce something 
“new” in the course of action); 
• “Intertuition”: Inter (between) + Tuition (take care, look after) – conception (to conceive, to give birth 
to, by coupling frameworks with daily action). 
From the first impulse, created intelligently as tools/artefacts and which can be embedded in 
management rituals, a movement is created that, in duration, will produce an educated 
intuition by combining academic knowledge and experience … 
The development of expertise and the concomitant capacity for intuition is an arduous journey; […] it 
requires a blending of conceptual/analytical knowledge, probably best gained in the classroom, with 
experiential knowledge. (Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p. 287) 
… in an “intentional automatism” capable of conception: 
While intelligence and intuition are connected to conceptualization (approach) and creation (formation), 
respectively, “intertuition” relates to conception (fertilization). To intertuit would be more than merely 
to create: it would be to conceive, since the process of giving birth to new strategic ideas would be 
obtained by the coupling of i) daily actions, information, etc. (dwelling) and ii) the strategic framework 
(building), by which we ‘enact a situation through a frame to make use of available stock of knowledge’ 
(Rasche & Chia, 2009, p. 719, my italics) and create a certain ‘grammar of action’ (Pentland & Rueter, 
1994) by which creation makes (strategic) sense. (Morgado, 2014, p. 45) 
The author of the current research is of the belief that strategic thinking requires support at 
first in order to evolve, since “the human mind does not deal well with non-events” 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 200). Hodgkinson et al. (2009) complement this view with the following 
statement: 
Neither insight [which succeeds intuition] nor intuition occur in a cognitive vacuum or in an ‘unprepared 
mind’; rather learning and experience constitute the substances on which such associative process 
operate. (Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p. 279) 
Additionally, it is crucial to recognize “the performativity of rational choice theory” 
(Cabantous et al., 2010, p. 1531, my italics), in the sense that rational choice activates 
strategic ideas. The following passage is deliberately extensive, in order to illustrate various 
buildings:  
This thing that is put before a strategic idea (and which has given birth to this one) can be: i) a certain 
strategic framework (such as SWOT analysis or Porter’s Five Forces); ii) a meeting, at a location where 
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participants are bracketed; the agenda set, the chair selected, the level of freedom decided upon during 
discussions, or the potential existence of a vote (Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008), which may lead to 
strategic conformity or divergence; iii) the use of a certain device – such as “computer and various 
software packages, telephones, flip charts, [or] Lego-based strategy models” (Rasche & Chia, 2009, p. 
18); iv) the analyses of a selected set of KPIs and their performance (which per se are business-relevant 
events); v) the language used and culturally embedded in the organization (Langley, 2007; Samra-
Fredericks, 2003; Sandelands & Drazin, 1989; Tietze, Cohen, & Musson, 2003); or even vi) the plans, 
when considered as artefacts – which play a role in “shaping routine enactments” (Parmigiani & 
Howard-Grenville, 2011, p. 444) – in the hands of “managers as craftsmen” (Giraudeau, 2008, p, 292). 
(Morgado, 2014, p. 42) 
In corporate strategy, “intertuition”, used in the sense of fabricated intuitions, turns into the 
practices that were presented in section 2.1.2 and which connects with duration, because 
intelligence “[…] molds itself on matter; but it only does so by means of mind or duration” 
(Deleuze, 1991, p. 98, my italics). 
Using the concept of “intertuition”, managers might take advantage of dwelling in many 
buildings – “interpretative grids” (Fisher, 2010, p. 136), or strategic “mediation frameworks” 
(Jarratt & Stiles, 2010), such as SWOT analysis or Porter and BCG models – and of being 
creative in the conception of those, given that building is a deliberated intermediate tool to 
create the “truly new”, provided that abuses of intelligence/of artificiality, are avoided. 
Laughter 
Although the analytic and tools/artefacts-oriented manner of doing strategy is necessary in 
order to create a systematic context for intuition production in duration, Bergson points to the 
dangers of excessive artificiality/of bureaucracy through the concept of laughter: 
Stiffness (the blind application of rules), automatism (brainless routines), distraction (toward market 
challenges), unsociability (alienation from common interest), when they all intertwine, provoke the 
comic in a character. (Bergson, 2001c, p. 417) 
When managers manage with a solemnity that overtakes them, creating a sort of professional 
stiffness, this means that they no longer care about being useful to a certain public (Bergson, 
2001c, p. 472). They begin to act as simple machines (p. 472), moving like mechanic robots 
superposed onto the fluidity of life, which in turn provokes laughter, as happens when 
someone slips on a banana skin, acquiring the motion of an object (Morgado, 2011). 
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Moreover, apart from something mechanical encrusted upon the living (Bergson, 2001c, p. 
410) – like some over-rigid intelligence inhibiting the intuitive – the exaggeration of some 
irregularity, as in the case of a manager obsessive about rules, in itself provokes laughter. The 
laughable character: the image of the distracted manager, who in their stiffness puts 
professional rules above the common strategic interest, brings to mind Bergson’s customs 
official, who, having bravely leapt into the water to save some shipwrecked souls, starts to ask 
if they have anything to declare (Bergson, 2001c, p. 409) … 
There is an expectation that these caricatures, well exemplified by Dilbert cartoons, will 
provoke the revenge of the organization against the abuses of bureaucratic power which fast-
foods the haute cuisine of strategy-creation; laughter is there to punish their distraction, to 
release them from their dreams. (Bergson, 2001c, p. 451) provoking: 
freedom from stultifying, stupid bureaucracy, and its common cohort, meaningless, busywork-making 
layers. (Farris & Welch, 2015, loc. 2120) 
Alongside the work by Bergson, in which intelligence and its abuses assume a vital role as 
part of his explanation of the mechanism of the comic in the volume Laughter (Bergson, 
2001c) –, as already mentioned in Creative Evolution (Bergson, 2001d), intelligence is 
contrasted i) with instinct, both being instruments in constant interplay, not least in trying to 
master life (Bergson, 2001d, p. 578), and ii) with intuition – in the chapter “The mechanism 
cinematographic of thought and the mechanistic illusion”. In the latter, as in Laughter, 
intelligence is linked to the mechanic while intuition is linked to the living. Intelligence is 
further contrasted with intuition in Creative Mind (Bergson, 2001g), where topics such as 
metaphysics and science are subject to analysis, and where, linked with intelligence and 
science, analysis itself is defined as translation, a development in symbols, a representation 
(always incomplete), taken from multiple perspectives, which meet already known concepts 
(p. 1396). 
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(2.2.3) Instinct and adjacent concepts 
In this section, instinct – a concept that is different from intuition and, surprisingly, comes 
closer to intelligence – will be treated together with the concept of improvisation and with 
élan vital; a Bergsonian concept that displays traits of leadership. 
Instinct 
Instinct has little to do with intuition, since the former is all-too-animal, being based on timely 
unreflective reaction to something unexpected, while the latter is all-too-human and based on 
reflective action. In fact, even if intuition is sometimes referred to as a “gut feeling” or “gut 
instinct” (Dane & Pratt, 2009), the two concepts are quite different. Instinct is considered i) 
“an innate, typically fixed pattern of behaviour in animals in response to certain stimuli”24 
“that [unlike intuition] is outside the threshold of awareness” (Parikh et al., 1994, p. 40). In 
addition … 
According to Bergson, the more instinctual an organism is, the more its responses will be in keeping with 
repeatable patterns of the past; perception will be selective, taking from a situation what the organism 
needs to know in order to launch the response from a limited repertoire of responses that seems most 
appropriate. (Lorraine, 2011, p. 8) 
Intuition, however, ii) involves a reflective exercise that is different from an instinctual 
reflexive reaction, a “conscious perception of a ‘sense of coherence’” (Sadler-Smith, 2012, 
loc. 2074). The listening to a “quiet inner voice” (Robinson, 2006, loc. 77), is what gives 
consent to the existence of the verb intuit and produces the corresponding results. Goldberg 
(1983) mentions different outputs of intuition – discovery/invention, creativity/imagination, 
evaluation/yes or no, operation/feeling, prediction/premonition, and 
illumination/transcendence – which again is all-too-human to be just instinctual. 
In The Two Sources of Morality and of Religion (Bergson, 2001f), instinct and intelligence are 
linked by their capacity to be used as instruments: in the latter case (intelligence), through 
invented (mechanical) instruments, and thus variable and unpredictable; in the former case 
(instinct), through organs provided by nature, and thus unchangeable (p. 997). The contrast 
                                                          
24 See Oxford dictionaries online: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/instinct. 
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between these two instruments takes place in Creative Evolution (Bergson, 2001d), a book in 
which the nature of instinct is classified as organic, linked to vital processes by which 
organisms react against threats (p. 636). Nevertheless, reinforcing a vision underlying this 
work, whereby instinct can act as a sort of strategic radar capable of fostering timely reactions 
to changes to the SWOT, Bachelard notes that “if intellect dims then instinct awakens” 
(Bachelard, 2000, loc. 473), thereby instinct is also seen as acting as an antidote against 
paralysis by analysis (Langley, 1995; Lenz & Lyles, 1985). 
Improvisation 
The idea of instinct is seen as an instrument of reaction, or of improvisation, considered as the 
thoughtless faculty that allows managers to permanently survey possible changes to their 
company’s SWOT. As pointed out, instinct acts as a kind of permanent radar, it provides a 
capability for alertness; what Cunha et al. (2012) call “cultivated attention” (p. 270), which 
creates the conditions for a leader’s survival in “fast changing landscapes” (p. 270), and is 
linked to “complexity and dynamism in hypercompetitive business environments” 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p. 278). 
Section 2.1.2 also explained how, since strategy is created by a chain of interactions between 
managers and their ecosystem (Mintzberg, 1978), the potentially random solutions that are 
simply improvised responses that “emerge ‘on the hoof’ unintentionally” (Chia & Holt, 2006, 
p. 644), or “on the spur of the moment” (Weick, 1998, p. 544) could nevertheless be framed 
by a strategic direction, by a strategic duration. Bergson completes this explanation by 
reuniting instinct and organization, two apparent opposites, through use of the following 
image: 
When a chick breaks the egg with its beak, we witness instinct; but this action grounds its origin on the 
(organized) embryonic life – in turn, during embryonic life, a lot of processes have an instinctive origin 
(Bergson, 2001d, p. 635). 
Instinct is sympathy (Bergson, 2001d, p. 645), or affinity with organization: it is difficult to 
define where organization ends and instinct starts (p. 635); and this improbable combination 
is related to another Bergsonian concept called élan vital, and to his view that “even 
instinctual creatures that live out their lives in mindless repetition of set patterns of behavior 
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evolve new behaviors over time in the differing flow [élan] of life [vital]” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 
9). 
Élan Vital 
Élan vital attracts focal attention in Creative Evolution (Bergson, 2001d). The concept is also 
treated in Mind-Energy (Bergson, 2001e), where it assumes vital importance, both i) as the 
word “energy”, ready to be converted into movement/action (p. 825), and ii) in the statement, 
“the triumph of life is creation” (Bergson, 2001e, p. 833, my italics) and the link it might offer 
between life and strategy with regard to creation. Élan vital, including its moral and social 
facets, is also approached in The Two Sources of Morality and of Religion (Bergson, 2001f) 
and compared to a faculty for solving problems by removing obstacles and resistance 
(Bergson, 2001f, p. 1071). 
Alongside intuition, instinct, and intelligence, there is energy, which complements the forces 
at work while strategizing. This energy is represented by an élan vital ‒ which acts as a sort of 
last-resort problem solver, when all other faculties seem insufficient for maintaining and 
developing a company ‒ and is considered as an organism. Élan vital could, paradoxically, be 
linked to a sort of organizational physical inertia,25 if it were not for the impulse (élan) in its 
name, and were it not for its intrinsic orientation to movement (to action) in the sense of 
creation and triumph – qualities that are consensual representatives of the competencies a 
strategic leader might be expected to demonstrate: 
On man’s line of differentiation, the élan vital was able to use matter to create an instrument of 
freedom […] ‘to use the determinism of nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very 
determinism has spread’. (Deleuze, 2011, p. 107, my italics) 
As we watch or hear a conversation [a strategic creation done interactively in duration] travel, so we will 
be able to notice times when the trajectory or mode of conversation changes. I call these moments of 
leadership. (Ramsey, 2016, loc. 4656, my italics) 
This élan of life, “or life-drive” (Kolakowski, 2001, p. 34, my italics), linked to a 
strategic/transformative leadership, “consists, in brief, in a claim for creation” (Bergson, 
                                                          
25 (Physical) Inertia is “A property of matter by which it continues in its existing state of rest or uniform motion in a straight 
line, unless that state is changed by an external force.” See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/inertia (accessed 
4/12/2016). 
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2001d, p. 708), through a movement that produces an evolving strategic duration: “the 
triumph of life is creation” (Bergson, 2001e, p. 833, my italics): 
Even should a certain global élan (some systemic tendency to evolve) be acceptable, individuals (agents) 
will use this energy to further their own interests: this is called adaptation. (Bergson, 2001d, p. 537) 
The impetus [élan vital] can be viewed as a typical characteristic of entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs 
who are able to innovate because they stay in duration, which means that they are part of the processes 
emerging within the organization and within the environment [adaptation]. (Colombo, 2009, p. 266) 
An explicit departure from the driver (or racer) position of the dweller-leader ‒ he who 
accelerates and brakes while steering in order to keep moving along the road (organization), 
taking a certain direction (strategy), and observing some procedures of driving (culture) along 
the way ‒ resides also in the “process of creative improvisation” (Painter-Morland & 
Deslandes, 2014, p. 854, my italics) and in the correspondent (re)action to the challenges of 
environment while executing a strategic plan, which does not have to be considered as some 
sort of fatality. It is this that Lenz & Lyles (1985) note to good effect when they affirm, “the 
occurrence of excessive rationality in strategic planning is a result of a myriad of complex 
administrative and technical processes. However, these processes are not inevitable in the 
sense that nothing can be done to arrest their momentum” (p. 70): 
If the evolution of life [impelled by an élan vital] is nothing more than a series of adaptations to 
accidental circumstances, then it cannot correspond to the realization of a plan. A plan is given in 
advance. (Bergson, 2001d, p. 582, my italics) 
[W]hen we approach organisational change, [in that] processes are seen as driven by intuition and 
impetus [élan vital], more than planned or designed. (Colombo, 2009, p. 265) 
The vital impetus, or élan vital, is the human creative drive […] an autopoietic26 move that invents itself. 
(Linstead, 2014, loc. 6261, my italics) 
Should leadership be absent, the (rigid) vision/plan, defined as a strategic direction, would 
probably become obsolete during execution (due to plan rigidity). This would result in a 
positioning well behind leading competitors (survival of the fittest, according to a Darwinian 
perspective). To avoid this, Richards (2013) proposes a different word for plan, which is 
planning: 
                                                          
26 “Relating to or characterized by autopoiesis; self-maintaining and self-regulating.” See 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/autopoietic (accessed 17/04/2016). 
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A plan [which “starts with a bunch of assumptions”] assumes what’s going to happen – even though you 
don’t. By contrast, planning in its truest sense [“instead of obsessing over the assumptions”] is a reality-
based process that allows for life’s unpredictability […] [since] we [keep] checking a situation and 
adapting to it. (Richards, 2013, loc. 920–90) 
According to the concept of élan vital … 
Practitioners also have the possibility of changing the ingredients of their praxis. By reflecting on 
experience, practitioners are able to adapt existing practices; by exploiting plurality, they are sometimes 
able to synthesize new practices; by taking advantage of openness, they may be able to introduce new 
practitioners and new practices altogether. (Whittington, 2006, p. 620) 
… practitioners, being agents and leaders, are able to invent many buildings or structures for 
many dwellings, many intelligences for many intuitions. 
In summary, from Bergson’s theories, the following connections with strategizing can be 
extracted. Intuition, which is generated in duration, in action/movement, and differs from an 
instinctual “gut feeling”, may be crucial to generating potential competitive strategy since, 
among other factors that will be discussed later, only intuition is suitable to create the “truly 
new”, capable of surprising competitors and clients. Nevertheless, intuition must be 
complemented by intelligence, in the sense of an analytical tool that is suitable to ascribe 
some firmness/building, some purposefulness and usefulness, to strategic work. This 
complementarity between intuition and intelligence, which also acts before intuition surges, 
was captured by the neologism “intertuition”. However, as Bergson warns, notwithstanding 
the usefulness of intelligence, all excesses of it in the sense of a bureaucratic machine, can 
become laughable, since what was supposed to be human, capable of bringing about smoother 
dwelling, can become robotic and thus incapable of intuition. Intuition, importantly, is also 
affected by memory, which might be associated with corporate culture or structure, a fact that 
transforms the latter into a concrete target of intervention when strategic change is at stake. 
Duration, as section 2.4 explains, dispels the notion of a static strategic decision followed by 
execution. Instead, it proposes that strategy should be seen intuitively as a continuous process 
moving along through different stages, whereby strategy is formed with more or less the same 
strategic intensity or thickness throughout. 
The concepts of intuition, specifically its relation with intelligence/rationality, and of 
duration, are next to be analysed. 
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(2.3) Intuition 
“In this information age, [where] we are glutted with communication” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 17), 
managers might face the challenge of changing their customary mode of thinking and making 
decisions, not least because “gathering all the relevant information and evaluating it carefully 
would use up more resources [management time and money] than the potential gains from 
getting the correct answer” (Freedman, 2013, p. 591). Taking a similar direction, Sinclair et 
al. (2009) state that “the rational choice model”, one of the most commonly accepted among 
strategists (see section 2.3.2) might be challenged by doubts regarding data 
availability/quality and understanding of “cause-and-effect relationships”: 
The rational choice model is predicated upon several assumptions that are highly questionable from a 
psychological standpoint, given the complex, uncertain and time-pressured environments confronting 
many organizations. […] The assumptions that the required data actually exist in a tangible and, ideally, 
quantifiable form, and the cause-and-effect relationships are understood sufficiently to enable 
outcomes to be predicted on the basis of logical and quantitative analysis are also dubious. (Sinclair et 
al., 2009, p. 394) 
In addition, the rational-choice model uses the “‘academic intelligence’ types of tasks found 
in the classroom and on IQ tests” (Wagner, 2002, p. 43), and not really those types found in 
the practical world. These intelligence-type problems tend to be: 
(1) well-defined; (2) formulated by others; (3) come with all information required for problem solution; 
(4) have one correct answer; (5) have one or at most several methods for obtaining the correct answer; 
and (6) be unrelated to everyday experience. (Wagner, 2002, p. 43) 
Nonetheless, although in an era of robots and artificial intelligence, or maybe because of 
them, an affirmation made by Mintzberg more than twenty years ago is still relevant and all 
the more opportune, for it highlights how strategy cannot be created by the same mechanic 
logic used in assembly lines: 
Organizational strategies cannot be created by the logic used to assemble automobiles […] [in which] 
every component […] produced by the machine as specified and assembled in the order prescribed [to 
produce] an integrated product. (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 13) 
If therefore i) complexity and changeability, ii) over-rationality, and iii) artificiality are 
complications that need to be overcome in this current era, then maybe decisional processes 
that use higher doses of intuition could be an answer to this three-way change. Sinclair et al. 
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(2009) offer some characteristics through which intuition can very probably add value in 
facing these challenges: 
• Fast digestion of huge amounts of information: “intuitive processing has been linked in strategic 
management to the fast ‘digestion’ of complex, ambiguous sources of information that 
complements rational processing” (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 401); 
• Humanize decision-making, bringing it close to execution: “Intuition [is] an experienced-based 
phenomenon, drawing on tacit knowledge accumulated through experience and quickly 
retrieved through pattern recognition” (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 400); 
• Foster creative and “truly new” strategies: “Intuition is employed by strategic decision makers 
and other key stakeholders as a means to support or engage in creativity, visioning and 
foresight” (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 400). 
The advantages of intuitive decisional processes for strategizing might then be subsumed into 
the following abbreviations: i) fast digestion; ii) humanized simplicity; and iii) the “truly 
new”. 
Below, after an important examination of how ideas are grasped and enacted, a 
comprehensive view on the nature of intuition will be offered, along with how it can be used 
while strategizing interwoven with Bergsonian intelligence. 
 
(2.3.1) Thought (reflective) vs. action (experimental) 
As Bergson affirms, “one must act like a man of thought and think like a man of action”27 
(Bergson, 2014, p. 461). In fact, in the same sense underlying this section, “thinking may 
drive doing, but doing just as surely drives thinking. We don’t just think in order to act, we act 
in order to think” (Mintzberg & Westley, 2001, p. 91). This virtuous circle might result each 
                                                          
27 Action is “The fact or process of doing something, typically to achieve an aim.” See 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/action (accessed 11/05/2016). 
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time someone is able to combine a reflective28 posture together with a propensity to act, albeit 
in experimental29 mode, “making rapid determinations” (Wilkinson, 2015, loc. 1062): 
That is how pragmatic people function when stymied: They get on with it, believing that if they do 
‘something’ the necessary thinking could follow. It’s experimentation – trying something so that you can 
learn. (Mintzberg & Westley, 2001, p. 91, my italics) 
While strategizing, strategy arises – not linearly but “cycling back” (Mintzberg & Westley, 
2001, p. 90) – from “a discernible pattern emerging in a stream of actions”, as Chia and 
Mackay (2007, p. 224) well recall, “and not through having ideas and mental images as 
Descartes presupposed” (p. 231). This idea reinforces the notion of language games 
mentioned above, which end up ascribing particular meanings according to the different 
buildings where managers dwell: 
action [shall] not be perceived as the pursuit of pre-established ends, abstracted from concrete 
situations, but rather that ends and means develop conterminously within contexts that are themselves 
ever changing and thus always subject to revaluation and reconstruction on the part of the reflective 
intelligence. (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 967) 
Thinking while acting through “on-the-spot examination and testing of a manager’s intuitive 
understanding of a situation, often in the form of a reflective ‘conversation’ with the 
situation” (Wagner, 2002, p. 51), “entails the capacity of actors to make practical and 
normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the 
emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations” (Emirbayer 
& Mische, 1998, p. 971, my italics). Ideas and thoughts once more occur within these 
language games, practiced while dwelling in certain buildings,: 
Within an organization, an idea occasionally appears about how to do something new. This idea may 
include notions about an organizational problem or opportunity, how current practice should be 
changed or augmented to address it, what personnel and material resources are necessary, and a 
strategy for how to make changes actually happen. (Sproull & Hofmeister, 1986, p. 45) 
Taking an alternative perspective, here there are the “realities of pervasive uncertainty, 
unknowable and unpredictable futures, learning by trial-and-error, and the inevitable lag of 
                                                          
28 Reflective: “Relating to or characterized by deep thought; thoughtful”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/reflective (accessed 14/5/2017). 
29 Experimental: “Based on untested ideas or techniques and not yet established or finalized”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/experimental (accessed 14/5/2917). 
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sensing behind motor actions (I see only what I’ve already done)” (Weick, 2009, p. 195, my 
italics). This attitude, which is only suitable if a culture of educated trial-and-error is fostered, 
also reflects a culture of “doing first” instead of “thinking first”, both being views based on 
very different features/resources, as Mintzberg notes: 
‘Doing first’ features: craft; venturing, learning; the visceral; experiences; […] ‘Thinking first’ features: 
science; planning, programming; the verbal; facts. (Mintzberg & Westley, 2001, p. 91) 
As Bergson points out, in order to learn to swim, one must already know how to float in the 
water, which means that, in order to be capable of swimming, one must already be a swimmer 
(Bergson, 2001d, p. 658); i.e. before starting the intended action, one must wiggle to stay 
afloat, and thus be concerned first and foremost with the beginning of an impending action. 
Considering that “activity can be purposive without the actor having in mind a purpose” 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p. 93), “a culture with a strong sense of urgency” (Spence, 2009, loc. 114), 
that pushes people to do things, to act, supported by mutual trust/unity/cohesion; intuitive 
knowledge; mission contract/orders; and focus of effort (Richards, 2004, loc. 3230), might 
foster more strategic ideas, and these in turn will generate new ones … 
[…] the primed ideas have some ability to prime other ideas, although more weakly. Like ripples on a 
pond, activation spreads through a small part of the vast network of associated ideas. (Kahneman, 2011, 
p. 53) 
… and, at the same time, produce alternatives that can be chosen from among others: 
That means doing various things, finding out which among them works, making sense of that and 
repeating the successful behaviors while discarding the rest. (Mintzberg & Westley, 2001, p. 91, my 
italics) 
In a demanding contemporary business environment marked, as Moussa et al. (2016) insist, 
by “volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, or VUCA” (loc. 2147) and undergoing 
fast-paced change, “in a world where hard facts have become increasingly exceptional” 
(Painter-Morland & ten Bos, 2011, loc. 268), time-consuming “rational approaches to 
management have been on decline” (Wagner, 2002, p. 45), with a predominance of the more 
practical tasks that are often: 
(1) ill-defined; (2) formulated by the problem solver; (3) missing information essential to solution; (4) 
characterized by having multiple solutions, each associated with liabilities and assets; (5) characterized 
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by having multiple methods of obtaining each solution; and (6) related to everyday experience. 
(Wagner, 2002, p. 44) 
In this context, where “the response to the need for a decision is usually rapid, too rapid to 
allow for an orderly sequential analysis of the situation” (Simon, 1987, p. 57), Wagner tends 
to privilege the intuitive side of decision making, affirming that “managers [people of action 
rather than of analysis] deviate from the rational model especially in terms of their propensity 
to act before the facts are in […] [an] action that is nearly spontaneous, and based more on 
intuition than [as mentioned] on rationality” (Wagner, 2002, pp. 48–50). 
Instead of separating thought from action, Bergson fuses both through effort: 
Between idea and action, a scarcely sensible and sui generis middle interposes itself: the effort. And 
from idea to effort and from effort to action, progress is so continuous that hardly can one say where 
idea and effort finish and where action begins. (Bergson, 2001a, p. 138) 
Going further, Bachelard reinforces the point of view that all action requires a corresponding 
effort, since he also seems to reject the idea that, even when an action is already known to be 
desired, i.e. after a conviction that a certain thought is to be pursued, this desire as such might 
not be an automatic/direct trigger of the correspondent action: 
Once an action has been willed, once it is conscious action and one that draws on reserves of psychic 
energy, it cannot flow continuously. It is preceded by hesitation, it is expected, deferred, provoked, and 
the subtle distinctions prove that it is isolated and that it appears in a dialectical wave-motion. 
(Bachelard, 2000, loc. 731, my italics) 
According to the Bergsonian view of action = thought + effort, considering “effort” as “a 
vigorous or determined attempt”,30 and assuming a managerial context in which the discipline 
of effort, referred to above, prevails, “talk and analysis without action are unacceptable” 
(Pfeffer & Sutton, 2013, loc. 3629), even considering Bachelard’s “hesitation”. Furthermore, 
thinking without acting – including speech acts31 (Searle, 1969) and the things we can do with 
words32 (Austin, 1976) – leads to management paralysis: the paralysis that occurs when 
                                                          
30 For a definition of “effort”, see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/effort (Accessed 3/6/2017). 
31 According to Searle (1969): speech acts may be assertive (convey opinions); directives (give orders); commission (assume 
commitment); expressive (express attitudes); and declarative (constitutive). 
32 According to Austin (1976), the performative impact of words can be locutionary [informative, like a journalist’s]; 
illocutionary [rhetorical, like a politician’s]; and perlocutionary [striking, like a humorist’s].  
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excessive analysis, or “research about the research” (Coffman & Sorensen, 2013, loc. 3517), 
sees management “frozen into indecisiveness” (Sadler-Smith, 2012, loc. 808); or when, as 
Cohen (1998) notes, “like many individuals who know they should stop smoking, see a 
physician, start exercising, or begin dieting, the management team ignores, avoids, delays or 
simply acts contrary to what they already know they should do” (p. 30). 
Naturally, as Bergson would certainly not refute, according to the aphorism with which this 
section started, acting without thinking is not a desirable option either, as it may lead to (a 
company’s) “extinction by instinct” (Langley, 1995), i.e. the destruction of a company based 
on precipitated irrational actions. 
 
(2.3.2) Intelligence (analytical) vs. intuition (experiential) 
Having recalled the major differences between a rational decision-making process – which is 
mainly linked to Bergsonian intelligence, an analytical33 form of thought – and a more 
intuitive and experiential34 managerial course of action while strategizing … 
The rational system […] [linked with intelligence] is conscious, relatively slow, analytical, primarily 
verbal, and relatively affect free […]. The experiential system […] [linked with intuition] is preconscious, 
rapid, automatic, holistic, primarily nonverbal, intimately associated with affect […]. [(Sinclair et al., 
2009, p. 399), citing (Pacini & Epstein, 1999, p. 972)] 
… and having acknowledged the differences and complementarity between intelligence and 
intuition during the literature review on Bergson, presented in section 2.2, this section is now 
aimed at elucidating how intuition can complement rational/intelligent decision-making 
processes while strategizing. 
It is known that “proponents of rational approaches have argued that one of their major 
strengths is that managers can apply them without having prior knowledge of, or experience 
                                                          
33 Analytical: “Relating to or using analysis or logical reasoning”. See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/analytical 
(accessed 15/2017). 
34 Experiential: “Involving or based on experience and observation”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/experiential (accessed 15/5/2017). 
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with, the problems they confront” (Wagner, 2002, p. 46). This is an indisputable idea that 
might explain why so many young MBA graduates have assumed CEO and similar executive 
posts in important companies, even considering the criticisms that can be directed to this state 
of affairs (Mintzberg, 2004). Additionally, it is considered that many companies are still 
“machine bureaucracies, top down and obsessed with rationalization” (Mintzberg & McHugh, 
1985, p. 191). Both these “academically ready” and “bureaucratic machines” approaches 
might still attract many supporters. 
Nevertheless,  a suggestion should be put forward here, “that this rational, or ‘think first’ 
model of decision making should be supplemented with two very different models – a ‘seeing 
first’ and a ‘doing first’ model” (Mintzberg & Westley, 2001, p. 89), which are models 
primarily linked with intuition, and according to which new ideas and decisions are “achieved 
as much by insights which are visioned, imagined and intuited as through a rational analytical 
process of defining, diagnosing, designing and deciding” (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 393). 
In fact, although intuition relates to “holistic, and contextual thinking inspires vision, hunch, 
an expanded view of untapped resources, and a feeling of the potential of the enterprise” 
(Allinson et al., p. 34, my italics), this faculty is not in conflict with rational modes of thought, 
but rather complementary to them: 
Intuition is not opposed to reason, but works with it in a complementary fashion. Typically, flashes of 
intuitive insight follow the exhaustive use of logic and reason. (Vaughan, 1979, p. 150) 
Confident decision makers blend logic and intuition (of thought and feeling), the so-called two wings 
that allow leaders to soar. (Patton, 2003, p. 995, my italics) 
On the other hand, while Bergsonian intelligence is based on “rational, analytic, and cause 
and effect oriented processes” (Allinson et al., 2000, p. 34) … 
‘Intuiting’ is defined as a [complementary] process leading to a recognition or judgement that is arrived 
at rapidly, without deliberative rational thought, is difficult to articulate verbally, is based on a broad 
constellation of prior learning and past experiences, is accompanied by a feeling of confidence or 
certitude, and is affectively charged. (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 393) 
Intuition, taken in the Bergsonian sense of an ability to conceive a radically new idea created 
in action (Bergson, 2001g, pp. 1275–76), is central to the direction of this research, since it is 
hardly thinkable that any company would be able to create a potential competitive strategy, if 
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novelty – capable of surprising market actors – were absent. In this regard, the United States 
principles of war, based on Clausewitz (1780‒1832), one of the first (military) strategists, 
cited by Mintzberg et al. (2009), affirms that “surprise results from striking an enemy at time, 
place, and in a manner for which he is not prepared [a fact that creates a competitive 
advantage for the attacker]” (p. 95). 
In recent years, many authors have referred to intuition as a faculty that almost inevitably is 
used in order to master reality. Fontcuberta (2008) goes as far as to say that one day we will 
discover that “the only knowledge is intuition” (p. 245) and what we call knowledge today, 
based on reasoning, is nothing more than a mechanical aspect of reality. 
In the literature, two major classes of intuition are usually identified: expert intuition, which is 
centred in the automatic use of experience, and creative intuition, which uses patterns from 
this experience to form grids for innovation. 
Expert intuition 
Expert intuition, shared either by the calm of the chess player or a rushed fire-fighter, can be 
defined as immediate knowledge, picked up from experience/learning and engraved in the 
memory, without the interference of analytical thought (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Isenberg, 1984; 
Klein, 1999; Myers, 2002; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Patton, 2003; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 
2004). And this is also why … 
It is a fallacy to contrast ‘analytic’ [intelligence] and ‘intuitive’ styles of management. Intuition and 
judgment—at least good judgment—are simply analyses frozen into habit and into the capacity for rapid 
response. (Simon, 1987, p. 63, my italics) 
In itself, expert intuition may be a source of potential competitive advantage when seen from 
the perspective of a “master craftsman [and the correspondent] wealth of expertise ‘at his 
fingertips’ after years of experience” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 8). The same grade of 
expertise can happen in companies, especially when an atmosphere of trial-and-error is 
fostered, since failure provokes learning: 
Encourage them to cultivate the habit of making mistakes, the best learning opportunities of all. 
(Dennett, 2013, loc. 396) 
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Creators share one trait: failure. […] But something deeper occurs as a result: failure provokes learning. 
(Wilkinson, 2015, loc. 1322) 
Notwithstanding, a trial-and-error atmosphere needs to be accompanied by increasing levels 
of expertise so that managers get closer and closer to the “perfect shot”. To put this in another 
way, although action is experiential, the rightness of enacting certain decisional processes 
might be more and more accurate if, instead of just actions, managers trigger educated actions 
backed up by a constant disposition to reflect in/on the activities undertaken and the 
correspondent results. In fact, as Boud et al. (2005) remark, “reflection is an important human 
activity in which people recapture their experience, think about it, mull it over and evaluate it” 
(loc. 318). In turn, Pritchard (2014) complements the activity of reflection with other learning 
profiles for which a possible interaction with the former could be established as follows: 
Activists [, who] prefer to learn by doing [like some strategists] rather than, for example, by reading or 
listening [would be transformed into] Reflectors [for whom it might be helpful to recall] what they have 
taken in when watching and listening to thoughts and ideas of others [that in turn evolve into] Theorists 
[, who] like to adapt all of their observations into frameworks [and finally in] Pragmatists [, who would] 
look for the practical implications of any new ideas or theories. (Pritchard, 2014, loc. 1077–90) 
In short, an activist (a dweller) through reflection may frame some uniformities (building) that 
can, pragmatically, also be used by other people, reinforcing their experience/knowledge. The 
discipline that covers most aspects related to reflection-in/on-action and learning is commonly 
referred to as Action Learning (McGill & Brockbank, 2004; Pedler, 2008), which Marquardt 
and Waddill (2004) translate according to the following formula: Learning = Programed 
knowledge (books, organizational memory, etc.) + Questioning (fresh information) + 
Reflection (remembering, thinking about, trying to comprehend). 
According to this formula, apart from reflection, understanding is improved both in terms of i) 
the elements of knowledge that strategists must organize in order to develop a knowledge-
creating company (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), and ii) in making use of the generative 
process of intuitions, “by focusing on the right questions rather than on the right answers” 
(Marquardt & Waddill, 2004, p. 192) including, as Cohen (1998) remarks, “the underlying 
causes that loom beneath any given performance problem” (p. 32): 
The effort of invention consists most often in raising the problem [i.e., true freedom lies in a power to 
decide, to constitute problems themselves]. (Deleuze, 1991, p. 15, my italics) 
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The rationality of problem solving, and the rationality of decision making too, depend on the prior 
practical rationality of attending to what ‘the problem’ really is. (Forester, 1999, loc. 514) 
According to this view, considering that “the deliberative practitioner learns from 
conversation and action” (Forester, 1999, loc. 217), the process of creation and problem 
solving is like a permanent interview, during which intuition is dialectically activated while 
answering questions that, in turn, activate further questions (Day, 1997). 
Creative intuition 
Creative intuition (creativity) is the synthetic impression that comes into consciousness with 
an aura of certainty (a Eureka! moment) after a certain period of incubation. It is “the pause 
that enlightens” (Goldberg, 1983, p. 63), inscribed in a continuous mental process (Dane & 
Pratt, 2009; Hayashi, 2001; Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Myers, 2002; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 
2004; Shapiro & Spence, 1997; Wild, 2013). 
Miller and Ireland (2005) associate expert intuition with a feeling of familiarity, while seeing 
that creative intuition produces a sensation of being right. Nevertheless, the latter depends on 
the former inasmuch as … 
The more ideas and images each of us gained through accumulated learning [experience], the more 
chances we have to combine the building blocks in creative ways. (Myers, 2002, loc. 965) 
In contrast to expert intuition, creativity supplements memory with external elements in order 
to generate the novum (Dörfler & Ackermann, 2012) by synthesis, i.e. something “truly new”: 
Expert intuition relies on your own experience, while strategic intuition draws on the experience of 
everyone else in the world as well. (Duggan, 2013, loc. 1026) 
Because creative intuitions tend to involve blending or integrating fairly diverse aspects of information 
in novel ways, they are often associated with discovery or the generation of something ‘truly new’. 
(Dane & Pratt, 2009, p. 10) 
Creative intuition is of the utmost importance to strategy, therefore, since it “may lead to 
insights which can result in major creative breakthroughs and commercial innovations” 
(Sadler-Smith, 2012, loc. 1421). 
In fact, the importance of creative intuition to strategy was confirmed in the 1990s, in a study 
undertaken by Parikh et al. (1994), in which 1,312 managers from nine countries participated, 
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and where the importance of intuition was ranked number one for corporate strategy and 
planning (selected 79.9 per cent of the time). 
The connection between creative intuition and strategy may explain why the latter demands 
certain duration to produce its effects, not only in execution, but also in formulation: 
An incubation period is often necessary for insight to occur because it enables non-conscious processes 
to operate more freely by relaxing constraints imposed by rational analysis. (Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p. 
279) 
Intuitions are [slow] intimations of [fast] insights. (Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p. 279) 
Insights are culminations of sustained underground activity called “incubation”. (Kounios & Beeman, 
2015, loc. 422) 
Conditioned by one’s genetic heritage, surrounding culture, and previous learning, the mind combines 
fragments of ideas, information, conjectures, impressions, etc., to form ‘many-sided, implicit cross-
references’, which become a new orientation. (Richards, 2004, loc. 1121, my italics) 
In other words, to produce an insight by creative intuition requires “an incubation period”, 
“[slow] intimations”, an “underground activity called ‘incubation”’, and “genetic heritage, 
surrounding culture, and previous learning”, all demanding a certain duration. 
Can intuition be trusted? 
This said, however, considering that intuitions are not always right and that “feelings can be 
expensive” (Richards, 2013, loc. 1095), how are managers to distinguish “the marvels of 
intuition from its flaws” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 235) when listening to these inner voices? 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) affirm that the successes brought by intuition (intuitive skill) are 
“unpredictable in zero-validity environments [as is the case of guesses in a casino]” (p. 524). 
From an alternative viewpoint, this would suggest that intuition should not be used in 
situations for which it is impossible to establish a grounded (and sustainable) relation between 
cause and effect (Fisher, 2010): 
[For instance] Ignore your feelings about the direction of the stock market. (Richards, 2013, loc. 1095) 
Johnson (2013) offers a more concrete list of when to trust intuition and when it is inadvisable 
to do so. Miller and Ireland (2005) on the other hand note that i) holistic hunches (creative 
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intuition) and ii) automated expertise (expert intuition) are more suitable for exploration of the 
unknown (e.g. a company’s new market positioning) and exploitation of the known (e.g. a 
company’s current information systems), respectively, where they recommend that the 
correspondence is not reversed. 
In addition, Kahneman and Klein (2009) note that for people who base intuition in mature, 
learned, lived experience – as Thaler and Sunstein (2009) affirm, “the automatic system 
[intuition] can be trained with lots of repetition […] but such training takes a lot of time and 
effort” (loc. 334) –, “the product of intensive learning, practice and feedback” (Hodgkinson et 
al., 2009, p. 287), 
[including] “deliberate practice”, where an expert coach […] takes you through well-designed training 
over months or years, and you give your full concentration [to it]. (Goleman, 2013, p. 163) 
… since these people have a greater tendency to be right than those who base intuition in 
heuristic processes, deciding recklessly “by [non-educated] trial-and-error or by rules that are 
only loosely defined”.35 Dane and Pratt (2007) also subscribe to this idea, adding to it the 
notion of domain-relevant schemas … 
Individuals who can bring complex, domain-relevant [i.e. applied to a specific reality] schemas to bear 
on a problem are more likely to make effective intuitive decisions than those who employ heuristics and 
simpler, domain-independent schemas. (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 43) 
… and of explicit learning … 
Explicit learning will positively influence the effectiveness of intuitive decision making through the 
formation of complex, domain relevant schemas. (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 43, my italics) 
More as an image than something that could be measured by the minute, Ericsson et al. 
(2007), when talking about the time it takes to become an expert, point to the need for ten 
years (10,000 hours) of hard practice to acquire respected experience. Nevertheless, Goleman 
(2013) draws attention to the fact that the 10,000 hours might represent a myth if people make 
the same mistakes over and over, never learning from them. 
 
                                                          
35 See http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/heuristic (accessed 27/02/2016). 
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Finally, since intuition also includes the  
cultural and emotional biases of that lifetime (Bonabeau, 2003, p. 118, citing Bruce Henderson, founder 
of the Boston Consulting Group) 
… it is important to access the rightness or wrongness of possible cultural or emotional biases 
by playing devil’s advocate. This is because, “with remarkable ease, we [also] form and 
sustain false beliefs” (Myers, 2002, loc. 1034), especially if it is considered that “people are 
susceptible to irrelevant influences from their immediate environment (which we call context 
effects), irrelevant emotions, short-sightedness, and other forms of irrationality” (Ariely, 
2009, loc. 3370, my italics), alongside bounded (or politically biased) rationality. This type is 
well illustrated by the organized anarchies of the Garbage Can Model, developed by Cohen et 
al. (1972), “plagued with goal ambiguity and conflict” (p. 16), and even (or, sometimes, 
“except”) in rational (thought) situations for which “the display of emotion [is] one key tacit 
resource for the ‘production of persuasion’” (Samra-Fredericks, 2003, p. 163). 
Playing devil’s advocate is also important for detecting and fighting against indisputable 
economical and business truths, since as repeated almost ad nauseam, and as reinforced by 
Dobbs et al. (2014): 
the collision of technological disruption, rapid emerging-markets growth, and widespread aging is 
upending long-held assumptions that underpin strategy setting, decision making, and management. (p. 
1) 
By playing devil’s advocate and generating counter-arguments – (counter-)arguments that in 
themselves contain patterns (typical of certain classes of arguments) which may be studied 
and used in sophisticated conversations (Morgado, 2003) – “executives can probe intuitive 
decisions for inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and irrelevancies” (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004, 
p. 86), by, as Milkman et al. (2009) note, … 
Simply encouraging people to ‘consider the opposite’ of whatever decision they are about to make 
reduces errors in judgement caused by several particularly robust biases: overconfidence, hindsight 
[remembrance], and anchoring. (p. 361) 
All in all, it can be said that the more an action is educated, i.e. honed by reflecting on 
experiences, the more an intuition can prove accurate. This assertion possibly implies that 
strategists as dwellers should invest in the construction of buildings that, while not reducing 
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their freedom of movement – with “movement” being literally taken in the sense of a 
processual/dynamic view of reality –, will protect them from strategic randomness; i.e. 
protect them from instinctual improvisation combined with disoriented intuition, something 
that inconsequent small talk among inconsistent management would most probably permit.  
In summary, in starting to analyse the pair thought vs. action, this section on intuition brought 
to light the function of action, which can be just experimental, as i) a trigger of intuition and 
ii) a generator of a practical trial-and-error reflection that at times due to volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA), does not always allow for a traditional 
rational decision-making process where actors are capable of digesting all information and 
making reliable cause-and-effect predictions. And in addition, it was also noted that acting 
without thinking might lead to a company’s extinction by instinct. 
The literature study, in relation to the intelligence vs. intuition pair, analysed further how 
intelligence, representative of rational thought, and intuition might interact; with the first 
assigning building to the second, and thus contributing to useful intuitive decision-making, 
and the second ascribing dwelling to the first, and thus bringing analytical intelligence closer 
to the field of action. Taking this direction, intuition was then divided into expert intuition and 
creative intuition, the first capturing the experiential side of sympathy with action, and the 
second capturing the possibility of using former patterns to generate new insights or 
innovative re-creations of strategic thinking. 
Section (2.3.2) ended with an explanation of the conditions that must be observed in order for 
intuition (considered a non-rational mode of decision making) to be trusted. Among other 
insights, the importance of playing devil’s advocate and the need to heed the dialectics it 
generates were highlighted, not only for testing intuitions but also to further foster creation. 
As section 4.2 will clarify, this dialectic wave of thinking and acting is directly linked with 
the flow of duration – a complex and dynamic concept ‒ and thus an elusive one that will be 
studied in more detail below. 
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(2.4) Duration  
This section seeks additional perspectives on how it may be possible to analyse and 
communicate – using Bergsonian intelligence, considered a tool – something that is captured 
in “living time, time experienced through intuition” (Styhre, 2003, p. 17) – a faculty that “is 
possible only from the inside and requires a sort of sympathy with the known entity” 
(Colombo, 2009, p. 263). This something, captured by intuition, is duration – a concept for 
which “there is no juxtaposition of events; [and] therefore is no mechanist causality” (p. 262). 
When this non-causality is borne in mind, i) when the causality between current strategic 
decisions and the future effects of their execution is what is at stake; ii) when an ethnographic 
method was not the/an option chosen for this research, a fact that undermines the possibility 
of experiencing a direct living time from inside; and, additionally, iii) when all of this must be 
communicated – since “in fact Bergson considered linguistic abilities functional to intellect 
more than to intuition” (Colombo, 2009, p. 266) –, it makes it easier to see why a new angle 
for inspecting duration is now needed. 
Although, as seen in previous sections, Bergson links duration to intuition and intuition to the 
“truly new”, as Cunningham (1914) adverted to: “the past is never merely old [dynamic 
memory] nor is the present ever wholly new [dynamic imagination]” (p. 539). This remark is 
essential to an understanding of why, although the “truly new” is a requisite of a (competitive) 
strategy capable of surprising competitors and clients, strategy formulation and formation is 
nevertheless a (conscious) process that possesses one (controllable) characteristic: “its 
anticipatory [i.e. non-surprising] nature, its tendency to become, not just anything, but 
something” (p. 539). 
Change as such 
Nevertheless, as implied above, although a deliberated/captured strategy holds as an essential 
requisite for the logically unforeseeable “truly new” – something that might be seen as 
paradoxical if a deliberated/captured strategy is seen as quite the opposite of unforeseeable – 
it is still possible and not contradictory, as Kleinherenbrink (2014) points out, since Bergson 
compares duration – as in the case of strategy creation/formation – to “a melody [that] is 
constituted by change as such” (p. 224), i.e. to something that is difficult to arrest. 
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This processual/dynamic concept of Bergson’s may sometimes seem difficult to grasp, due to 
the paradoxical nature of the oxymoron “arresting (imprisoning) movement”. In fact, 
strategically speaking, how is it possible to deliberately create the “truly new” and fix it in a 
plan, if movement/duration is needed to create this “truly new”? Or to put the question in 
somewhat different terms, how is it possible to hold on while deliberating and then, after this 
moment, act, execute? A plausible answer might be “by making the mistake of not 
considering duration, of not considering change as such”, as a melody embodies: 
When we listen to a melody, we have a clear perception of movement and succession which is not the 
movement of ‘something’ [but change as such]. (Chia, 2002, p. 865) 
In this context, strategists must be prepared to master change (Bremer, 2012; Cameron & 
Quinn, 2011; Katzenbach & Khan, 2010; Kotter, 1990; Kotter, 2012) as such, and not just 
pursue artificially fixed (deterministic) plans if they want to succeed in a strategy that, in 
order to be considered as such, must include duration: 
The future [future strategy] does not exist [for a determinist] […] since for a determinist every event 
merely unfolds the ready-made reality hidden in existent conditions. […] On the contrary, the life of the 
universe [including strategizing] is a creative process, whereby something new and thus unpredictable 
appears at every moment. (Kolakowski, 2001, pp. 2–3) 
This becoming world-view [in duration] privileges change over persistence, activity [verb] over 
substance [substantive], process [dynamic] over product [static] and novelty over continuity. (Chia, 
2002, p. 866, my italics) 
One must reintroduce her/himself into duration to capture reality on the mobility that is the essence. 
(Bergson, 2001g, p. 1272) 
With this supremacy of “creative process”, “novelty” and “mobility” in mind, it is close to 
inevitable that this section will try to bring some understanding to the confrontation ‒ or better 
put, contrary ‒ acquaintanceship, between strategic deliberation and unpredictability, between 
act and fact, between dynamic memory ingrained in the manager’s experience and future 
dynamic creation in the course of strategic duration/creation, which leads to newness. 
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Attention 
One key element that might be suitable to reconcile these complementary opposites – 
deliberated-unpredictable, act-fact, or memory-future – is attention and its condition as an 
expression of purpose, considered an intrinsic element of any strategy: 
Every act of attention is the expression of a purpose, either immediate or remote, either in the form of a 
clearly conceived end [a strategic vision] or in the form of a sub-conscious tendency [conceivably 
interwoven with corporate culture]. [On the other hand] purposes […] anticipate the future, and, 
through this anticipatory quality, control the passing ‘presents’ of conscious experience. (Cunningham, 
1914, p. 534, my italics) 
In other words, strategy implies a purpose and this purpose requires attention. This attention 
will lead to a sort of selection of the “truly new” f/acts, which will be labelled as strategically 
relevant, as a strategic issue: “an emerging development, trend or event which is potentially 
relevant to the organization’s strategy” (Dutton & Duncan, 1987, p. 281), and which will have 
originated through interaction with stakeholders ‒ i.e. “those individuals, actors, and 
organized groups and institutions that have bearing on the policies and actions of the 
organization” (Dutton & Duncan, 1987, p. 282). Regarding these interactions with 
stakeholders, Jarzabkowski et al. (2015) note the existence of “a global ‘nexus’ of practices” 
(p. vi) and “rationalities through which different elements of the market are coordinated 
within collective practice” (p. 53) or “a pattern of activities that is recognizable” (p. 206). 
In this context strategizing is clearly not about engaging in an uncontrolled process by which 
duration and its apparent unpredictability assumes the lead as inconsequential artistry. On the 
contrary, strategizing implies that managers shall be attentive and selective in relation to 
certain issues that will trigger and then maintain a deliberated course of action in preference to 
any other. Hereafter, various definitions of attention/selection are provided: 
Attention as selection has been the most common paradigm for research. (Roda, 2011a, loc. 603, my 
italics); Bottom-up processes [of attention] select stimuli on the basis of their saliency, where saliency is 
determined by how much an item stands out from its background [a SWOT analysis]. (Roda, 2011a, loc. 
674); Top-down processes, instead, select stimuli on the basis of their relevance to the current task or 
goal [strategic objectives]. (Roda, 2011a, loc. 684); Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of 
its [attention’s] essence. It implies [like strategy] withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others. (James, 2011, loc. 7243); Attention’s essential effect is to render perception 
more intense and to get rid of details. (Bergson, 2001b, p. 245) 
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Naturally, if this selective exercise, settled by attention, is pushed to the limit with leaders 
rejecting the “truly new” because it has been labelled as “irrelevant” and, simultaneously 
deciding against change, both newness and change are cancelled out by a blind and stiff 
“propulsion [drive] of anticipatory [strategic] purposes and aims” (Cunningham, 1914, p. 
535). In similar conditions, then, it could be said that competitive strategizing should be 
suspended since, as implied in the current work and as noted above, strategic creation 
involves duration shaped by change as such, which implies that acceptance of a certain dose 
of its unpredictability is essential. 
Furthermore, if this exercise of paying attention to the known (the opposite of the “truly new”) 
– either as part of a purposeful strategy or due to being imprisoned in memory/culture – is 
pushed to its limit, then the “truly new” will be tyrannically transformed into the truly known. 
Now, through this despotic behaviour, it might be that artificial strategy will be made/baptized 
ex post, and leaders will rhetorically reinforce their self-fulfilling prophecies and 
correspondent linguistic legitimacy (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), defining reality 
(Zbaracki, 1998) as almost divine leaders. This artificiality does not correspond to strategy-
creation, but only strategy baptism, which at best can be useful to gain legitimacy in order to 
convince corporate stakeholders to favour the continuation of a certain strategy. 
In conclusion, it could be said that duration – “the stuff out of which [strategic] conscious 
existence is made; for a conscious being, to exist is to change and to change is to endure” 
(Cunningham, 1914, p. 526) – is a concept that may help managers to determine the 
strategically effective range within which their strategic guidance shall evolve. Too little 
guidance, refraining from labelling relevant future f/acts, due to a lack of purpose and 
attention, will lead to a predominance of fortuitousness; and too much control, in the sense of 
an enclosed dictatorship and its dogmatic attention, will lead to non-change – and thus, non-
duration/non-strategic creation – or to an ex post baptized strategy. 
In light of this ‒ and having as a fundamental requisite leaders’ openness to engage in 
constructive dialogue, instead of dictatorship, either with the researcher in the course of this 
project, or with their stakeholders ‒ the current research sets out to analyse how the 
participant CEOs pay attention to the “truly new”, as one of the chosen techniques to 
rationalize something (duration) that belongs to experiential intuition. 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 68 
 
Could this technique of rationalization, of paying attention to attention, be considered too 
artificial? No, not if attention is considered as a requisite of survival; in order to surpass 
“immediate impediment” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 39) while dwelling – an overtaking action that 
implies a “mental faculty of considering or taking notice of someone or something [the 
immediate impediment]”36 that “is said to guide action” (Stojanov & Kulakov, 2011, loc. 
5746), “implying a degree of reactive spontaneity” (James, 2011, loc. 7245) – and 
furthermore, since during the current project dwelling has been attached so closely to 
intuition, the answer may again conceivably be no, because: 
[Although] during last century information was a scarce resource; [n]ow, human attention has become 
the scarce resource whereas information (of all types and quantities) abounds. (Roda, 2011b, loc. 322) 
Chia – for whom “reality is change” (Chia, 2002, p. 866) and thus, as “change is indivisible 
[like a melody]” (p. 866), “the past would be immanent in the present” (p. 866) – gives an 
additional reason for the essentiality of attention in a context where managers do not need to 
remember but, on the contrary, need to selectively forget the past that is already immanent in 
the present: 
Organization37 [as in our brain] is a censoring/centring device that works to create a figure/ground effect 
[which includes a strategic vision] so that attention, focus and purposefulness are directed towards 
productive outcomes. (Chia, 2002, p. 866, my italics) 
Furthermore, since “for Bergson, the past, present and future are always related in durée 
[duration]” (Styhre, 2003, p. 18), it is essential to understand how it is possible to separate 
these moments/stages while asking interviewees/managers to talk about i) what they presently 
intend to execute going forward and in the future, and ii) what they have actually done in the 
past; this notably in order for the researcher to carry out the research underlying this section. 
This need, in essence, is what leads to the concept of a virtual strategy and to the notion that a 
strategy can be real while being actual: that is, a strategy can be a strategy even if it is not the 
final strategy yet. And why is this precision important? Because this project has shifted 
perspective from i) strategy as a supposedly finished thing – a plan – ready to be implemented 
                                                          
36 On attention, see: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/attention (accessed 30/07/2016). 
37 Chia considers that “‘Organizations’ are conceptually-stabilized abstractions: ‘islands’ of fabricated coherence in a sea of 
chaos and change” (Chia, 2002, p. 866). 
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at a later time, to ii) an activity during which strategy is created, i.e. it is in the course/process 
of formation. 
Virtual strategy 
As Colombo (2009, p. 264) and Styhre (2003, p. 18) reaffirm, citing Proust, the “virtual is real 
without being actual and ideal without being abstract”. This affirmation means that these 
authors are likely to share a processual/dynamic view of reality, this, also applied to 
knowledge: “actionable knowledge can only be virtual knowledge” (Colombo, 2009, p. 264, 
my italics), since “knowledge is always in a state of becoming, i.e. in a state of being further 
refined, developed, used and transformed” (Styhre, 2003, p. 19, my italics). 
Making an intuitive parallel between knowledge and strategy, since both are subject to a 
cognitive process of formation, we can affirm that strategy, translated into the vision and 
action plan managers intend – ideal without being abstract – to execute – to be actual – and 
which steers their attention “is still real and ideal without being abstract to us” (Styhre, 2003, 
p. 19), i.e. it is virtual, it is something. 
In other words, a possible answer to the state strategy stands in now – given the fact that it is 
developed in duration, and that duration conceptually has no defined past/present/future – 
while in the state of being formed, i.e. in the state of becoming actual, in duration, is that it is 
virtual and consequently real, since “duration [is] where the real and the virtual meet” 
(Linstead, 2014, loc. 6178). 
This virtual state reinforces the vision that strategy is not only that which is implemented, i.e. 
what is actual, since “the totality of our knowledge [strategy] is always a combination of 
virtual and actual knowledge [strategy]” (Styhre, 2003, p. 20), a fact that reinforces the 
perspective underlying this project, which is the mastering of duration. 
In addition, and considering the discussion in the initial paragraphs of this section, it may also 
be assumed that attention is what maintains duration, what makes it active between these two 
moments – virtual and actual, between current actions and future results – and, thus, 
associates i) a gap between decision and execution with ii) a breach of attention. Naturally, 
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the idea is not to reproduce the entire answer for the strategic question here – since this is the 
ultimate goal of the current research as a whole. Instead, here, the intention is to offer a 
number of contributions that seek to comprehend what the drivers of attention are; thus 
extracting some clues towards understanding how the gap between decision/virtual and 
execution/actual might possibly be reduced. 
The method elected to analyse possible breaches of attention – the conceivable cause for the 
fissures in strategic formulation and formation already referred to – is not based on analysis of 
inattention, such as “selective inattention […] [to] things that people who have been 
accustomed to the life of the organisation do not see” (Schon, 1970, p. 4, my italics). Instead, 
it is based on the contrary view, i.e. how to foster/hold attention. 
Directly associated with the actions of fostering and holding attention are the concepts of 
highlighting (information) and framing (meanings), bearing in mind that, as Ramirez et al. 
(2013) note, “all acts of highlighting are also acts of framing” (p. 827). 
 
(2.4.1) Fostering attention – Highlighting 
“Highlighting is an act of conceiving and promoting issues, thereby directing attention to 
certain issues ahead of others” (Ramírez et al., 2013, p. 827, my italics). There are various 
articles related to this topic (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Dutton & 
Ashford, 1993), namely on i) labelling an issue as strategic, ii) the creation of momentum to 
focus attention on it, and iii) selling this, highlighting it, to senior management and dominant 
stakeholders – such as, for instance, those stakeholders that limit companies under 
intervention and branches of multinational companies. 
Labelling 
It has already been noted that strategic issues are captured/created in response to external 
challenges, since … 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 71 
 
The short-term effectiveness and long-term survival of organizations are determined partly by the 
actions they take in response to [strategic issues on] their external environments. (Dutton & Jackson, 
1987, p. 76, my italics) 
Managers ascribe meanings to strategic issues by categorizing them by use of labels. 
Labelling/categorizing is a crucial strategic activity, because “it reduces the complexity of the 
stimulus world by organizing objects into meaningful groups” (Dutton & Jackson, 1987, p. 
78), fostering a closer, more consensual relationship between “strategic issues and eventual 
organizational action” (p. 79, my italics). As Bergson affirms, we do not see a thing in itself, 
but only the practical tag that it carries (Bergson, 2001c, p. 460). 
However, seen another way, considering that “an interpretative view of meaning and action 
predominates any attempts to link individual cognition to organizational actions” (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987, p. 76, my italics), then labelling/categorizing assumes a crucial role, since it 
may create strategic reality. In fact, managers do so inasmuch as it gives rise to selective 
managerial attention/disregard or positive/negative tendencies towards issues/non-issues or 
opportunities/threats that may emerge; what could be termed a fact or non-fact, which gives 
rise to an act or non-act. Naturally, and in accordance with Dutton and Jackson (1987), 
managers can affect labelling during/for strategizing, namely i) by working on the criteria 
underlying the task, and ii) by ascribing positive or negative values to the labels, connecting 
them to positive or negative individual outcomes. 
Momentum 
Once a topic/action is labelled relevant/irrelevant, or an opportunity/threat, to mention but two 
possible categories, it is important to ascribe it a priority, i.e. to identify the momentum that 
puts it on the table. According to Dutton and Duncan (1987), evaluation of urgency and 
feasibility, within an organizational environment that has already been characterized as 
interpretivist and constructionist, is what decides action, starting with decisional action. 
Urgency in this respect is related the cost resulting from paralysis, the result of doing nothing, 
in resolving a problem, or taking advantage of an opportunity; while feasibility is related to 
the capacity to i) identify a suitable solution and ii) to economically implement it. If both 
urgency and feasibility are low/high, the consequences in terms of action are clear: stop/start, 
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respectively. If urgency is high and feasibility is low, then organizational frustration based on 
inaction might increase; whereas if urgency is low and feasibility high, opportunistic actions 
of the spare-time action type can most probably take place. 
Selling 
The sponsorship of senior management, but also of stakeholders, seems vital in labelling a 
certain issue as strategic, a previous condition of allocating attention to it that, according to 
Dutton and Ashford (1993), is “a necessary precursor to their taking substantive action” (p. 
404, my italics). To attain this sponsorship, managers have to sell an event as a strategic issue, 
by capturing the attention of senior management/major stakeholders to focus this attention on 
a certain issue, by organizing resources/routines in the desired direction. 
Dutton and Ashford (1993) also advocate the idea that sellers may act i) as pure 
constructionists, building a reality that is supported, as shown below, by certain frames; ii) by 
impression management (Goffman, 2016) centred on creating a good impression, acting as a 
sort of reward-henchman; and iii) by persuasion, namely by means of rhetorical devices 
(Morgado, 2003). 
Raising a certain strategic issue to the top of the agenda/priorities of leadership/stakeholders, 
persuading them to buy-in and offer their sponsorship, can be measured by “(a) the naming of 
an issue, (b) collection of relevant information, (c) conversation about the issue, or (d) 
creation of either roles or task forces devoted to the issue” (Dutton & Ashford, 1993, p. 404, 
my italics). Among other factors, Dutton and Ashford (1993) link the success of selling to the 
following: 
(i) Credibility of the seller; (ii) presenting the issue with an attached solution; (iii) demonstrating the high 
payoff in considering the issue as strategic; (iv) higher expertise of leadership/stakeholders in the issue 
at stake; (v) the use of a convincing/consensual frame; (vi) the use of effective emotion; (vii) evidence 
that supports claims; (viii) being synthetic (right to the point).  
Consequently, a good seller of a strategic labelling and/or momentum most likely increases 
their potential for being very successful if they are credible, advance a solution instead of a 
problem, draw a business case that shows payoff, are considered an expert, know how to use 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 73 
 
emotion, provide evidence, are right to the point and, as will be analysed hereafter, have a 
convincing/consensual frame that gives sense/ purpose, to a certain course of action. 
 
(2.4.2) Holding attention – Framing 
As Creed et al. (2002) note, frames “define boundaries [windows] and direct our attention to 
what events and texts are relevant [perspectives] for our understanding of an issue or 
situation” (p. 36, my italics). Various authors have published papers on the characteristics of 
framing (Gamson & Lasch, 1980; Kaplan, 2008; Ramírez et al., 2013), including on i) 
scheme, ii) political status, and iii) value-added (or value-destruction if/when frames become 
straightjackets that hinder attention to the emergent) brought about by consensus. 
Scheme 
With regard to the subject of a scheme38 ‒ this is a framing ‒ a “day-to-day sense making 
technique” (Creed et al., 2002, p. 36) that creates “packages of meaning” (p. 37), references, 
grounds and reasons; each of which, according to Gamson and Lasch (1980) contains its own 
signature, its own “set of elements that suggest its core frame and position in a shorthand 
fashion” (p. 3), sometimes rhetorically, as if someone were “try[ing] to tell a tale around a 
specific set of circumstances” (Freedman, 2013, p. 563). As an example of a scheme, or 
schemes, eight different possible signatures have been assumed, which may be synthesized as 
follows: 
• Metaphors: when an idea (principal) is presented in terms of the characteristics of 
another idea (association) – a common example is when someone wants to 
characterize a company as resource-intensive with low value, and refers to it as a 
white elephant; 
• Exemplars: to create a sort of past metaphor, in which the associated idea is a 
memorable (strong) past idea (event) – may often be used in economic turnaround 
situations, in which the past is used as an example of what not to do; 
                                                          
38 A scheme is “a large-scale systematic plan or arrangement for attaining some particular object or putting a particular idea 
into effect”. See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/scheme (accessed 27/5/2017). 
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• Catch-Phrases: “are attempted [memorable] summary statements [tag-lines, titles, 
slogans] about the principal subject” (Gamson & Lasch, 1980, p. 5) – a typical catch-
phrase is “clients first”; 
• Depictions: act like weak metaphors/exemplars, limiting their function to colour the 
principal with strong adjectives – if managers want to cut certain expenses they 
consider unacceptable they can refer to them as delirious expenses, outrageous 
expenses …; 
• Visual Images: “we include here icons and other visual images that suggest the core of 
a package” (Gamson & Lasch, 1980, p. 5) – logos, created to accompany certain 
internal meetings and programmes, are a good illustration of the strong symbolic value 
of images; 
• Roots: when a package gives sense to certain elements that are based on the 
background of the current situation to illuminate it – managers usually appeal to past 
mismanagement (system) in order to explain the reason for making members of the 
workforce redundant …; 
• Consequences: where a certain package is anchored to foreseen consequences that 
the principal (current situation) will generate – … or to the sustainability of the 
company and, consequently, the preservation of many jobs; 
• Appeal to principal: when “packages rely on characteristic moral appeals and uphold 
certain general precepts” (Gamson & Lasch, 1980, p. 6) – these may include appeals to 
values belonging to a specific corporate culture, like working hard, client-centricity, or 
low cost. 
Politicking 
Apart from the strategic value that framing and its inherent language game brings, by making 
sense of, and providing a certain “truth” to certain strategic decisions/actions (Samra-
Fredericks, 2005), framing is also a purposeful political activity in its own right, especially, as 
Carter et al. (2008) note, with regard to “how power and politics shape the strategies that 
emerge” (p. 83). 
Framing is on the agenda for managers who engage in a sort of competition for selling a 
predominant collective frame (Kaplan, 2008) – “practical accomplishments forged in 
contention [dispute]” (p. 744) – which may achieve the status of law and its correspondent 
true outcomes. These framing actions, which represent execution while deciding, make up 
part of “a process [of sense-making] by which these outcomes are [thus] constructed” (p. 746, 
my italics), not only by moulding ideas, but also by creating “contexts for action” (p. 747), 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 75 
 
moving further away from probably naïve “conceptions of strategy as a set of neutral or 
‘rational techniques’” (Samra-Fredericks, 2005, p. 804). 
Taken from a perspective referred to by Mintzberg as political games, politicking assumes 
more belligerent facets: 
The competing goals of individuals and coalitions ensure that any intended strategy will be disturbed 
and distorted every step of the way. People play all sorts of ‘political games’ in organizations 
[insurgency, counterinsurgency, sponsorship, alliance (peer power)-building, empire (power with 
subordinates)-building, budgeting, expertise, lording (by decree), line/staff, rival camps, strategic 
(promote) candidates, whistle-blowing, young Turks (reformists)]. (Mintzberg et al., 2009, pp. 244–46) 
These belligerent facets identified by Mintzberg, in which “insurgency” or barriers to change 
might assume a crucial role in a process of strategic change, can be complemented by what 
Buchanan and Badman (2008) call “management turf [territory] tactics”, organized around: 
Image building [appearance]; information games [manipulation]; scapegoating [blaming]; alliances 
[support]; networking [influence]; compromise [negotiation]; rule games [bureaucracy]; positioning 
[visibility]; issue selling [propaganda]; dirty tricks [underworld]. (Buchanan & Badham, 2008, p. 16, my 
italics) 
Finally, unethical politicking includes “situations that involve bargaining,39 whereby purely 
selfish people tend to perform less effectively than others who have a strong emotional 
commitment to norms and fairness” (Frank, 1988, p. x). More vicious still is the unlawful 
defence of personal interests, another power source or turf-war trait that gives rise to white-
collar crimes (Morgado, 2005), and particularly to corruption (Morgado, 2007), distorting and 
jeopardizing a vital goal of any organization: to sustainably serve their stakeholders. 
Consensus 
The dominant frames will “focus and shape management attention [to issues/responses] […] 
which would have otherwise remained peripheral” (Ramírez et al., 2013, p. 827), thus 
increasing political clout. The choice of dominant frames, therefore, potentially mobilizes a 
high level of consensus. Sometimes, however, the frames need not be concerned with 
                                                          
39 On negotiation, taken as a value-added process rather than just a bargaining tool, see O Processo Negocial (Morgado, 
1994). 
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consensus but just compliance, if in the meantime decisions have already been converted into 
a binding project or action plan around specific strategizing. 
But even consensus, according to Homburg et al. (1999), may not always be a good thing. 
One specific case in which the lack of consensus might be better is, as Murrell et al. (1993) 
suggest, while playing devil’s advocate. This has already been referred to in section 2.3.2 as 
an instrument to enhance the reliability of intuitive thinking. 
Nevertheless, having acknowledged this, with the objective that managers avoid blindly 
pursuing consensus, strategic consensus – i.e. what Kellermanns et al. (2005) call “the shared 
understanding of strategic priorities among managers at the top, middle, and/or operating 
levels of the organization” (p. 721, my italics) – is still considered crucial to effective strategy 
formation and is easier to achieve among a homogeneous group of managers, sharing simple 
and stable beliefs (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). 
But in what sense can consensus be crucial to effective strategy formation? Consensus should 
i) enhance managers’ understanding of a certain strategy, by combining or synthesizing “the 
various separate understandings into a unity that reconstitutes, or provides a better 
understanding of, the concrete” (Herepath, 2014, p. 874); and ii) foster commitment, which is 
maximized [namely] when strategic objectives are aligned with a bonus scheme (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992). 
And naturally in terms of framing, as noted above, if it is blind either through negligence or 
deliberately, it will be converted into a value-destroying liability: it will imprison managers in 
straightjackets, creating artificialities that, as Bergson points out, might be laughable. 
In this context, and considering that framing – which can be formed of various sub-frames 
and permits the coexistence of several frames, even if one is the frame-of-frames (Ramírez et 
al., 2013) – may be followed by reframing, in turn triggered by new highlighting(s), it is 
reasonable to acknowledge that a certain frame is what keeps a certain strategic duration 
going, while a certain highlighting is suitable in order to create a new frame (i.e. changing 
strategic course) in a close and mutually influential relationship, in which cause and effect are 
not clearly defined: 
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[…] Framing and reframing acts took place, which were aimed at group consensus regarding which 
signals to highlight. (Ramírez et al., 2013, p. 832) 
With this in mind, it was nearly inevitable that questions underlying the research of duration 
should comprise the concepts of highlighting and framing and correspondent 
characteristics/causes, as depicted in Figure 5 ‒ a framework conceived in order to analyse 
strategic duration, titled Framework of Strategic Duration: 
Momentum 
(urgent x feasible)
Politicking 
(power contests)
Scheme 
(and rhetoric)
Consensus 
(understanding x 
commitment)
Foster
ATTENTION
Keeping
FRAMING
HIGHLIGHTING
Labelling
(stakeholders/
SWOT)
Selling 
(sponsorship)
 
Figure 5 ‒ Framework of Strategic Duration 
 
This framework will serve as the nodes and lenses, through which analysis and interpretation 
of the interviews on duration will take place over the course of the qualitative research 
presented in sections 3.3 and 4.2. In the introduction to Chapter 4 – the research findings – 
and especially in section 4.2, some additional literature has been introduced to explore how 
duration, presumably a flow that is accessed intuitively, can best be explained 
intelligently/analytically, namely by breaking its continuum into six constituents represented 
in Figure 5 above. 
It is also important to note at this point that, despite the fact that any constituents analytically 
identified for duration might create an idea of a duration (which after all can be fragmented 
into separate parts, as will be seen), the notion that strategic duration can be spatially 
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represented as a line traced by a pen, as mentioned in section 2.2.1, is still valid. As presented 
above, this line is formed by a forward movement, although possibly slowed down by back-
and-forth movements at different stages/constituents, and this forward movement is what 
gives strategy its thickness;40 i.e. its strategic quality, since duration measures qualitative 
time. Should a strategy disregard one or more of the constituents, the strategy might then 
become thinner and thus more prone to breaking. 
All in all, the literature review consolidated the opinion that, to answer the strategic question 
that underlies this work – How can the formal gap between strategic decision and execution 
be reduced? – a processual/dynamic view of reality would best be adopted. 
To bring this idea to the forefront, the researcher turned both i) to the discipline of Strategy-
as-Practice and ii) to philosophy, making use of Bergsonian theory. 
From looking at the discipline of Strategy-as-Practice and through analysis of Bergson’s 
philosophical theories, notably in terms of decision vs. execution and building vs. dwelling, 
the researcher reinforced the need to focus the current study on the activity of strategizing 
rather than on strategy as a model/plan and, by the same token, developed the notion that the 
activity undertaken by managers while strategizing had to be, in some way, framed by 
building practices that could ascribe some deliberate direction to dwelling praxis. 
Taking an overview of Bergson’s theories, the researcher came to a decision about which 
Bergsonian concepts to select in order to analyse reality in dynamism, particularly in relation 
to strategizing. The selection made was, on one hand, concerned with intuition and its 
interactions with intelligence and, on the other hand, with duration. Intuition is essential to 
strategizing because it brings about the “truly new”; this being the key to creating a strategy 
capable of surprising competitors and clients. Intelligence is also needed to ascribe usefulness 
to intuition, by “intertuition”. Duration is required in order to reconcile and reunite these 
concepts, because it is only in the course of action that they can be approached. This selection 
developed into further investigation on these topics. 
                                                          
40 Thickness is “a broad or deep part of a specified thing”. See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/thickness 
(accessed 4/6/2017). 
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The literature review around intuition focused on the pairs thought vs. action and intelligence 
vs. intuition. The major learning extracted from this study was that, especially in a world 
characterized by Volatility-Uncertainty-Complexity-Ambiguity, educated (reflective trial-
and-error) action replaces, in part, the decisions once taken exclusively by rational thought. 
This argument was further developed by studying the interaction that takes place between 
intelligence and intuition, the former understood as a human tool used to foster (ex ante) and 
test (ex post) the latter; and then taken up in “intertuition” – a neologism that represents an 
assembly of concepts that can only be separated through analysis. 
The literature on duration examined how strategic control might subsist in a flow (duration) 
that in itself symbolizes the creation of the “truly new”, something that cannot be anticipated. 
Part of the answer was provided by the need to master, as far as possible, change as such. 
This possibility was connected to the need of strategists to highlight and frame attention on 
some issues instead of others, while navigating in “a stream [duration] against which we 
cannot go” (Bergson, 2005, p. 505). Each of these modes of capturing and holding attention 
gave rise to different constituents of duration and to the correspondent framework represented 
in Figure 5. It is these constituents that give thickness to a line along which managers seek to 
connect the dots while strategizing, in duration. 
These concepts, which were captured/deepened over the four sections of the literature review, 
constitute the building blocks that frame the current research, the dwelling activity that 
substantiates this project and the method and findings which are presented in Chapters 3 and 4 
that follow. 
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3. Methodology and Methods 
 
This chapter analyses the methodologies and methods underlying the current research, 
beginning with an explanation of how coherence with the theoretical work of Bergson frames 
the research stances and the strategies followed. This analysis includes an explanation about 
the ontology and epistemology underlying the research developed for this project, before 
finally turning to discuss the chosen method of qualitative research interviews. These examine 
the following research questions (RQ) in accordance with the strategic question – How can 
the formal gap between strategic decision and execution be reduced? – and the findings of the 
literature review (Chapter 2): 
• RQ1 – How do the usually-considered “opposite” pairs – building vs. dwelling, 
intelligence vs. intuition, thought vs. action, and decision vs. execution – combine 
while strategizing? 
• RQ2 – What is the importance of intuition to strategizing and how is this revealed? 
• RQ3 – How does strategy formation evolve over a certain period of time, through 
specific stages, along which a specific duration is produced? 
 
(3.1) Implications of Bergson’s theory for methodology and methods 
Henri Bergson shares an important element of his philosophy with the American philosopher 
and psychologist William James (1842–1910), specifically in his pragmatism, which defends 
a truth that is built by the individual contributions of many inventors, who create a reality, 
rather than discovering it (Bergson, 2001e, p. 1447). This is a truth that might be measured 
“in terms of the success of their [theories or beliefs] practical application”,41 such that 
Bergson would not refute a constructionist stance of the world for which reality is constructed 
or “continuously shaped by social activity and human intervention” (Ng & Coakes, 2014, p. 
32).  
                                                          
41 Pragmatism is “an approach that evaluates theories or beliefs in terms of the success of their practical application.” See 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/pragmatism (accessed 2/5/2016). 
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Additionally, for the French philosopher, “the world is presented as what Bergson calls an 
extensive manifold [many and various], a region of things in relation to one another […], 
[something that] can be very complex and changeable” (Helin et al., 2014, loc. 421, my 
italics), a view that is compatible with process philosophy: 
Process philosophy encourages us to follow the goings-on of organizations, finding a world of swelling, 
falling away, erupting, and becalming without rest. (Helin et al., 2014, loc. 393, my italics) 
Process philosophy also seems to suit management and strategy studies, as Helin et al. also 
note, referencing topics like “creativity”, “innovation”, “power”, “resistance”, or “influence”, 
terms that are approached throughout this work: 
Force, intensity, the enquiry after movement, is what concerns studies of creativity, innovation, and 
(again) entrepreneurship, operations management and supply chains, and governance, as well as power, 
resistance, and influence (such as governmentality studies) and gender and identity studies. Finally, 
potentiality, that which ‘might become’, is what grounds strategy studies and broader enquiry into the 
possibility of alternative economic and social settings (such as in social entrepreneurship). (Helin et al., 
2014, loc. 278) 
The literature review has already offered this dynamic view of reality using Bergson’s 
concept of duration, the flow of which we cannot go against (Bergson, 2001d, p. 527). This 
concept is implicit to the view underlying this research into strategy, where an action verb – 
strategizing – regulates the methodologies and methods used to guarantee coherence with “the 
enquiry after movement […] [which] concerns studies of creativity, innovation, and […] 
entrepreneurship”, as Helin et al. mention in the passage quoted above. 
It is worth noting that, contrary to expectations the concept of the subjective, for Bergson, 
means that which appears entirely and adequately known (Bergson, 2001a, p. 57, my italics). 
This is an idea developed further by Nayak … 
It is the subjective that is real, imageless, continuous [as in a film] and heterogeneous. (Nayak, 2008, p. 
180, my italics) 
… it is a view that brings credibility to the constructionist stance referred to above, as a 
strategy to capture reality, and that contributes to the creation of a “fit between the research 
question[s], the theoretical framework and the methods used to collect and analyse data” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 290). 
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In this context, therefore, it is not surprising that the ontology—the “nature of the world” (Ng 
& Coakes, 2014, p. 29) or, according to Ormston et al. (2014), “reality and what there is to 
know” (p. 4)—underlying this research is constructionism, since it holds that “reality is 
socially constructed” (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 39, my italics), mainly “through the use of 
language in conversation” (Ng & Coakes, 2014, p. 30, my italics), which leads to a 
“convincing interpretation of the subjective ‘reality’ of the phenomenon being researched” (p. 
33, my italics). 
There is a need for precision here: constructionism is different from constructivism; in fact, 
although constructivism is “sometimes used instead of, or interchangeably with, (social) 
constructionism […] [it] can be applied more individualistically and psychologically oriented 
than constructionism” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, pp. 328–29, my italics). For example, 
according to the psychologist Jean Piaget’s constructivism, the child is “inner-driven” 
(Ackermann, 2001, p. 446), while according to the mathematician and computer scientist 
Seymour Papert’s constructionism, the child advocates a more external orientation, in which 
knowledge is built “through discourse in interaction” (Ormston et al., 2014, p. 13). The latter 
explanation is the concept most coherent with strategizing, here seen as a relational process, 
as presented in the literature review: 
Papert’s ‘child’ […] is more relational and likes to get in tune with others and with situations. […] S/he 
learns from personal experience rather than from being told. […] [and] enjoys gaining understanding 
from singular cases, rather than extracting and applying general rules. (Ackermann, 2001, p. 446) 
The epistemology—“the ways of knowing and learning about the world” (Ormston et al., 
2014, p. 6), capable of establishing “valid knowledge” (Collis & Hussey, 2009, p. 59)—
correspondent with constructionism is interpretivism, a “position that requires the social 
scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 715, my 
italics). Thus, it “is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences” (p. 16), and 
aware that natural science usually deals with palpable facts, and is focused on testing the 
known rather than generating the real/truly new, by constructionism. 
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(3.2) Method adopted in this project: qualitative interviews 
Considering that “an interpretivist stance is consistent with a largely qualitative structure” 
(Ng & Coakes, 2014, p. 45, my italics), it is not surprising that qualitative research, a strategy 
that can be defined as: 
a set of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible [through] a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to 
self […] (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 3; cited by Ormston et al., 2014, p. 3), 
…was the elected method for this research, centred on interviews. The following paragraphs 
seek to provide evidence in relation to “what happened” (Symon et al., 2016) during the 
qualitative research conducted as part of this research. 
Qualitative interviews 
Interviewing, considered “the most common method of data gathering in qualitative research” 
(King, 2004, p. 11), is a technique that assumes “both [researcher and participant] are working 
hard” (Yeo et al., 2014, p. 178) and implies that “the researcher is an active player [hopefully 
prudently active] in the development of data and of meaning, and [that] the interview is 
potentially transformative for both parties” (p. 179) participating in the “specific construct 
that the researcher wants to understand and describe” (Köhler, 2016, p. 406). 
Qualitative interviews are characterized by open-ended questions, the objective of which is 
“to capture the range and diversity of participants’ responses” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 79). 
This view is coherent with the adopted semi-structured interview approach, in which … 
The interviewer has [just] a schedule to remind them of the issues and topics that need to be covered by 
the respondent. (Fisher, 2010, p. 175) 
As explained in more detail below, in addition to holding one-to-one interviews with ten 
interviewees – single interviews –, the researcher, with the objective of accessing duration, 
also undertook a sequence of interviews with five other participants – triple interviews. 
“To remind” the researcher of what topics to cover (although these were complemented by a 
set of more practical questions) the Bergsonian concepts applied to strategy (Figure 1) and 
the Framework of Strategic Duration (Figure 5) were used, for the single and the triple 
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interviews respectively, as “aide-mémoire[s]” (Ng & Coakes, 2014, p. 103) – which in turn 
became the nodes around which the ideas underlying this research were organized. 
The decision to choose qualitative interviews as the method underlying this project was not 
based only on the popularity of interviews as “the most common [qualitative] method of data 
gathering” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 77; Cassell & Symon, 2012, p. 11). The decision was 
taken equally, and especially, because of the suitability of interview methods “to explor[e] 
understandings, perceptions and constructions of things that participants have some kind of 
personal stake in” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 81, my italics). 
To explore this from another perspective, here is a question: what did this research seek to 
analyse once the decision to focus on practice had been taken? If analysis of both i) “what 
managers actually do” (Johnson et al., 2003, p. 12, my italics) while strategizing, and ii) how 
they (think they) do/did it (presumably) right, then interviews with CEOs, seemingly the 
commanders-in-chief of strategizing – a non-consensual military metaphor used to 
demonstrate the likelihood that CEOs lead strategic change, dealing with what is “essential in 
fighting a war”42 –, does fulfil the requirement of a personal stake. What is more, if one 
considers the CEO’s answers partially as narratives of practice (Rouleau, 2011), and that the 
research seeks to explore “the reconstruction of the life [or parts of] stories of successful 
executives” (p. 259), as well as to understand “the experience of the individuals whose lives 
reflect those issues” (Seidman, 2013, loc. 463), this is more likely to be obtained through 
qualitative interviews, a method that “is deeply satisfying to researchers who are interested in 
other’s stories” (Seidman, 2013, loc. 467). 
Naturally, considering that “most papers associated with [the] Strategy-as-Practice 
perspective have been based generally on longitudinal case studies drawing on ethnographic 
methods” (Rouleau, 2011, p. 258), some authors could argue that ethnographic methods are 
more suitable to discovering “what managers actually do, and with what techniques” (Johnson 
et al., 2003, p. 12, my italics). As a counter-argument, Seidman offers the following 
elucidative analogy: 
                                                          
42 Military, strategic means “essential in fighting a war”. See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/strategic 
(Accessed 3/6/2017). 
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If a researcher is asking a question such as, ‘How do people behave in this classroom?’ then participant 
observation might be the best method of inquiry. (Seidman, 2013, loc. 410); 
If the researcher is interested, however, in what it is like for students to be in the classroom, what their 
[lived] experience is, and what meaning they make out of that experience – if the interest is in what 
Schutz (1967) calls their ‘subjective understanding’ – then it seems to me that interviewing, in most 
cases, may be the best avenue of inquiry. (Seidman, 2013, loc. 414–18) 
With the objective of investigating elusive phenomena such as intuition and duration, 
observation — a data-collection activity used in ethnographic research (Bryman & Bell, 2011) 
— would probably be most unsatisfactory. As Seidman (2013) recalls, the researcher is in 
pursuit of learning about managers’ experiences while strategizing and what meaning, in the 
context of intuition and duration, they extract from that experience. In this context, 
participants in the current research were invited to reflect on the circumstances and contexts, 
on the actors involved in strategizing; their decisions, behaviours, tools, methods, and the 
lessons learnt …– together with the constituents of the conceptual frameworks presented in 
the literature review – when, at present or in the past, they were performing activities 
recognized as strategic. 
Unsurprisingly, considering the very elusive nature of the concepts being studied, some 
intermediate concepts with which managers are more familiarized, such as leadership and 
culture, or in the case of duration its six constituents (represented in Figure 5), needed to be 
used during conversations as bridges to practice. The use of these bridges reinforced the idea 
that the elected method was the most appropriate, since the “research interview is ideally 
suited to examine topics in which different levels of meaning need to be explored” (King, 
2004, p. 21) – this was particularly true, for instance, when the interviewer had to clarify that 
intuition was not the same as an instinctual gut feeling. 
All in all, as the goal was “to have participants reconstruct his or her experience [from their 
point of view] within the topic under study” (Seidman, 2013, loc. 495), and being that these 
topics are hardly amenable to observation, “asking people about them represents the only 
viable means of finding out about them within a qualitative research strategy” (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011, p. 496), a remark that is totally coherent with the option of turning to interviews. 
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Recruitment of participants 
The recruitment of the fifteen interviewees who participated in the study was based on a mix 
of convenience sampling, “selected because it is accessible to the researcher” (Braun & 
Clarke, 2013, p. 57), and stratification, in the sense that the “sampling [must] … ensure that 
the range and diversity of different groups in a population are included in your sample” (p. 
57). 
Regarding accessibility, interviewees were selected from the researcher’s own network 
through leveraging his position as the CEO of a professional services company and thus his 
inherent proximity to senior representatives of companies belonging to different sectors. In 
this context, the interviews were conducted with fourteen current and former CEOs from 
well-known companies in their respective markets and one Minister, considered as the CEO 
of the bodies under his responsibility. 
Why just CEOs? Whittington points out that “historically, elites have often taken a leading 
role […] associated with the transfer of innovative practices” (Whittington, 2006, p. 625), 
whereby likewise the researcher believed that CEOs were the most likely to be aware of what 
happens while strategizing in their organizations. Nevertheless, highlighting some limitations 
of centring the research on CEOs, Sproull and Hofmeister (1986) note that the researcher 
“should not rely on one informant, typically a senior manager, for data on how an innovation 
[as an example] has been implemented in his or her organization” (p. 57). In this context, 
although the researcher did not interview anyone other than the CEOs of the organizations 
concerned, he did take care to ask about the other strategists that strategize(d) with the 
interviewees and their roles. 
Regarding stratification of the participants, a quest for sector and business-issue diversity was 
followed, concluding in the following selection: 
• Nationalities: Portuguese and Spanish companies, linked to the fact that the 
researcher is Portuguese and the CEO of a Spanish company (belonging to a 
multinational), although some of the interviewees belong to multinationals; 
• Sectors: banking (5); energy (3); construction & infrastructures (2); consultancy & 
technology (2); healthcare (1); telecommunications (1); and government (1); 
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• Business issues: Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A); Business Development (BUD); 
Multinational Contexts (MTN); Turnaround/Intervention (TAR); and Privatization (PRV). 
The reason for the variety among sectors/issues was not due to some sort of a quest for 
quantitative representativeness. Rather, selection was based on two factors considered 
primordial to choosing this group of senior executives: i) the need to cover different types of 
strategic contexts linked to various business issues, in most of the cases related to ii) the 
proposed interviewee having a history of strategic accomplishment to share, translated into a 
publicly known transformational process relating to the business issues raised above. 
On the other hand, although authors/actors of demonstrated strategic transformational 
accomplishment are likely to be competent at conveying a set of strategic practices, as 
demonstrated by studies that link “strategist[s] to outcomes in terms of their individual 
practices” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 87), the fact that all of the participants are/were 
leaders, and that leaders are keen to use rhetorical techniques and metaphors (Tietze et al., 
2003), constituted an inherent limitation of this study. 
Still, and since the researcher was alert to the need to control the potential “fancy” 43 
(Silverman, 2011, p. 4), and “challenged to overcome the staged performance of a positive 
self-identity” (Hay, 2014, p. 513, my italics), which could potentially adulterate the 
conclusion, as seen in the next chapter, this limitation could be partially overcome not least by 
the researcher pointing out some concrete examples of epic rational styles, since … 
Business strategy, like military and revolutionary strategy, could suffer from its own heroic myths. It 
acquired an unrealistically elevated status as the ingredient that could make all the difference between 
success and failure. (Freedman, 2013, p. 569) 
Apart from controlling the greatness of strategy, since “research, like almost everything else 
in life, has autobiographical roots” (Seidman, 2013, loc. 904), the researcher, who has “some 
passion about his […] subject” (loc. 908) has, nonetheless, not only controlled a potential 
“tendency to prescriptive hyperbole” (Freedman, 2013, p. 569), but also been careful to avoid 
becoming, and in renouncing, the behaviour of those interviewers that: 
                                                          
43 “Fancy”, a word that Silverman places in opposition to “fact” (Silverman, 2011, p. 4), means: “The faculty of imagination” 
(noun); or “Elaborate in structure or decoration” (adjective). See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fancy 
(accessed 21/5/2017). 
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Are so intimately connected to the subject of inquiry that […] what they are really hoping to do is 
corroborate their own experience; they will not have enough distance from the subject to interview 
effectively. (Seidman, 2013, loc. 915) 
Being a CEO as well as the researcher/interviewer, it was particularly important to avoid the 
temptation to express “one’s own voice” and to obtain strategic views different to those that 
prevail in the organization where the interviewer/researcher is a CEO. For this reason, 
contrary to the former qualitative and quantitative research, with one exception, participants 
were selected from outside the researcher’s own organization. 
Ethical issues 
With regard to ethical issues (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Miles et al., 2014), all the interviews 
were conducted and recorded with the consent of participants, whose 
confidentiality/anonymity was guaranteed, and whose participation was entirely voluntary and 
came with the right to withdraw from the research. 
All the names of the interviewees have been anonymized using the following pseudonyms: 
Bond, Collier, Corwin, Ferdinand, Idelle, Ivy, Jarvis, Jonathan, Lowell, Mark, Martina, 
Melville, Miles, Ramsey, and Warren. 
Administration of the interviews 
The interviews were led in person (78%), via video-conferencing (13%), and by telephone 
(9%). As the high percentage of in-person (in Portugal and Spain) and video-conferencing 
(from Spain) interviews demonstrate, despite quite a wide geographic spread, visual contact 
was always preferable, so that the researcher was “in a position to respond to signs of 
puzzlement or unease on the faces of respondents when they are asked a question” (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011, p. 208). 
As already stated, the researcher conducted both single and triple interviews. 
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(3.2.1) Single interviews 
Single interviews, which mainly, though not exclusively addressed Research Questions 1 and 
2, took place among ten participants. They were conducted between March and April 2016, 
lasting for about an hour each. 
The Bergsonian concepts framework (see Figure 1) was employed to build both the aide-
mémoires of a semi-structured interview script and the codes,44 i.e. analysis (Miles et al., 
2014), “used to retrieve and categorize similar data chunks” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 72). 
Examples of the key questions, used as aid-mémoires, discussed during interviews are 
provided below: 
• Strategy-as-Practice [setting the context]: Differences between Strategy-as-Practice 
and strategy as plan; intended vs. executed; deliberated vs. emergent; role of 
conversations for the emergence of strategy: with whom, when, with which tools; role 
of analysis; decision vs. execution; thought vs. action; management paralysis; the role 
of values and ritual; typical behaviours; action-oriented culture; the role of 
bureaucracy; principles while executing … 
• Intuition [main topic]: What is the role of intuition [if any] during strategizing? Expert 
vs. creative; who draws the first vision sketches/takes the first steps? An action-
oriented impulse: how does it happen? Combination with analysis and how to foster 
intuitions? Making mistakes and learning from action; the need for duration (of quality 
“time”) for strategic effects; the importance/role of experience and of learning from 
experience; the importance/role of action (and which action) to foster intuition; 
building vs. dwelling views … 
The single interviews, although insightful into what managers do while strategizing, were 
nevertheless limited by, sometimes even coloured by, an immobile view of the past, views 
that could be seen as almost contradictory to capturing the concept of duration, which 
underlies the dynamic view assumed in this project. For this reason, and in an attempt to bring 
to the forefront an idea of dynamically sympathizing with strategic formation, the study also 
included a set of triple interviews, which were designed to be conducted at three different 
moments in time, over a set period of time. 
                                                          
44 “In qualitative research, coding is the process whereby data are broken down into component parts [codes], which are 
given names” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 713). 
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(3.2.2) Triple interviews 
With the idea to at least partially overcome a frozen view of the past, and considering, as 
Langley et al. state (2013), that “process studies focus attention on how and why things 
emerge, develop, grow, or terminate over time” (p. 1), the triple interviews were designed to 
complement the information gathered from the single interviews, mainly addressing duration. 
In fact, in order to better capture this Bergsonian concept, the triple interviews were 
conducted among five interviewees, each scheduled to be interviewed at three different times, 
over the duration of approximately nine months, although there were two exceptions.45 
With the initial intention of these triple interviews, designed to capture a sense of duration by 
momentarily sharing the flow of experience with participants over a stated period, in very 
simplistic terms, the method consisted of first starting a discussion about participants’ likely 
strategic initiatives over the following months and, after a certain period of time quantitatively 
speaking, and a certain duration in qualitative terms, to check what elements had gone as 
planned and what had failed, or turned out differently from the outcome initially forecast. 
Apart from the inherent difficulties concerning confidentiality around such topics, especially 
when they are part of strategic initiatives intended for future implementation, and not from 
reports relating to the past … 
Accessing elites’ practical work as an everyday affair is a major problem and one obvious reason for this 
is confidentiality […] (Samra‐Fredericks, 2004, p. 128, my italics) 
… for reasons that will be explained in the following chapter, the triple interviews proved to 
have some limitations in terms of accessing duration over three separate chronological periods 
of time, with researcher and participants concentrating an important part of the conversation 
around the constituents of duration presented in Figure 5 of section 2.4, in the second and 
third interviews. Still, the triple interviews went ahead with these five participants, as stated, 
                                                          
45 For two of the participants, Ivy and Ramsey, the second and third interview questions had to be adapted to fit into just 
one interview (the second/final one), due to the following reasons: one interviewee delayed July’s interview to mid-
September due to agenda constraints, offsetting the passage-of-time effect for the third interview; and another announced 
that they would be changing company after the second interview. In both cases, “third interview” questions included the 
nature of strategizing and the impacts of duration. 
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each of whom was interviewed over three different groups of questions for approximately one 
hour. These interactions occurred in March/April, July, and September/October 2016, and 
were based on the following main questions: 
• First interview: participants were invited to describe the intended strategic objectives 
and correspondent actions for the period covering the two interviews (decisions that 
led to the implementation of these objectives were not addressed): What strategic 
practices and with which tools? Developed with whom? What are the expected 
outcomes? What are the measures for success? What might go wrong? How do you 
intend to mitigate risks? ... 
• Second interview: during the second and third interviews, participants were invited to 
reflect on past actions and the degree/quality of achievement of the correspondent 
objectives (a task that ended up being almost impossible to complete successfully, due 
to reasons explained in the introduction to this chapter): How did the initial strategic 
intent turn out? What worked/failed and why? What new ideas (including intuitions) 
did this stage bring? What is the evolved strategic intent for the coming months? (As 
the framework of duration started to have form, some of the third interview questions 
were anticipated in the second interview). 
• Third (final) interview: during the final interview, participants were invited to reflect on 
possible theorization (building) – although not expressed in such an ambitious and 
scientific way – of their actions and the circumstances surrounding them (dwelling), 
including answers to questions about other situations that may fit into one or more of 
the six dimensions that form the framework created to understand duration (see 
section 2.4). 
Although participants in all the interviews were invited to participate in a reflection exercise, 
oriented by the researcher, the first interview phase was immanently of the reflection-on-
action and reflection-for-action-type, being the initial [on action] form of reflection “refer[ed] 
to reflection after the event”; while the second [for action] “refer[red] to planning, being able 
to think ahead” (Thompson & Thompson, 2008, p. 16). On the other hand, whereas the 
second interview may have had some characteristics of the first [on & for], it came closer to 
the third (or second and final interview for two of the participants), which was almost fully 
concentrated on reflection-on-action. All material quoted from participants in the triple 
interviews will indicate from which interview their words were extracted. 
In this context of a predominance of reflection-on-action, the narration of past experiences 
did not cease to be the most common way to construct knowledge and, in fact, despite all the 
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limitations, these narrations did go some way to capturing and conveying meaning in a 
context of a processual/dynamic perspective of reality: 
Lived experience is the breathing of meaning. In the flow of life, consciousness breaths meaning in a to 
and fro46 movement: a constant heaving between the inner and the outer […]; in such a way that the 
effect of the text is at once a reflexive re-living and a reflective appropriation of something meaningful: 
a notion by which a reader is powerfully animated in his or her own lived experience. (Van Manen, 2016, 
loc. 902–06, my italics) 
Seen in another way, despite the apparent contradiction of capturing something that has 
already happened, i.e. that is no longer live, “a lived experience has a certain essence, a 
‘quality’ that we recognize in retrospect” (Van Manen, 2016, loc. 910), and thus is suitable to 
be accessed by interview: 
Therefore we must contrast those experiences which in their running-off are undifferentiated and shade 
into one other, on the one hand, with those that are discrete, already past, and elapsed, on the other. 
The latter we apprehend not by living through them but by an act of attention. This is crucial for the 
topic we are pursuing: because the concept of meaningful experience always presupposes that the 
experience of which meaning is predicted is a discrete one, it now becomes clear that only past 
experience can be called meaningful, that is, one that is presented in retrospective glance as already 
finished and done with. (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1649–54) 
What Schutz seems to be doing here is to reconcile a discrete access to experience based on 
interviews and narratives of the past, on the one hand, while providing a processual/dynamic 
view of reality on the other that, according to Bergson, is intuitively accessed in duration 
through a sympathy that transports us to the interior of the [living] object, in order to coincide 
in what is unique about it and thus inexpressible (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1391, my italics). 
 
(3.3) Analysis Process 
The interviews were conducted in either Portuguese or in Spanish according to the nationality 
of interviewees. They were taped, and analysed using NVivo47 (www.qsrinternational.com), 
which was employed essentially to dissect, classify, and organize the twenty-three audio 
                                                          
46 To and fro means “in a constant movement backwards and forwards or from side to side”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/to_and_fro (accessed 2/5/2017). 
47 “NVivo is a qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software package produced by QSR International. It has been 
designed for qualitative researchers working with very rich text-based and/or multimedia information, where deep levels of 
analysis on small or large volumes of data are required.” See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NVivo (accessed 1/5/2015). 
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recordings: i) ten single interviews, plus ii) five triple interviews for which thirteen sessions 
were conducted (since, as noted, two of the scheduled interviews did not take place). 
NVivo’s nodes/codes followed the strategic framework and its main concepts for single 
interviews (represented in Figure 1) as well as the constituents belonging to the framework 
(see Figure 5, section 2.4), which was assumed in an attempt to understand duration by 
undertaking the triple interviews reflecting the constituents: labelling; momentum; selling; 
scheme; politicking; and consensus. 
Each audio recording, including video-conference tapes, was integrally listened to/analysed 
and the relevant passages transcribed and coded within each node and sub-node. Passages 
were selected “in such a manner that the subject of the enquiry was correctly identified and 
described” (Collis & Hussey, 2009, p. 182), in order to assure the credibility of the study, 
while ensuring/guaranteeing a “substantial contribution to management theory” (Symon et al., 
2016, p. 9, my italics), and that the topics were “internally coherent, consistent, and 
distinctive” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 287). Transcriptions were made in NVivo, before 
being transposed to Microsoft Word; the time “location” of each excerpt was noted, to allow 
navigability between texts and audio files, and thus to assure accuracy and auditability. To 
achieve “a good balance between analytic narrative and illustrative extracts” (p. 287), the 
narrative gives direct voice to all the participants. The excerpts are coherent with the 
researcher’s posture to extract a “reality” (although not refusing critical views), by inviting 
interviewees to self-report on what they say they do while strategizing. 
The credibility of the study was reinforced by the involvement of the researcher “in the study 
for a prolonged period of time […] [and subject to] peer debriefing – acting as a kind of 
indirect ‘member checking’ (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 282) – by colleagues [both from 
practice and academia] on a continuous basis” (Symon et al., 2016, p. 9). For example, in 
relation to conforming to the procedure for correction and selection/interpretation of 
interviews and relevant excerpts, most of the concepts were contrasted against various 
published interviews with Spanish CEOs.48 These acted indirectly as appraisers of the 
                                                          
48 See https://paulomorgadoweb.com/en/encuentros-de-alta-direccion/ (accessed 10/6/2017). 
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relevancy and potential contributions of the constructed/selected content: had these interviews 
indicated that the proposed questions were irrelevant, then that would have been a warning 
about the credibility of the uniformities created throughout this project. These interviews were 
published in the magazines APD49 (the central theme of interviews is the impact of Digital 
technology on company strategy) and TDN50 (these interviews touch upon many topics 
studied in this project related to strategy). Thus, although these Spanish CEOs did not 
participate in this study – and thus their opinion does not constitute a triangulation51 in the 
strict sense –, as implied, they could indirectly confirm the relevancy/credibility of the topics 
being theorized by this research. Additionally, it is worth noting again that, having worked in 
professional services companies for more than twenty years, the researcher possesses valuable 
practical experience in strategic topics such as those being studied. This fact allows him to 
“understand participants’ (subjective and situated) meanings and experiences” (Braun & 
Clarke, 2013, p. 283) and allows him to place himself ready to be “[prudently] active in the 
research process; [for which] themes do not just ‘emerge’” (p. 283). 
For the single interviews, the analysis of each node gave rise to a new internal group, 
composed of sub-nodes, generated along a “thorough, inclusive and comprehensive” (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013, p. 287) process as part of the data condensation process: “writing summaries, 
coding, developing themes, generating categories, and writing analytic memos” (Miles et al., 
2014, p. 12). These notes were then subsumed to sections that use the same concepts 
employed to dissect the subject areas of Strategy-as-Practice and Intuition, in the literature 
review.  
For the triple interviews, since some topics to be discussed were already too centred in the 
possible constituents of duration, the goal was essentially to i) complete/refine and ii) 
examine the practicality of the Framework of Strategic Duration (Figure 5). Thus, the six 
                                                          
49 APD is a Spanish association for the progress of managers. See http://www.apd.es. APD magazine publication dates: May-
16 (319); Jul/Aug-16 (321); Sep-16 (322). 
50 TDN (tendencies of Business) is a magazine published by AECOC, a Spanish association that aims to bring efficiency to the 
commercial relations between producers and distribution. See https://www.aecoc.es/revistas/tdn-tendencias-de-negocio. 
Publication dates: Apr-15 (19); Sep-15 (20); Oct-15 (21); Jun-16 (22); Oct-16 (23); Dec-16 (24). 
51 “Triangulation traditionally refers to a process whereby two or more methods of data collection or sources of data are 
used to examine the same phenomenon, with the objective of getting as close to the ‘truth’ of the object of study as 
possible” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 285, my italics). 
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constituents of strategic duration were used as nodes based on the real-life examples provided 
by practitioners who undertake strategizing. Despite the elusiveness and complexity of the 
concept of duration, none of the participants found the questions either too theoretical or 
unsuitable to illustrate a lived or ongoing strategizing situation. As the interviews on duration 
continued, the framework that ended up crystalized in Figure 5, was being strengthened. On 
reflection, this was such an interwoven process of framework–interviews– framework that it is 
difficult to separate cause and effect – curiously, or maybe not, this is exactly as happens in 
duration (see sections 2.4 and 4.2). 
All of the processes of the administration and analysis of the interviews were conducted in a 
“systematic, rigorous and well documented way” (Symon et al., 2016, p. 9). All data was 
secured, by archiving all audio recordings and all PDFs extracted from NVivo registered 
content, and by verifying its dependability/trustworthiness. Any possible confirmation that 
“the findings flow from the data” (p. 9) was collected and stored to certify/guarantee the 
conformity of the conclusions gathered from the interviews. 
The quality of this research can be assured by all the procedures having been correctly put in 
place. And since the nodes/codes were based on an all-embracing grounded literature 
(Chapter 2), transferability is possible, although understood within the bounds of qualitative 
research, in the sense that “the findings can be applied to another situation that is sufficiently 
similar” (Symon et al., 2016, p. 9); thus allowing the constitution of management uniformities 
or “a modestly generalizing social science of management”52 (Whittington & Mayer, 2002, p. 
4, my italics).  
  
                                                          
52 Coincident with the referred to middle-range or “middle ground” theory (Gilgun, 2015, loc. 4) or middle-range theory: 
“one that is neither so abstract that it cannot be empirically tested, nor so concrete that it has little scope and significance” 
(Hammersley, 2003, p. 172). 
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4. Research Findings 
The interviews provide empirical insights that “examine how [by which activities] a particular 
strategy emerges” (Chia & MacKay, 2007, p. 220) rather than “what strategic decisions are 
taken” (p. 220) and, as informed by Bergson’s framework, provide special attention to i) 
strategic intuition and ii) strategic duration. 
Quotes from the interviews have been selected deliberately to illustrate a broader analysis. 
They give voice to participants, namely through illustrative examples extracted from their 
answers, since sometimes “managers were urged [by their own need of clarification] to use 
stories to help make their case” (Freedman, 2013, p. 564, my italics). Considering that the 
data presented constitutes self-reporting of what participants do, or what they say they do 
during strategizing, a contextualized and critical view will accompany the analysis and 
discussion of the interviews, which may lead to a reinterpretation of the answers. 
Analysis of the interviews is separated into two major sections. The strategic intuition section 
examines the importance of intuition during strategizing, bringing to light the managerial 
activities that might be linked to this Bergsonian faculty and its adjacent concepts, among 
which intelligence/analysis is particularly relevant. 
In the strategic duration section, emphasis will be put on activities that illustrate and which 
may also substantiate the constitutive elements of this Bergsonian concept, as presented in 
Chapter 2, the literature review, while keeping the strategy formation “dance going” 
(Ackermann, 2001, p. 447). 
Before moving on to the research findings, it is important to reflect on some of the limitations 
arising from the elected methods that were evident during the interview process itself, namely 
regarding i) a possible rhetoric of methodical science, related to ii) the presence of fancy and 
epic postures in the language used by managers, as noted in section 3.2, and iii) the partial 
inability of the triple interviews to capture duration. 
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Regarding the possibility of what the researcher calls the rhetoric of methodical science, it 
should be noted that … 
When asked to explain their behaviour, managers either are at a loss of words or will make up an 
explanation that may be fictitious, perhaps not intentionally, but only in the spirit of trying to satisfy the 
questioner. (Wagner, 2002, p. 50) 
What this remark suggests is that something explained by the participants as a common and 
well thought-out strategic practice in their organization might after all turn out to be an 
answer created “on the spur of the moment” (Weick, 1998, p. 544) to satisfy the interviewer, 
despite its exactitude, ample adoption, underlying intentionality … and so forth. 
With regard to the presence of fancy, the researcher was aware that “leadership discourse is 
replete with suggestions of management as saviours of organizations tasked with the 
responsibility of ensuring survival” (Hay, 2014, p. 511). This tendency, particularly relevant 
when leaders are asked to talk about strategy, is reinforced by a discourse of “application of 
expertise and rational analysis to provide control over organisational activity and ultimately 
the realisation of organisational goals” (Hay, 2014, p. 510, my italics), acting as “‘captains of 
industry’ keeping their organizations stable and set on a steady course” (Freedman, 2013, p. 
571). 
In this regard, one interviewee, Corwin – considered a successful CEO who had steered a 
process that involved the M&A, turnaround, and business development of a number of banks 
–, while explaining how attached to rationality he is and how he tried to master all the 
transformational processes undertaken in the bank(s) he managed, demonstrated during his 
interview a fascination for systematizing everything (Jennings & Haughton, 2015), as well as 
being methodical and disciplined (Spence, 2009), and seemingly could not avoid persistent 
reiteration of an idea of order and organization: 
“The first thing I did was to put things in order. I am an engineer, a civil engineer, and the first thing I did 
was to put things in order; I sorted out the transformation, sorted it out by business unit … I put someone 
I trusted in the Financial Department and asked him to analyse all the areas in a well-ordered manner; I 
am very tidy … In the Financial Department [I chose] someone I trusted ‒ a controller ‒ to pilot and 
measure the transformation of all areas of the bank … Resources (including people and IT) and 
management control, I made a [plan, like] forceps to help me to control parametrically, in a quantified 
manner, the transformation … I then started to sort out, to organize each area in a coordinated way, 
because everything should be coordinated … I appointed a strategic consultant that took charge of this, 
led by another engineer to bring order and to control the implementation … We must bear in mind that I 
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am very tidy, I am an engineer … Because if there is disorder in an organization … Banks go bankrupt due 
to disorder in commercial, retail, risks, credit recovery, finances, systems … I wanted everything well-
ordered at the same time.” (Corwin) 
The example of Corwin highlights the predominance of Bergsonian intelligence, translated in 
this case as “engineering”, “order”, “analysis”, “financial department”, “controlling”, “pilot”, 
“measure”, “forceps”, “quantified”, “coordination”…. Apart from the interviewee’s 
conviction of being in total control of the situation, this illustration of a rational mind as 
captured in the discourse of Corwin, alerted the researcher to the difficulties that might be 
experienced when trying to capture intuition, a concept that it is not usually linked to 
rationality, understood in its analytical/intelligent sense. 
Said otherwise, it was not only that the researcher had to be aware of a possible “grandiose 
managerial discourse” (Hay, 2014, p. 511), but that he additionally had to be prepared to cope 
with a potential shyness to acknowledge, or to confess to the importance of intuition taken as 
non-intelligence. Nevertheless, this shyness could not preclude that during some interviews 
words like “paranoia” and “crazy” ended up enriching the detailed description of deliberated 
and controlled rational behaviours, showing that supposed rational/scientific interviewees are 
after all human beings as well! 
Finally, regarding the triple interviews, the first limitation detected was related to their 
capacity to capture the wholeness of the strategizing process, since the analysis was centred 
on some lines of implementation deriving from previous decisions; i.e. that the emphasis was 
put predominantly on execution, according to the interviewee’s discourse, and less on 
previous decisions that had led them to adopt the view of execution they were being asked 
about following those decisions. Naturally, this limitation could also be seen to present a very 
pertinent context when it came to capturing how much decisional fine-tuning or decisional 
change still persists during the execution process. For instance, as referenced below, Mark 
clearly stated that a new shareholder for a company under his supervision was Chinese, 
something that surely could not have been anticipated at an early stage of the strategizing 
process, but which would impact on the commercial strategy of that company: an airline that 
would open new routes to China. 
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Nevertheless, this focus on execution, although coherent with the posture that is discussed in 
section 2.1.1, could not provide the discussion that would take into account information about 
strategic activities and decisions that give rise to planning the intended objectives, and for 
which some of the conceptual constituents of duration (presented in Figure 5 of section 2.4) 
are relevant. 
Additionally, and from another perspective, nothing could prevent interviewees “[giving] 
voice to certain ideas while silencing others” (Hay, 2014, p. 510), submitting to scrutiny a 
narrative that, consciously or unconsciously, was selected by memory, by degree of 
confidentiality, or by other factors that the researcher could not control. 
A supplementary limitation, this time more apparent than real, of the triple interviews 
concerned a perceived “woolliness” that might appear while trying to measure the degree of 
accomplishment of a certain strategy. In fact, bearing in mind that one of the objectives of the 
triple interviews was to analyse the deliberated part of the strategic intent that would persist in 
actual strategy (see section 2.1.1), this measure of intentionality would be impossible if on 
one hand i) strategy is seen as an endless activity or, on the other hand, ii) strategy is 
considered as unfailing, either because objectives are conceptually immutable or, from the 
opposite perspective, are moving targets. 
Strategy seen as an endless activity, “always a work in progress” (Carter et al., 2008, p. 94), 
was noted by one of the interviewees: 
“In strategy there is no final phase, it is a dynamic activity.” (Miles, Interview 2) 
But, if strategy has “no final phase”, then a measure of strategic achievement is impossible, 
since the hypothetical straight line that defines intent and result is infinite. What is more, it is 
difficult to create a correspondence between chronological delay and “delay” in duration, 
since, for instance, the answer about the impact of strategic thickness/quality (see section 
2.2.1) of, say, a delay of two months, apart from a very discrete situation such as the launch of 
a new product, which has a specific date on which to happen or not, would always be very 
subjective. 
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Moreover, with regard to the impossibility of a deliberated strategy failing during a sequence 
of interviews, if this deliberated strategy is ultimately connected to strategic objectives and, 
by definition, these are seen as immutable, as Mark initially considered … 
“Strategic objectives endure; the way to implement them, the implementation calendar, the entities with 
whom we implement, these I can change … Nevertheless, strategic objectives endure.” (Mark, Interview 
2) 
… then, in that case, no matter what happens to the elements that lead to these objectives, – 
the “calendar, entities with whom we implement” – strategy will not suffer mutations since, 
according to this questionable view, strategic objectives are immovable and so is strategy. 
Finally, still in the domain of infallibility and in the opposite direction of the aforementioned 
immutability of objectives, if strategy is seen as a continuous adaptation of strategic 
objectives – a continuous adjustment of the target depending on the probability that the 
arrows already let loose will reach it –, then strategic failure would only occur if the strategist 
is incompetent in the sense that they are incapable of adapting the objectives. This idea is 
expressed by Miles – an engineer and CEO of a Utility company, responsible for a strategy of 
business development in another country to that where his headquarters enjoys a favourable 
positioning as an incumbent – in the following terms: 
“By definition, a strategy is long-term … If you start to see that you are moving away from a certain 
direction or objective, typically what you do is to revise the objective … You do not recognize that the 
former was wrong, but we define a new orientation. I think it is unusual that someone says, ‘I had this 
strategy and, reaching the end of a period, I recognize that I had failed.’ If this happens, you are 
implicitly saying ‘I gave up’… And then, either you quit or they will fire you …” (Miles, Interview 2) 
According to Miles, a strategist cannot give up on finding new directions to existing 
initiatives that moved away from a certain direction, implying that potentially there are no 
failed strategies but, instead, failed strategists – something that would hardly be assumed by 
any of the interviewees and thus precluding the possibility of measuring strategic failure. 
The limitations of an endless or unfailing strategy are classified as “apparent” because, 
although the triple interviews were designed to capture the degree of managers’ control over 
strategizing – which is something very inappropriate to apply to an endless and unfailing 
activity, since logically they should never be out of control –, during conversations, 
participants ended up bringing to the discussion their incapacity to control all the variables 
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that may have an impact on strategizing, including an analogy with unpredictable weather 
conditions while navigating, while also talking about factors they cannot control and which 
may impact decisively on strategic results: 
“There are some factors that I control; there are other factors that I do not control: I do not control the 
Brent [oil] price; I do not control the prices of the pool53; I do not control completely the client’s response 
to a certain offer; I do not control the regulatory authority … So, there are a number of external factors 
that may have an impact upon us but which I have no control over.” (Miles, Interview 2) 
“What happens is that you play with more variables. This is like when you are navigating: you set a 
direction and have a weather forecast. You expect that things happen according to some assumptions. 
Then [when] things that you were not expecting happen: a storm, there is no wind … you are confronted 
with new difficulties.” (Ferdinand, Interview 2) 
These more-than-justified “confessions” about non-prophecy skills, about a lack of control, 
seem quite “strange” and incoherent with “a form of masculinity, which seeks to ‘master all’” 
(Hay, 2014, p. 510), and which is splendidly illustrated by a quote from Corwin: 
“If you want to maintain tension, deadlines … When the consultant told me ‘this is late’ … I immediately 
(that night at 20:00, 21:00, or 22:00) called those responsible for the delays and the consultant, to my 
office … The delay could never exceed one month; never, not under any circumstances … But, when I 
started to talk, I did not start off by scolding … First, I asked: why it was late; then, what was happening; 
why was the work one month late; what could I do to help them? … And then I would say: here you have 
it [the decision/resources to solve the problem]. If the delay persisted, I would say: you are still late, I 
gave you this [extension], what is happening? This is the second warning; I will not give you a third one … 
I do not want friends around here; I want people who control the implementation [including consultants] 
… I could not allow anything to be delayed; I have a commitment to the stakeholders, we have deadlines 
to respect. First, I listen to why it was delayed; secondly, what they need; and thirdly, at third warning … 
fired! You have to be implacable, implacable … [The executive] Jack Welch used to be called ‘Neutron 
Jack’ [for having dismissed a lot of people] … I was very inspired by Jack Welch …” (Corwin) 
Corwin, inspired by the personality of Jack Welsh – who among other books published 
Winning in 2005 –, uses words like “tension”, “deadlines”, “immediately” (no matter what 
time), “to my office”, “not under any circumstances”, “scolding”, “this is the second warning, 
I will not give you a third one”, “I do not want friends around here”, “control”, 
“commitment”, “fired!”, “implacable, implacable”, or “Neutron Jack”, to express what an 
implacable executor he was, no matter what the circumstances, “taking aggressive action 
against all inefficiencies and so extracting the last ounce of shareholder value from a 
business” (Freedman, 2013, p. 571). This does not mean that Corwin was not a successful 
                                                          
53 Instrument for the interchange of power among the utilities companies. 
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strategist, because indeed he and his team proved to be very capable of achieving difficult 
strategic objectives. What it means is that Corwin, as well as other managers when 
interviewed, might be keen to avoid any evidence of the unmanageability of his management. 
Miles, this time against the epic and rational views about managers, ends up assuming that, 
somehow, these discourses of total control are rather rhetorical after all: 
“I have no doubt that [in the manager’s mind] what works well is deliberated and what goes wrong is an 
exogenous factor.” (Miles, Interview 2)  
As back-up to Miles’ and Ferdinand’s “confessions” of experiences of a lack of control, it 
could be said that their attitudes are more compatible with the type of leader that is open to 
changing ideas while strategizing, as noted in section 2.4 of the literature review. Mark, who 
in a former quote expressed the quasi-immutability of strategic objectives – a posture that 
might be closer to a stubborn attitude typical of the saviour-warrior –, ended up recognizing 
that, under certain circumstances, he had to be flexible: 
“To do strategic planning is not to write the plan in stone, in that it would never change forever and ever, 
no. I am open to revisiting my three- to five-year strategic options, not on a monthly basis, not on a bi-
weekly basis, but if I have to look at my strategic plan on an annual basis, to check if I need to put it in 
line with reality, I will do it. … What I need is a long-term direction … Nevertheless, I have to have the 
capacity, the humility even, to look at the reality and to understand that, to a certain extent, my capacity 
to change the reality has certain limitations, that I did not conceive well a certain strategic objective; I 
have to have the humility to change this strategic objective.” (Mark, Interview 2) 
This idea of a moving plan is coherent with the Bergsonian idea of élan vital presented in 
section 2.2.3. What is more, Mark’s ideas evolve in such a way during the interview – 
somehow gaining distance from the idea of a heroic leader – in that, despite his leadership 
status, he admits to considering it normal to abandon initial objectives if these were not 
sponsored by even more powerful entities: 
“If I am not able to convince my stakeholders, my chairman, I have to have the capacity, the flexibility, to 
incorporate the input that these stakeholders brought me and, if necessary, to adjust my implementation 
proposal or my strategic plan; I adjust myself to the relevant stakeholders.” (Mark, Interview 2) 
In conclusion, strategic intuition and strategic duration, besides being quite elusive concepts, 
also need to be accessed in a very swampy and rhetorical context; one in relation to which a 
critical spirit must be both alert and determined in order to overcome limitations as they arise. 
Nevertheless, despite these restrictions, the richness of the conclusions brought by the 
interviews and the empirical illustrations of the conceptual frameworks should not be 
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downplayed because, “while interview data are subject to limitations, they do offer important 
insights which future, more intensive research can develop” (Hay, 2014, p. 513, my italics). 
The following analysis will provide examples that have been deliberately selected in order to 
illustrate themes directly related to the literature review, and which were identified from 
wider analysis. 
 
(4.1) Strategic intuition 
The structure designed to analyse and present the results of the interviews addressing intuition 
– single interviews – was based on the following logic: begin by addressing the level of 
importance participants attribute to intuition when compared to Bergsonian intelligence – 
acknowledged as the most common mode of deliberated decision –, and the corresponding 
parallel with dwelling and building views of the world, respectively. After this incursion into 
the nature of the choices made while strategizing, focus will be directed to the seeming 
oppositional pairs, decision vs. execution and thought vs. action. 
To frame the research findings, the pairs studied in different Literature Review sections were 
reunited in order to express the relationship that might have been uncovered between 
Strategy-as-Practice and Bergsonian theory, and also between building vs. dwelling and 
intelligence vs. intuition. 
Naturally, in that intuition is a concept that is profoundly interwoven with duration, according 
to Bergson’s theory, some overlap between the perspectives analysed in this section and in the 
later study of duration cannot be avoided. It was this fact that prompted moving part of the 
interviewees’ quotes from the single interviews to section 4.2, as well as using some quotes 
from the triple interviews to illustrate ideas about intuition in the following sections. 
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(4.1.1) Intelligence vs. Intuition and Building vs. Dwelling 
As anticipated, when asked about how they strategize, participants put close focus on the 
rational process that led to a certain market positioning; a priori, strategy was mostly linked 
to rational and deliberated choice rather than to a constructionist activity in which emergent 
and intuitive decisions played an important role. Nevertheless, as the interviews progressed, 
and especially when asked about the potential importance of intuition, some participants 
ended up crediting significant relevance to intuition, even though this concept, as already 
mentioned, appeared sometimes as a “substitute” for experience. Additionally the researcher 
more than once had to clarify that intuition was not to be confused with a gut feeling – a gut 
feeling, as seen in the literature review, being associated more with instinct. This clarification 
then led some participants to attempt implicitly to retract their scepticism towards intuition, 
sometimes, as mentioned, by renaming it “experience”. 
Before analysing the interviews, a brief recapitulation of some of the concepts presented in 
the literature review will undoubtedly help to position the discussion. 
In relation to the building vs. dwelling views of the world, the difference fell within the 
following terms: while the first view presupposes that “cognition and mental representation 
precede meaningful action” (Chia & Rasche, 2011, pp. 34–35, my italics); the second view 
assumes that “both the individual and society are viewed as mutually constitutive […] [and] 
that individual agents [strategists] are so constituted by everyday social practices that they act 
and interact” (Chia & Rasche, 2011, p. 35, my italics). 
Seen from a different and complementary angle, building is mostly linked with intelligence, 
considered by Bergson as the analytical, scientific, mode of understanding and interacting 
with the world; it is the attention of the spirit towards matter (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1319), 
constituting mental representations; while intuition, which according to Bergson … 
means above all consciousness, immediate consciousness, a vision [a direct vision of the spirit by the 
spirit] that is hardly distinguishable from the object seen, knowledge that is in contact with it [the object 
seen] and that even coincide[s] with it [the object seen]. (Bergson, 2001e, p. 1273) 
… so that instead of taking a detached position in relation to the objects, these are used as a 
sort of ignition of insights. 
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In a very synthetic mode, Figure 4 displays the links between the pairs analysed in this section 
and in section 4.1.2. This representation has been dissected in detail in sections 2.1 and 2.3 of 
the literature review. 
In the following lines, voice will be given to the participants, as stated, with their quotes being 
selected deliberately to illustrate a wider analysis. 
Jonathan – From intelligence for formulating to intuition for executing 
As noted, while reporting their views about what strategizing means, participants had a 
tendency to be attached to model-concepts, guided by and guiding rational and deliberated 
choice. The predominance of this view started to be illustrated by the report Jonathan gave: an 
engineer, he explained how he started to strategize even before being formally appointed to 
his job as CEO of an energy company, at a time when the organization was going through a 
major transformation process that would impact on its international positioning, HR, 
corporate culture, and other strategic domains. Jonathan had collected some essential elements 
relating to the company—these included organograms, holding Who’s Who information, 
along with annual reports, analysts’ reports, sectorial research, and mandatory information 
concerning the United States stock market, containing very detailed information. In addition, 
leveraging a study in which he had participated previously, Jonathan, with the support of a 
Harvard colleague, co-drafted a preliminary analysis: 
“We drafted a[n Ansoff] matrix, with business [products] vs. geographies [markets], and for each of the 
quadrants, we analysed the following information (for a historical series of five years): (i) return of 
investment and free cash flow; (ii) a governance model, including at the shareholder level; and (iii) 
human resources (with some guesswork, because I did not know everyone), including management 
resources, allocated to each of the geographies … in order to check [analytically] where [in which 
quadrant] value was created or destroyed.” (Jonathan) 
This passage highlights the importance given to a detached building perspective, since 
Jonathan had not yet joined the company, but through this building perspective, using 
intelligent tools, such as an Ansoff matrix, and a financial sieve based on the return of capital 
employed, he could start to draft an idea about what to do in the different geographies and 
with what type of HR profiles. Jonathan’s activities, appealing to various methods/tools, 
embody the concept of practice presented in section 2.1.2. The level of conviction expressed 
during the interview about the validity of these a priori ideas was categorically associated 
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with the prestige of Harvard University, where he had recently studied, and the presumed 
quasi-infallibility of the theories taught at the university by some of the most reputed 
international professors: 
“I believe and defend something that in Harvard they used to insist on a lot: bring me the hard data, 
instead of lip service … Although I do not believe in an ultra-conceptualization of reality either. You have 
to have data, decide with those who are going to help you to implement, and then take action – a stage 
in which motivation and communication [which are not necessarily hard data] are crucial.” (Jonathan) 
“Bring me the hard data”. Although Jonathan admitted that he did not believe in an ultra-
conceptualization, an extreme building posture, he did believe in a decisional process that 
could be translated into data on which he would be able to rely. The following example is a 
good illustration of this conviction: 
“We did a benchmark with Spanish companies and reached the conclusion that the company had 2,000 
redundant people, approximately 30 per cent.” (Jonathan) 
This account evidences the dictatorship of figures obtained through benchmarking in 
companies based in, or exploring views of, different countries/different markets, but which 
nevertheless would ascribe a solid conviction that 2,000 people needed to be dismissed. As 
section 4.2.2 will explain further, more than an analysis to follow faithfully, this 
benchmarking might work as a more or less rhetorical scheme of reasoned justifications for a 
certain course of action. 
With the number of potential redundancies in mind, or in mouth, Jonathan started a process of 
communication and negotiation with the employees and their unions, leading him to the field 
of action, and exposing him to a less masterful, dwelling view of reality, capable of bringing 
him emergent intuitions (see section 2.3). Indeed, during one of his all-hands-on meetings 
held with employees, and after appealing to their sentiments and fears, stating that if the 
company remained in Portuguese hands – rather than in Spanish hands – people would be 
better treated and the dismissal process would be “well done”, reality struck for Jonathan 
while he was giving explanations and justifications, with the conviction that the execution of 
his unpopular measures had the green-light when a feared unionist got up and, with the choice 
between bad and less bad, corroborated the plan: 
“And then there’s a guy who gets up and says: ‘If the man thinks that this has to be like this, then so be 
it, but let it be well done!’ From that moment on, I felt that change had begun.” (Jonathan) 
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In this short passage, Jonathan uses the word “felt” without reticence and, maybe for the first 
time, started openly to admit that strategizing was not so deliberated and rational after all. 
Indeed he was acting with the certain intent of selling a turnaround idea, but somehow this 
action brought more thought and conviction than he had expected. Had he not acted, probably 
this conviction of the green light to initiate execution of the turnaround would not have arisen 
(see section 2.3.1). What is more, at the end of the interview, Jonathan even admitted that he 
took decisions that were considered “borderline crazy”, leaving no doubt as to how he started 
to get rid of the stereotypical image of the rational strategic leader during our conversation: 
“We made four sketches, after a first phase in which they [the company who produced and delivered the 
performance] talked with us and other people in the company, to detect their problems, and then four 
humoristic sketches were made about these problems … Everyone thought I was crazy.” (Jonathan) 
In summary, this conversation began with Jonathan primarily assuming his status of an 
engineer who had recently studied at Harvard and, after dwelling for some time with the 
researcher, ended up as Jonathan capable of taking advantage of an opportune situation 
produced in the field of action, where he could leverage a momentary window of opportunity 
opened up by a worker; i.e. the idea that Jonathan had the freedom to execute his plan was 
grasped in symbiosis, in sympathy, with that moment, maybe while looking at the union 
worker and at the way he was acting.  
Jarvis – Learning from the experiences of others 
Another participant, Jarvis – also an engineer and former CEO of a bank undertaking a 
challenge of accelerated business development, including M&A operations – reacted to the 
question about the importance of intuition to strategizing exactly as one would expect from 
someone who leads a bank and where one assumes that in such organizations strict financial 
and accounting standards prevail: 
“I think intuition is very (mmm) … I think [strategy] is rather [dependent on] study and knowledge; I 
believe very little in feelings; that leads us to geniality … I do not know, maybe some people think exactly 
the opposite … I think it is effort, study, knowledge, and a certain tolerance to change – there were no 
reactionary people.” (Jarvis) 
This quote, clearly oriented in the direction of a building position based on study, shows 
nevertheless a vocal hesitation “(mmm)” about the importance of intuition and also expresses 
openness to bringing the dwelling part to the scene, through praxis (see section 2.1.2), by 
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referring to a “tolerance to change” and “no reactionary people”, when one considers that 
change, and resistance to change, are usually experienced rather than thought of. What is 
more, when asked about the importance of consultants and, as Sturdy et al. (2016) note, their 
“traditional role […] in bringing management ideas into client organisations” (p. 185), and 
especially the prominent “strategy consultants, such as McKinsey & Co. and Boston 
Consulting Group” (Whittington, 2006, p. 619), Jarvis gave an interesting answer: 
“Consultants bring with them world experience (from other clients); then the bank’s managers develop 
the consultants’ ideas, working together with them. During execution, the consultants move into the 
background and managers assume the lead. Consultants will then resume their role, following up on 
execution, analyses, systematization, and evaluation of information; and then present 
reports/conclusions to the board.” (Jarvis) 
This suggests that Jarvis, even when thinking about consultants – usually linked to other 
complementary building positions that include analysis, systematization, and evaluation –, i) 
seeks to extract from them “world experience” – something that, as seen in section 2.3.2, 
nurtures intuitions –, and, at the same time, ii) he emphasizes a dwelling view of strategizing, 
stating that, as a “rule”, as a practice (see section 2.1.2), managers assume the lead while 
executing, certainly as a way to foster experience and absorption of the consultant’s 
knowledge. To put this another way, Jarvis seems to believe in buildings built from dwelling 
– world experiences – and on dwellings, practices, anchored in buildings – consultants’ 
knowledge put into practice by managers. This attention to the role of experience, and to the 
dwelling view that underlies it, was, as a matter of fact, translated into quite a modest 
affirmation from someone who held so much power in such a large organization at the time 
Jarvis was CEO: 
“People must pay attention to the experience of others.” (Jarvis) 
To give substance to this statement, Jarvis admitted that he took the decision to change the 
branding of the bank after having had a conversation with a branch director during a field-of-
action visit, something apparently contradictory with his statute of studious engineer: 
“For a long time I kept Bank A with a board of directors and Bank B with another board of directors, and 
they were two different brands … The merger of brands occurred when I visited the branches in the north 
of the country … I used to have at my table people I did not know … At some point, one of the directors 
told me the following: ‘Mr. Jarvis, last week Mr. X was here selling A; and, exactly in the same week, Mr. 
Y was here selling B to the same clients. Mr. Jarvis, you know that both Mr. X and Mr. Y belong to the 
board of directors of the umbrella company … Please, Mr. Jarvis, stop this tomfoolery.’ At the time, a 
consultant was carrying out a study to decide what to do with the brands. When I returned to the bank, I 
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said: ‘My friends, when someone from the field says this is tomfoolery, it means that we have to stop this 
and merge the brands’.” (Jarvis) 
What this illustration shows is that, maybe touched by the expression “stop this tomfoolery”, 
Jarvis did not wait for the conclusions of the study carried out by a highly-paid consultant but, 
instead, made a decision based on a “popular” insight captured while acting in the field. 
Maybe Jarvis relied more on intuition than he thought he did, or admitted to, when he stated – 
confounding intuition with “feeling”, and thus reinforcing the elusiveness of the phenomena 
under investigation – that study was more important than intuition. This subliminal belief in 
intuition is not a hypothesis to discard, particularly in light of a bold movement he confessed 
to having taken against a study that concluded: demand was too low for retail banking 
services and that he should not invest in it. In fact, innovating, he bet instead on cross-selling 
and demand-creation to prove the point; and the result he believed in turned out to be an 
unprecedented success, a case that showed that the given analysis itself was incorrect or, at 
least, incomplete. Nevertheless, the hesitation to admit the role of feeling, as stated, was 
expressed by an onomatopoeic “mmm”, which was there to signal formal reservations 
regarding non-rational- or non-study-based modes of strategizing. 
Lowell – The building edge of an intervention and the frame of intelligence 
Lowell, the CEO of a bank undergoing intervention, and which was facing a very difficult 
challenge of financial turnaround, revisited a situation similar to Jarvis’ – whereby he went 
against “Vox Populi” convictions by rejecting the results of a study and opting instead to 
follow his own experience. Disregarding the studies, Lowell and his management team opted 
to ignore the recommendations of consultants, investment banks, and even central authorities, 
regarding a potential fire sale54 of a bank’s assets: 
“Everybody [consultants, investment banks …] considered that this fire sale was crucial, but the 
management was able to demonstrate that if they did sell, the bank would be less reliable and 
sustainable … This conviction was based on the idea that it was not good to sell in an unfavourable 
position, since the asset had already been put up for sale one year before and the transaction did not 
succeed ... So trying to sell this asset again, when its return on investment and [strategic and financial] 
                                                          
54 A fire sale is “a sale of goods or assets at a very low price, typically when the seller is facing bankruptcy.” See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fire_sale (accessed 23/04/2017). 
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position were not yet good, would cause capital destruction, which would be destructive for the bank’s 
value.” (Lowell) 
Asked about why the consultants had taken a different view, even though they had access to 
the same information, something that did not seem rational (see section 2.3.1), Lowell 
suggested that consultants prefer to cover their backs, tend to always play on the safe side or, 
as he mentions, they have a tendency to take the so-called “I warned you” position, thus 
discrediting some strategic decisions that do require some audacity: 
“The consultants knew that there were a lot of people that were favourable to a fire sale … and thus they 
wanted to cover their position … Consultants prefer to say that is very difficult, because if we succeed it is 
ok [and if not they had warned you].” (Lowell) 
In this case it is quite clear that different rationalities/intelligences could be at stake when 
agents face the same decision and have access to the same information – something that again 
anticipated the debate of section 4.2.2 on the role that schemes and politicking (analysed in 
section 2.4.2) play while strategizing: consultants prefer to play a safe game, in order to 
defend their reputation; while managers need to be more audacious if they want to assure the 
future of the bank and, by the same token, their future; for the consultants it was a 
professional decision and no more; for Lowell’s management team, it was a critical decision 
that, if the correct decision had not been made, might have jeopardized the future of their 
bank and possibly their careers. 
The story that Lowell narrates signals the need of a critical intuitive perspective when 
interacting with consultants and, as Whittington (2006) notes, “other advisors too, for 
example investment bankers, corporate lawyers and business school gurus” (p. 619). Despite 
this apparent “rebellion” against building frames, anchored on his own intuition, Lowell 
recognized that in a bank under intervention due to a state of financial emergency, the scope 
for a management decision was significantly reduced and the decisions had to be 80 per cent 
analytical and only 20 per cent intuitive: 
“There was a group of [quantitative] constraints and [therefore] the [strategic] plan presented was to be 
concentrated particularly on cost reduction and [optimization of the] non-core loan portfolio. … The long 
way to go in terms of the bank’s strategy was about balancing the unbalanced: financial leverage, 
capital, impairments … It was a cycle of survival and recovery … In a state of emergency, strategy is 80 
per cent analytical and 20 per cent intuitive.” (Lowell) 
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In this quote, the building position of a predefined strategic constraint is clear. Words and 
phrases like “quantitative”, “cost reduction”, “financial leverage”, “capital”, or “impairments” 
set the context for a significantly reduced dwelling space. In other words, within this 
financially restricted building space, dwelling would be so limited that intuitions coming from 
conversations among managers would be threatened ab initio. 
This view of building as a constraint rather than a deliberated tool/practice, to fuel a 
deliberated and effective dwelling during which intuition might lead to the creation of the 
“truly new”, was somehow an idea that emerged from the interviews, with participants that 
called the researcher’s attention to the effects of potentially suffocating buildings. This idea is 
explored immediately below and then elsewhere while analysing Ferdinand’s frustration with 
the irrelevant position of his business unit amidst much more relevant countries belonging to 
the same multinational organization (see section 4.2.1). 
Martina – The building of the headquarters 
Martina, who is responsible for several offices/countries belonging to a multinational, also 
acknowledged the strategic restrictions brought about by a detached headquarters and the 
tyranny of finances, which is typical of any listed company: 
“[Strategic] content, what we can sell, clearly comes from the global organization ... Strategic options 
need to be translated into figures … I must first get approval from the finance department for the 
[strategic] model that I want to implement … In fact, once the strategic exercise and where we are seeing 
the focus areas [the only degree of liberty allowed by the building position brought by the headquarters] 
is agreed with the executive committee, what we do, somehow, is to match this with the financial team 
to check it fits [with the figures].” (Martina) 
The examples of Lowell and Martina effectively illustrate how building positions, coming 
from both shareholders and other stakeholders, together with their correspondent financial 
language to contextualize a strategy and measure its results, impact on the degree of liberty 
managers are allowed while strategizing, while dwelling and intuiting. As noted, this building 
is quite different from those constituted by Strategy-as-Practice practices presented in section 
2.1.2. Here the building posture does not help to foster creative and visionary intuitions, but 
rather expert ones, based on expert intuition (see section 2.3.2), by which managers might 
need to improvise and be able to “work around” it, in order to get rid of a potentially too-
narrow strategic space. 
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Melville – A model to foster the intuitive to come closer to the execution of solutions 
Melville, an economist who also works for an engineering multinational that was vying to 
find its competitive positioning in Portugal, was able to overcome a similar restricted strategic 
space and reduce the domination of the building in favour of the dwelling. This was partially 
due to the peripheral position of the country he manages – Portugal, being both too 
geographically remote and too small in the context of a big multinational, characterized by a 
“distanced view of the challenges that the [local] organization face[s]” (Painter-Morland & 
Deslandes, 2014, p. 854) –, a feature that, while being potentially adverse (as in the case of 
Ferdinand mentioned above) was transformed into an advantage by Melville with regard to 
strategic autonomy: 
“I took the (local) strategy in hand for the next ten years.” (Melville) 
In order to “take hold of the future in a very pragmatic way”, Melville placed his bet on 
simplicity, clarity, and engagement (measured by follow-up), without losing sight of “what 
we are” (in order to avoid non-implementable idyllic strategies): 
“I was focused on carrying out strategy, but following something cool I saw the other day and which 
[Albert] Einstein used to say: my way of solving matters has always been to simplify the complex ... 
Everything had to be simple and accessible. Why? So people can then implement. First of all, 
simplification, there had to be simplification: all [the participants in the strategic meetings] had only to 
propose three measures and two or three actions to execute … Therefore, all very simple and very fast.” 
(Melville) 
In this quote Melville repeats the idea of “simplicity” five times. Betting on simplification and 
on realism, he adopted a position closer to a dwelling view and, thus, a strategizing process 
closer to execution. Melville, an economist among engineers working in the engineering 
sector, practised a method that involved grouping five more experienced and older people 
with five youthful ones and asking them to share simple intuitive resolutions, an attribute 
which Melville recognizes as crucial for implementation. In doing this, Melville, as stated, 
brought the decisional process closer to execution, already impregnating decisions with 
attributes that, typically, belong to the dwelling world of implementation – simple, intuitive, 
and communal. This idea, offered by Melville, that intuition – apart from bringing the “truly 
new” and of having the capacity to digest huge amounts of information – also carries decision 
closer to execution, reinforced the researcher’s view of the strengths of simplicity while also 
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helping him to create an additional category, later looked into more thoroughly in the 
literature, about the merits of intuition to strategizing: 
“There were the older ones (who might have a tendency to boycott the youngsters) and the young high-
potentials (who were likely to be the bosses within ten years). I formed five groups of ten people – with 
five older/experts and five younger/future bosses – for each of the five divisions, and asked them to 
develop a three- to four-page presentation about what the division will look like in ten years, based on 
SWOT analysis. Additionally, I selected three horizontal topics – innovation, engineering, and service –, to 
be developed by three groups of specialists/experts. Then all the groups got together over one day, 
looked for cross-synergies and committed to paper two to three initiatives (implementation of actions) 
with five objectives each (for eight groups) …. It was fast work, based more on intuition [experienced 
specialists conjugated with motivated and risk-taking, high-potential youngsters] than on deep [and 
abstract] analysis.” (Melville) 
With this intertwined and practical method, Melville obtained around a hundred objectives to 
be followed over the coming years, with a degree-of-completion target of about 80 per cent in 
the first three to four years. What is interesting about Melville’s method is that even though it 
is very practical and has some intelligence, like the SWOT analysis, not to mention the 
method itself, it was used to good effect in order to foster intuitive solutions. By bringing 
together the more senior and experienced staff with the young risk-takers in the same working 
groups, Melville was able to fuel a specific and purposeful relationalism (see section 2.1.2), 
which possibly, maybe evidently, was most suitable in order to generate operative innovative 
ideas. 
This complementary interaction between intelligence and intuition represents a return to the 
idea of “intertuition” (see section 2.2.2), as it provides the pathway to creating a methodical-
intelligent impulsion for intuition, by stimulating collective problem-solving with the help of 
strategic tools. A similar scenario happens with Idelle … 
Idelle – Different buildings for different dwellings 
Idelle, an engineer managing a small but innovative and very efficient bank, illustrated the 
idea of dwelling in different buildings mentioned in section 2.2.2 quite well, when she talked 
about the added value brought by i) on one hand, international benchmarks and ii) on the 
other, consultants. In fact, on the one hand, she might have put in place a self-evaluation 
method to build the context with regard to IT productivity, regardless of the validity and 
applicability of the benchmark to the case in hand: 
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“We had a lot of developers, and for each area of programming fortunately there were benchmarks … 
there were exams that could be taken … and these tests had already been taken by hundreds of 
thousands of people, both in the USA and in Europe, and this allowed us … to define the average level of 
our programmers when compared to the best international scores and to reach the conclusion that … we 
were around 10‒20 per cent below those standards of productivity … and this was instrumental to 
convincing people that a change was needed …” (Idelle)  
And on the other hand, in terms of business and strategy, she used a consultant-based 
approach to create, through different hats, many buildings to foster innovative dwellings… 
“I use my own methods [frameworks] … For instance, the hat method … Someone comes to broach a 
topic and then we do a brainstorming session … and then, idea by idea, scenario by scenario, we start to 
discuss it … I demarked the way people act by giving them a hat with a different colour so that each one 
could perform a different character … one playing devil’s advocate – the character that is always against 
and can only see the problems –; the one that is emotional and only sees the positive side of solutions; 
the analytical one that just sees numbers … For initial scenarios I may appeal to external consultants, 
which are very good to spark initial ideas that later require densification by those with substantial 
sectorial experience.” (Idelle)  
In the first of the two presented frameworks, Idelle created self-awareness among the 
programmers by making them aware of their margin for progression in terms of productivity, 
which, surely, would have had an impact on the way they approached their daily routines 
delimiting, for instance, their amount of free time. Naturally, it was not clear if the benchmark 
itself was suitable to create a reference to each of the employees or, alternatively, if it was 
imposed by another type of building position that was anchored in rather more dogmatic 
hierarchical positions. 
Throughout the second framework, that based on the approach of consultant workshops, 
which is more circumstantial, Idelle fosters a demarked field by intuiting while dwelling in 
brainstorming and decision-making meetings. Particularly interesting in this second method, 
as noted, is the use of the different hats, which in themselves also create sub-buildings and 
corresponding sub-dwellings during an already building-dwelling situation. 
In the context of “intertuition”, consultants, be they external or internal – prove right those 
who think “that consultancy is becoming internalised” (Sturdy et al., 2016, p. 201) –, already 
seen as particularly important “to help instil enterprise, manage change and reduce 
hierarchical boundaries” (p. 185, my italics). But consultants must also be considered as 
particularly important in, as mentioned, in helping managers create several buildings for 
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several dwellings; and by which managers are expected to reflect on matters inside a specific 
strategic referential (e.g. Porter’s (1979) Five Forces, BCG matrix, etc.), based on tools to 
“support collective knowledge production and learning” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 297, 
my italics), and other strategic practices that were presented in section 2.1.2. 
Collier – Intelligence and culture as frames of intuition 
A paradigmatic example of this referential function of consultants was given by Collier. An 
economist, acting as an external consultant for ABC, Collier created the strategy that he 
would help to implement, after being recruited as the CEO of a large construction company 
that was facing a challenge of overseas business development. This case illustrates quite well 
the presumed separation between deciding and executing, since Collier was initially 
contracted to build the plan, which only afterwards was he requested to help execute as the 
CEO of the company he had joined.  
But this strategic plan was not the sole building vision that he would take into account to lead 
a transformation process that led to a significant internationalization of ABC. In fact, he 
attributed crucial importance to the history of the company, and particularly “the founder’s 
history”, to define a strategy that could be absorbed collectively, and around which cohesion 
could be created: 
“When I was given the challenge of joining ABC … the first thing I did was to read its founder’s life 
history. This was a very important decision for having in mind what is crucial to developing a strategy 
within a big group: to know its origins, its history, its culture, in order to develop a strategy that might be 
absorbed by the people in the company. I have a conviction that the strongest feature of companies that, 
although listed, are family-owned, what gives them cohesion, is their founder’s history.” (Collier) 
The importance ascribed by Collier to the building created by corporate culture, like a 
Bergsonian memory (see section 2.2.1), is in line with a view that recognizes the “embedded 
cultural and historical practices that shape the practices available for strategists to draw upon 
and also constitute the possibilities for being a strategist” (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 83). 
This quote also brings to the fore Peter Drucker’s aphorism which affirms the supremacy of 
culture over strategy, quoted in Coffman and Sorensen (2013): “Culture eats strategy for 
lunch” (loc. 85–88) and is coherent with Chia & Mackay’s (2007) idea that “the causal 
efficacy of actions [although causality, as seen in section 2.4, is somehow incoherent with the 
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concept of duration] is attributed to historically and culturally shaped internalized propensities 
and dispositions rather than to individual choices” (p. 232). 
In this context, Collier develops his view further: 
“Intuition for a group with more than sixty years of history, with great experience in the many locations 
in which [the company] operates … I have always been guided by listening to the older and more 
experienced people who have in-depth knowledge, but also know well both the activities and regions in 
which we operate. … I think intuition is very important; intuition and concrete knowledge, as well as 
knowledge of every stage of life of these regions and correspondent results.” (Collier) 
In this passage, note that Collier not only directly recognizes the importance of intuition, but 
also acknowledges its connection with organizational memory and culture, as seen in section 
2.2.1. What is more, Collier not only recognizes the importance of a building culture, but also 
the importance of building analysis to centre intuitive thinking. Consequently, he states that: 
“Before the deep conversations with the company founder, to capture his intuition about markets or 
strategy, I started to study, in detail, the market’s economic context, tax and political systems, and other 
crucial topics, sometimes with the help of local consultants.” (Collier) 
To look at this from another angle, although Collier was not supporting the concept of 
“intertuition” per se (since almost certainly he did not know this concept), he readily admitted 
that “the meetings were both formal [intelligence] and informal [intuition]”; and he was able 
to recognize that prior to having conversations with his boss and company-founder, he should 
focus the conversations in order to capture and generate intuitions, making use of previous 
analysis and study. It is this building, this structure, created before the conversations with the 
founder that explains the use of the adjective “deep”: 
“I used to have conversations with the main shareholder [and founder] of the company; profound 
conversations from a strategic and territorial point of view, since he was in the business for many years. 
… These meetings were both formal and informal at the same time: I used to closely study the matters 
where I needed some insight [from the founder], but then meetings were informal and usually one-to-
one, not in a group. For instance, to come to a decision to enter market X we used to have a [criteria] 
table in order to study the country concerned, including tax, political systems, and so on. These matters I 
would study with consultants, so that when I went for the meetings I knew how I should orient them in 
order that [the founder’s] intuition could match the matters about which I needed clarification. That is to 
say, I did not go as an open book because this would represent a loss of time, an endless meeting. It was 
to avoid this that I used to prepare myself so well for these meetings… To take full advantage of the 
founder’s intuition and so as not to mix intuition with generic conversations that one can have about no 
matter what.” (Collier) 
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This perspective, where the roles of intuition and analysis – normally used to test intuitions –, 
and the correspondent sequence, seem to be reversed – since initially Collier prepared the 
analytical grids and then he used them to converse with the company’s founder –, points to 
the importance of “intertuition” (see section 2.2.2), such as: 
Analysis is essentially selection. Our mind concentrates on those aspects of things that are practically 
important, and discard the others. (Kolakowski, 2001, p. 25, my italics) 
At this stage, the more critical reader could bring the perspective that Collier, while talking 
with the company-founder, was looking for zones of selling or consensus, similar to those 
presented respectively in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, regarding duration, rather than sources of 
intuitions. While this might be so, it does not however preclude the practicality that a building 
analytical view can bring focus to intuition in the generation of operating solutions: 
Life demands that we acknowledge things in their connection with our own needs. To live is to act. To 
live is to accept nothing more in things (in reality) except what is useful. (Bergson, 2001c, p. 459, my 
italics) 
This focus of intuition on the “useful” through use of analytical grids, so long as it does not 
create a strategically stifling straitjacket, ascribes practicality to intuition, thus preventing 
inconsequent strategic randomness produced by too much artistry or too many artistic minds. 
Martina and Mark – A strategic plan to avoid free dwelling and improvisation 
Martina’s contribution is appropriate to bring to a conclusion this analysis of the interactions 
between the interrelated pairs, building vs. dwelling and intelligence vs. intuition. She 
stressed the importance of the strategic plan – building plan – which she saw as crucial in 
order to prevent managers acting as “free electrons”, the neighbour of strategic randomness, 
reinforcing the “strongly purposive terminology of goals, plans, and objectives to the more 
ephemeral language of dreams, wishes, desires, anxieties, hopes, fears, and aspirations” 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 984): 
“When the time to execute comes … I know perfectly well the difficulties that we have while executing 
[dwelling] due to the pressures of short-term [results] ... The moment you leave people to act as ‘free 
electrons’, inadvertently, it is very easy for people to focus on the day-to-day … Which is why I put strong 
emphasis on strategic [plan] follow-up … because, otherwise, people would go in the wrong direction.” 
(Martina) 
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This quote from Martina is a warning about dwelling without building, something that relates 
to Mark’s comments and which, in turn, also relates to the concept of improvisation presented 
in section 2.2.3: 
“I will be improvising, focused on the urgent and fine-tuning here and there, when I am convinced that 
what I had considered really important has altered in such a way that the [planned] strategic objective is 
not there at all.” (Mark, Interview 2) 
Nevertheless, neither Martina nor Mark gave any indication during their interviews that they 
would, on the contrary, be likely to become imprisoned in cultures that are too immature to 
recognize the bounds of planning and the corresponding dictatorship of assumptions, or that 
advocate a merely quantitative, formalized or deterministic view of the world (Lenz & Lyles, 
1985). 
In summary, it can be said that intuition, either directly, or through accumulation/application 
of experience, is widely recognized as an important element while strategizing. Jonathan and 
Jarvis, both engineers, and hence potentially prone to favour a scientific and quantitative view 
of the world rather than an intuitive and subjective one, gave good examples of how their 
incursions into the field of action brought them important insights, prompting them to pursue 
or change a certain strategic initiative. Both cases illustrate an evolution—from more 
analytical or intelligent tools for strategizing to action-based and intuitive ones, although this 
trajectory was not calculated. On the calculated side of the use of intuition, for which 
“intertuition” has been mentioned, Melville, Idelle, and Collier gave good examples of how 
they combine rationality and intuition, explaining their methods to generate strategic ideas. 
Finally, it was recognized as a “fact of life” that managers have to strategize, to dwell, within 
different types of building, be they more creative – as in the methods referenced for 
“intertuition”– or, on the other hand, be they more restrictive, as in the case of the intervention 
for Lowell, or for a headquarters of a listed company for Martina, or, but only partially, be 
they for plans, as in the cases of both Martina and Mark. 
All in all, although marked by the limitations identified in the introduction of this chapter, the 
interviews have contributed to consolidating views that advocate the important role “intuition 
plays in strategic decision making, [considered] a process that demands a delicate balance 
between rational analysis and intuitive judgment” (Sinclair et al., 2009, p. 393). Additionally, 
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apart from having examples that go in the direction of Heidegger’s view that “building is not 
merely a means and a way towards dwelling – to build is in itself already to dwell” 
(Heidegger, 2001, p. 144), another idea surfaced: dwelling takes place in different buildings 
or, to borrow a biblical expression, in a house of many mansions. This helps in understanding 
that the construction of these mansions, these complementary (sub)-buildings, comes under 
the responsibility of managers while strategizing, by choosing the right frames for intuition, 
by “intertuition”; and this presents a new aspect to the choice in theories and brings something 
new to the Strategy-as-Practice corpus. It is also worth mentioning that these buildings cannot 
be asphyxiating in the sense that, instead of promoting dwelling, the more stuffy and stiffer 
the boundaries to dwelling become, and the closer to the point of artificiality they move, the 
more laughable they are (see section 2.2.2). 
 
(4.1.2) Thought vs. Action and Decision vs. Execution 
Once again the literature review is instrumental in helping to position the topics under 
analysis with regard to the thinking vs. analysis pair. The most important idea in this regard, 
repeated several times throughout this work, is that one must act like a man of thought and 
think like a man of action (Bergson, 2014, p. 461). The importance of being a man of action 
for thinking is “like walking [action], where one puts one foot in front of the other to advance, 
the natural movement of the spirit needs an idea for the other ideas to progress” (Jankélévitch, 
2008, p. 266): 
Action prompts discovery, which generates new action, which leads to new discoveries, which leads to 
better action, and then discovery, etc. (Coffman & Sorensen, 2013, loc. 3553) 
On the other hand, regarding the pair, decision vs. execution, Mintzberg acknowledges that: 
the dichotomy between strategy formulation [decision] and strategy implementation [execution] is a 
false one under certain conditions, because it ignores the [practical] learning that must often follow the 
conception of intended strategy. (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 247, my italics) 
As this brief recapitulation shows, not only are the pairs thinking vs. acting and decision vs. 
execution not opposites after all, but they act as a requisite for thinking as well, for thinking 
intuitively; because thinking intuitively is to think in duration, which departs from 
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movement/action (Bergson, 2001e, p. 1275). Some of these “movements” or actions 
undertaken by managers, as for instance in regularly talking with clients or reading market 
reports/attending market events, both of which may generate intuitions, are presented in the 
form of a word cloud in Figure 3 (see section 1.4.2). This illustration was the result, as 
mentioned, of an open question asked in former quantitative research: “In less than ten words, 
please name (up to) three possible sources of intuition in a business context?” 
In the remainder of this section, and, moreover, in the rest of Chapter 4 as specified, voice has 
been given to the interviewees by offering excerpts from their interviews. The objective is to 
elucidate from a much larger analysis some of their views that unfortunately, due to space 
restrictions and focus on intuition and duration, cannot be presented in full in this text. 
Experience (action) as intuitive thinking and accumulated knowledge 
In line with the literature review (see section 2.3.2), Jonathan considers experience a 
neighbouring concept of intuition: 
“I would replace the word intuition for an [idea of] accumulated experience that is put into practice … Let 
me give you an example: something very important in the banking sector is risk analysis … My company 
[in the energy sector] used to have zero tolerance to risk … My former experience [in the banking sector, 
which does not assume zero risk] made me define certain areas for which risks might be assumed.” 
(Jonathan) 
Interestingly, Jonathan seems to recognize the double meaning of the word “experience55”, 
seeing it on one hand as a kind of living action (see section 2.3.1) coming from former jobs in 
other sectors, and on the other, as knowledge ready to be put into practice in new situations. 
In his example, Jonathan innovated by taking patterns of risk used in banking, which were 
more permissive, and adapting them to a much more risk-averse sector – energy and utilities – 
thus instilling a cultural change towards more entrepreneurism. Maybe conditioned by one of 
the most relevant rules of finance which states that higher risks must be taken in order to 
achieve higher returns, Jonathan took an intuitive decision that he hoped would be coherent 
with his strategy for increasing the company’s profits. It is quite clear here how fuzzy the 
                                                          
55 Experience is simultaneously action, i.e. “practical [in-action] contact with and observation of facts or events”; and 
knowledge, “the knowledge or skill acquired by a period of practical experience of something, especially that gained in a 
particular profession.” See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/experience (accessed 1/10/2016). 
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barriers between thinking and acting are, for Jonathan’s idea was clearly generated by his 
former actions and experiences, and probably influenced by financial theory and thought. This 
mode of acting embodies the concept of creative intuition as presented in section 2.3.2. 
In the case of Ivy, she explicitly acknowledged that when she wants to disrupt strategically, 
she prefers not to use people from her own sector; she denies the corresponding experience of 
her own sector. In this case, surprisingly, the experience of Ivy’s own sector does not act as a 
source of creating intuition, but rather it acts as a blocker, framed by mechanical memories of 
itself (see section 2.2.1): 
“When I looked strategically at the digital revolution, I thought: this does not need to be sorted out by 
changing a process here and a process there; one needs to look to the whole journey of the client and 
understand how this will change all the processes in a comprehensive manner. Then, I recruited someone 
to be the client’s journey-process owner, responsible for working together with them in all areas, to 
establish standards of what to do, and the correspondent implications for IT, and so on. An important 
thing: when we talk about disruption, I do not like people coming from my sector. I recruited someone 
from another sector; this person has retail experience and comes with the retail sector and client-
orientation mindset … Very different from what happens in our sector; when we want disruption we 
cannot count on people from our sector; otherwise they will not disrupt everything, but rather start to 
think like we are already thinking.” (Ivy, Interview 2) 
Apart, from the innovation of applying formerly captured patterns to new realities (see section 
2.3.2, on creative intuition), Ivy’s quote recalls that experience has two “faces” when taken as 
expert intuition: it can permit managers to respond faster to the challenges of the business 
ecosystem but can also limit the out-of-the-box-thinking for a specific reality. To put this 
another way, sectorial experience might act as a constraint to strategic disruption in the 
correspondent sector, rather than acting as an intuitive source of the “truly new”; this was the 
reason that led Ivy to recruit some very experienced personnel … from another sector. 
Recognizing the importance of experience(s)/occurrences to foster companies’ thinking and 
encourage better action in the future, Bond – the CEO of a telecommunications company 
involved in M&A and business development processes – built a knowledge base with the help 
of three highly reputed engineers. This knowledge base exploited former dwelling-in-a-
building experience and could be accessed by any newcomer, but it did not require a personal 
passing-on of that particular knowledge/experience in order for the newcomer to know how to 
act/think: 
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“There was much written: notes, models, reports, procedures, processes … Almost all processes were 
written down. What is more, I created a department to audit processes into which I put three engineers, 
who were close to retirement, three great telecommunications engineers who had neither the rhythm 
nor the dynamism to face our challenges. … I called them and said: I need respected auditors; people 
who have seen difficult cases in the past, and can make recommendations to improve our processes … 
And they agreed to do it and we improved the processes a lot. To give you an example … We had the 
territory divided into geographical areas and at some point we introduced an optical fibre network and 
their redundancies were not of great number … One day something happened during maintenance work 
where an optical fibre was cut, and the incident took twenty-four hours to solve – something that was 
completely unacceptable. They [the auditors] audited the situation and concluded that the incident 
occurred on the border between two regions, and that nobody felt responsible for that area. Before a 
decision was made about who was responsible for the area in which the problem took place, several 
hours passed … And therefore the process of improvement was to create an overlap between regions, so 
that in the worst case scenario, two maintenance teams appeared for the same area.” (Bond) 
This quote, apart from illustrating how Bond decided to frame/build accumulated experience, 
exemplifies the need to experience specific situations in order to enter into intuitive sympathy 
(see section 2.2.1) with a certain type of problem that would probably otherwise go unnoticed. 
Take the point where “nobody felt responsible for” a certain incident; it shows the practical 
need to evolve in a certain strategic direction, based on a lesson learnt in the field of action 
(see section 2.3.1). On the other hand, were it not for the auditors, the acts that took place in 
the field would not have been analysed and, later, transformed into accessible knowledge. 
Once again, it is difficult to isolate the contributions, neither of the workers’ behaviour nor the 
auditors’ thinking, since without the action of the former, the future knowledge-creation by 
the latter might not have been possible. As stated, the quote also illustrates the method by 
which practical experience captured while/from dwelling is converted into intelligence/a tool 
through writing; and this constitutes an elucidative example of a framed accumulation of 
experience – a praxis (livingness) that originated a practice (method) for future praxis (see 
section 2.1.2), which also illustrates an intuition-to-intelligence perspective of “intertuition” 
and, as referred to in the literature review, is in accordance with Herepath’s (2014) view by 
which strategists can reproduce or construct new structures/practices.  
Execution as the substance of decision (and of strategy) 
In the case of Bond, it is also execution – usually considered a consequence of decision – that 
is difficult to separate from decision since, in his case – contrary to the common sequence – 
execution was considered an essential requisite to give substance to strategy: 
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“The question is: whether assembling telephones in twenty-four hours is a strategic problem or an 
operational problem? It is a strategic decision in terms of the [corporate] image and the path that the 
company had to follow [client orientation]: the client does not have to wait – this was the image 
underlying one of the strategic aims.” (Bond) 
Taking “operational” as a neighbouring concept of execution, it was very difficult for Bond to 
conceive a client-centred strategy if, due to one of its components, the client would have 
complained. Miles’ experience goes in a similar direction: 
“Strategy is one per cent decision and ninety-nine per cent execution. … Sometimes there are very similar 
strategic directions among companies, but how they are executed makes all the difference. Strategy 
without execution is nothing.” (Miles, Interview 3) 
Miles puts much greater emphasis and importance on execution than on decision and, going 
even further, clearly links the concept of strategy to execution rather than to decision. In a 
similar way, Melville orientates towards the “no matter what” form of implementation in a 
context where he believes “there is no strategic perfection” – i.e. such as for a strategy that a 
priori will assure 100% success no matter what; Jonathan states that “it is better to execute 
and hit 80 per cent than do nothing”; and, likewise, Corwin recalled that:  
“The macro is the sum of the micros … if you do not understand this you cannot do anything, you remain 
a theorist, a philosopher … and a dreamer, a generalist, a politician, none of which are helpful for our 
work … when what we need are doers, specialists that understand our business.” (Corwin) 
In this quote, Corwin uses the word “micro” as a substitute for execution, to defend the 
importance of acting – he then uses the word “doers” – and holds up experienced people, 
considered by him as “specialists that understand our business”, to give substance and 
density to a thinking that otherwise would remain as elusive as the thinking of “a dreamer, a 
generalist, a politician” – all of whom have characteristics not commonly associated with the 
character of a CEO and are more or less in the antipodes of the quantitative mind of an 
engineer. In short, Corwin also elects action as an essential condition to meaningful strategic 
thinking. 
Bringing the field of action closer to decision 
While it is more or less obvious that conversations might foster intuitive thinking, not all of 
the companies involve operational people in strategizing, thus wasting an opportunity to 
enrich strategic thinking and formulation. This is not the case for two of the women 
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interviewed: Ivy and Martina. Ivy needs no “sages” to counsel her on strategy. Instead, being 
the person responsible for strategy within the C-Suite (executive board of directors), she asks 
operational people to share with her their experiences captured in the field of action: 
“I have operational people in the field, multidisciplinary teams … Here, I do not have a group of sages 
thinking about strategy; I carry out strategy with a group of people who are in the field; and on certain 
occasions I force them to leave the field and come to think strategically with me, including defining the 
priorities (which will then be validated by the C-suite).” (Ivy, Interview 2) 
Naturally, she does not dismiss the intervention of her colleagues at C-Suite level, with their 
partial building position, in validating ideas brought from the field; but even so, she knows 
that the closer to execution decisions are, the higher their quality, and the greater the 
likelihood of their being potentially suitable in a successful execution derived from field-
based thinking. The practice undertaken by Ivy and her operational team, though certainly not 
a prevailing method for companies in general, is coherent with Whittington’s (2006) opinion 
that “middle managers also engage in strategy work, not just through implementation, but 
through middle-top-down processes of agenda seeking, proposal selection and information 
filtering” (p. 619). Martina uses a similar practice, this time to address clients’ needs: 
“I listen a lot to people that are close to the clients … These people have the objectivity of the client’s 
specificity.” (Martina) 
Interestingly, Martina, “surrendering some control to those closest to situations who had the 
best information to develop realistic strategies” (Freedman, 2013, p. 555), uses the word 
“objectivity” to refer to the nature of the knowledge possessed by her sales force, denoting 
that she is not looking for intuitive thinking generated by people in the field, but rather a dose 
of realism that can help her step into her customers’ shoes, and thus create an intuitive 
symbiosis with her object of analysis. Bond also clarified that, although intuitive thinking was 
not directly involved in his process of strategizing, it was indirectly there, after incorporation 
of ideas captured at conferences and other specific events organized by his innovation 
department – a department that is in the field of learning through experiences: 
“What we had were, systematically, conferences and workshops organized by the Innovation 
Department … And so I would say that if intuition has any role in strategy, it is the absorption of that 
knowledge, of these ideas that each of us capture and, afterwards, used during the process of strategy-
creation. That is, intuition was not a direct element of the strategic process, although intuition was 
incorporated into it within the action of the Innovation Department.” (Bond) 
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In this quote, Bond uses the word “absorption” to refer to the fusion of experiences, coming 
both from actions undertaken by the innovation department as well as from his colleagues 
who participated in the strategizing process. This idea illustrates quite well a form of 
relationalism (see section 2.1.2) fostered by “intertuition” (see section 2.2.2), since there was 
a method/intelligence employed in order to create a convergence between a department for 
innovation and Bond’s strategists, so as to absorb innovative thinking, which in turn could 
produce intuitions. But for Bond – which is in agreement with Bennis & Nanus’ view that 
“reasonable failure should never be received with anger” [(Pfeffer & Sutton, 2013, loc. 3659, 
my italics), citing (Bennis & Nanus, 1997)] and with Hyman, for whom “justifiable mistakes 
and blunders should not be labelled ‘stupid’” (2002, p. 20, my italics) – it was important to 
register not only the good experiences, but also the errors. The errors, when justified, were 
seen as ignitions of learning and, for that reason, they were tolerated: 
“We had one major rule: never blame your subordinates; each of us should assume our errors and be 
supportive of our subordinates. Every time we do not support those who make mistakes, and when the 
error is explained (and while undergoing aggressive change, several mistakes are made during the 
process), that is dramatic: the day after, nobody is willing to change anything in her/his conservative 
behaviour. Therefore, the rule was to be supportive … Another rule was to tolerate all mistakes that 
could be explained; that is, I have made a decision, that decision had a set of grounds, and turned out to 
be wrong … Either the grounds were wrong, or they were wrongly implemented, or something went 
wrong … But, it was possible to explain the basis for the decision: what the grounds were and why they 
went wrong; i.e. the learning was almost automatic – we will not do it again. An inexplicable error was 
harder to accept.” (Bond) 
In this quote, Bond states that “learning [derived from justified errors] was almost 
automatic”. Once again, just after a certain action, and this time also after its evaluation, 
learning could take place, further reinforcing the idea of thinking derived from action. 
However, Bond did not accept all errors as sources of learning; he accepted errors only if they 
were grounded; he was reluctant to accept without question the incorrectly implemented or 
unexpected errors, and certainly would reject “cases in which individuals make repeated 
mistakes – without being able to learn much from their experiences” (Ariely, 2009, loc. 124). 
All other errors, all other actions leading to these errors, if not unexpected/unthinkable, had to 
have had a thought behind them; i.e. only thought-out actions, which also include lessons 
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learnt from previous mistakes, were accepted, since these are the only ones suitable for 
developing educated action – to make the analogy with an educated guess.56 
The main outcomes taken from this section, which somehow anticipates the relevance of the 
analysis of duration, is an awareness of the interwoven nature of thinking and acting, and of 
decision and execution, once a dynamic view of the world like Bergson’s is adopted. Action 
was always considered a crucial element for strategizing during the interviews, even though 
indirectly. Jonathan, Ivy, and Bond illustrated the importance of experience well (their own 
and others’), as a generator of intuitive insights to strategy formulation. All of them explained 
what were/are the actions that they undertake/captured in the field of operations, which help 
them to generate realistic – in the sense of a closer-to-market reality, or “objectivity” as 
Martina states – strategic decisions. Melville even went a step further when he explained a 
very simple and humanized method to make decisions subordinated to their suitability for 
execution. Miles remembered that “strategy is ninety-nine per cent execution” (Interview 3); 
and Corwin, as if following Wilkinson’s (2015) recommendation to “pay attention to details 
and stay alert to anomalies” (loc. 1040), never gave up on micro activities to complement 
macro thinking. On the other hand, Bond, a defender of building on experience, mentioned 
the words automatism and absorption to characterize the fusion between action and 
thinking/knowledge that occurs in managers’ minds after i) justified or thought-out errors and 
ii) experimental activities developed by his innovation department, respectively. 
All in all, the fluidity of interaction and interpenetration between thinking/deciding and 
acting/executing exhibited by participants’/practitioners’ responses, contrasted with the 
question underlying this work – How can the formal gap between strategic decision and 
execution be reduced? –, appears to make this question pointless. What is more, participants’ 
views brought to light problems that may arise when concepts divide what is in practice 
indivisible (Sayer, 2000), a trap that is likely to occur with static views of reality … and 
which the following section will try to resolve. 
 
                                                          
56 “A guess based on knowledge and experience and therefore likely to be correct.” See 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/educated-guess (accessed 9/4/2016). 
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(4.2) Strategic duration 
Bergsonian duration is a concept even more elusive than intuition since, according to the 
French philosopher, “it is intuition that is able to access the durational whole of time, thus 
allowing creative responses to life that exceed the reach of representational [intelligent] 
schemas” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 10); and it is probably due to the difficulties of representation, as 
claimed, that it is less commonly treated in the literature. For this reason, the major objective 
of this section is to illustrate how this concept might be valuable to understanding the 
vicissitudes that happen while strategizing, in a sort of parallel activity that is more connected 
to strategic formation than to formulation, and which, even though the former comprises the 
latter, constitutes a “stream [duration] against which we cannot go” (Bergson, 2005, p. 505). 
In order to overcome the near-impossibility of directly applying this so very philosophical 
concept to a so very practical activity, focus has been put on its conceptual constituents 
identified in section 2.4 of the literature review, which at first sight could represent a seeming 
incoherence within the limitations of schemas representing duration as outlined above, but as 
explained hereafter, might not be incompatible after all: highlighting, which consists of 
drawing management attention to a strategic issue, and framing, which consists of 
concentrating management attention on the strategic finality. These two concepts, and 
corresponding sub-concepts, depicted in the Framework of Strategic Duration (Figure 5, 
section 2.4) have helped guide the analysis presented in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned and as explained in the literature review, one of the features of 
duration is its non-divisibility and its non-causality, or as Schutz notes, “a continuous coming-
to-be and passing-away of heterogeneous qualities” (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1513), which is 
certainly different from chronological time and from the divisibility of stages implied by the 
Framework of Strategic Duration. Naturally, the current research is not meant to be captured 
mainly by “engaged intuition” as Bergsonian purity would defend, “without beginnings or 
ends” …  
The flow of duration is without beginnings or ends, and is just constant movement in the middle. 
Freedom then is not only processual: it is a triumph of quality over quantity, duration over artifice. 
Rather than being apprehended by unreflective instinct, or the abstract operations of intellect, duration 
is known through engaged intuition. (Linstead, 2014, loc. 6205) 
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… but by intelligence, and its “abstract operations”, since it is supported by language as a 
tool, as well as by other tools that permit undertaking research and hopefully reaching reliable 
conclusions. Thus, by analysing duration through interviews, set around a conceptual 
framework that was divided into components, “we have grasped motion that is no longer 
motion, motion that has run its course, in short, not the motion itself, but merely the space 
traversed” (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1524). 
Does this mean that it is impossible to analyse duration, a “temporally evolving phenomena” 
(Langley et al., 2013, p. 3); a fact that would make the work of the researcher useless? Schutz, 
notes the artificiality … 
In order to effect such an artificial division within duration, I should have to get outside the flow itself. 
[…] The ‘Now’ is a phase rather than a point, and therefore the different phases melt into one another 
along a continuum. (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1639) 
 … and that “each phase of experience melts into the next without any sharp boundaries as it 
is being lived through” (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1642); but [still]… 
Each phase is distinct in its thusness, or quality, from the next insofar as it is held in the gaze of 
attention. […] I turn my attention to my living experience, I am no longer taking up my position within 
the stream of pure duration, I am no longer simply living within that flow. The experiences are 
apprehended, distinguished, brought into relief, marked out from one another; the experiences which 
were constituted as phases within the flow of duration now become objects of attention as constituted 
experiences. (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1642–46) 
In other words, the same attention that, as explained in section 2.4, was attached to the 
concepts of highlighting and framing a certain course of action during strategizing, are 
recognized by Schutz as elements that allow strategic leaders to get out of their “stream of 
experience” (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1513) while strategizing, in order to try to capture the 
dynamic elements of strategy formation without completely losing the notion of duration, 
which they have “to be part of”: 
Reality is not stagnant, and hence leaders have to be capable to be part of, process and engage with the 
qualitative experience of duration. (Painter-Morland & Deslandes, 2014, p. 854)  
It is easier to understand the concept of being attentive to the different components of 
strategic duration identified in section 2.4, as in for instance being attentive to the business 
environment that may impact on the company’s SWOT, if these stages are identified as 
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possible alternatives to a dispersion in day-to-day routines that, in all likelihood, would lead 
to improvisation rather than strategy, as seen in the preceding chapter. Taken from this 
perspective, attention is not a mere philosophical concept, but, instead, a neighbouring 
concept of strategic focus, considered by many authors (Goleman, 2013; Halvorson & 
Higgins, 2013; Wolff, 2010) as a key element of strategizing. 
Having reached the conclusion that communicating duration intelligently was not a 
conceptual issue, since, as noted above, “I turn my attention to […] [“communicable”] living 
experience, I am no longer taking up my position within the [“incommunicable”] stream of 
pure duration” (Schutz, 1967, loc. 1645), the researcher still needed to be coherent with 
Bergson, who despite acknowledging that “our intellect does undoubtedly grasp the real 
moments of real duration after they are past” (Bergson, 2005, p. 2233), still insisted that … 
It is no use trying to approach duration: we must install ourselves within it straight away. This is what 
the intellect generally refuses to do, accustomed as it is to think the moving by means of the 
unmovable. (Bergson, 2005, p. 3314) 
It was due to the need to “install ourselves within” duration that led the researcher to try out 
the triple interview method, whereby he spoke with participants at three different times, 
separated by a three-month period. This possibly represents the first of the 
practical/conceptual conundrums the researcher faced: choosing three different chronological 
moments, quantitative times, to access “lived, or qualitative time—what Bergson called 
duration” (Helin et al., 2014, loc. 291). Additionally, as Bergson states … 
We place ourselves in duration in order to go from that duration to moments, instead of starting from 
moments in order to bind them again and to construct duration. (Bergson, 2005, p. 4012) 
Consequently, this option to take different chronological moments for later “control” of 
strategic duration was very likely the origin of the already recognized impossibility of 
measuring the level of strategic progress between the first and second interviews, since, as 
analysed in the introduction of this chapter, for participants, strategy is either endless or 
unfailing. Moreover, since strategic formation should have been grasped intuitively while 
strategizing, alongside the interviews, something that was practically impossible, the utility of 
the interviews in certain moments was at risk ab initio – but this impossibility only became 
evident to the researcher after he had tried the triple-interview method; i.e. after he 
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acknowledged the impossibility of apprehending duration when he was in action inside the 
duration of interviewing. 
Additionally, as if all the above challenges were not enough, duration goes further than the 
limits of a person; hence witnessing it would imply access to, for instance, the relationalism 
created between strategists, something that might escape from the interviewees. Here, it must 
be acknowledged that what philosophy, and specifically Bergson, offers to extend, and 
sometimes even permits, is the reader’s comprehension of difficult phenomena that impacts 
upon strategizing, but ends up being too elusive to be captured in a practical context. 
Additionally, if measuring the duration of a painting, knowing that, according to Helin et al. 
(2014), … 
Neither the painter nor the mountain act upon the world; both are implicated with one another, pulled 
along and mixed within the fluidity of fact (loc. 208) […] [which] In the duration of this belonging, 
become with the event, the trace of which is the painting (loc. 246) […] This is done as an intensive 
(passionate) process of receiving the situation so that one belongs to it, become with the event of 
‘painting it’, and make this materialize on a canvas (loc. 252). 
… it is already difficult, since the quality of it is different from the progression of it – not to 
mention the inseparability that exists between the painting and the painter, as retold above – it 
is not hard to imagine how complicated the task of accessing strategy formation is, being that 
strategy is not visible on a canvas. And even considering a certain degree of materialization in 
documents, achieved results, and so on –, in contrast to an image in a painting, it is not 
“physical”, and, what is more, depends on the narratives of strategists, i.e. on the narratives of 
the judge and judged. Therefore, to evaluate the complexity of grasping strategic duration, the 
simple description of what it means to grasp duration in a painting is already sufficient, 
especially if strategic management is assimilated to making art (Mintzberg, 1973; 1987), thus 
allowing the continuation of the painting analogy: 
The painter is before his canvas, the colours are on the palette, the model is sitting – all this we see, and 
also we know the painter's style: do we foresee what will appear on the canvas? We possess the 
elements of the problem; we know in an abstract way, how it will be solved, for the portrait will surely 
resemble the model and will surely resemble also the artist; but the concrete solution brings with it that 
unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art. (Bergson, 2005, p. 3777, my italics)  
From this quote, what Bergson seems to offer to strategists is the idea that no matter what the 
vision or the plan – “the model” – and the fact that strategy most probably resembles the plan, 
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there will always be a “truly new” part in strategy, “that unforeseeable nothing”, that only 
duration and its creative power can explain. But if there is a part of strategy that is an 
“unforeseeable nothing”, how could the researcher be sure that the interviewees were capable 
of communicating such an elusive idea just by departing from their own flow of strategic 
duration?  
All of these reasons help to explain why, during the second interviews, the researcher realized 
that he was not accessing duration in quite the way he had expected. On the other hand, 
enacting these interviews not only allowed ideas to emerge concerning problems associated 
with accessing duration, but also brought about an imperative for clarity that could overcome 
the vagueness that the second interviews presented: 
The vague and variable hues of a phenomenon must be erased so that its constant features can be 
drawn. All precise knowledge leads to the annihilation of appearances […] Reality is thus analysed by 
means of negations [of elusiveness]. Thinking involves disregarding certain experiences and willingly 
casting them into the shadow of nothingness. (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 679) 
In fact, and from a positive point of view, leveraging a constructionist approach, throughout 
the triple interviews, the researcher grasped that even if it was almost impossible to 
acknowledge strategic duration in its purity, he could nevertheless identify some “stages”, as 
mentioned, which not only suggested that a further review of the literature was necessary to 
understand duration, but also helped to inspire, create, and complete the Framework of 
Strategic Duration (Figure 5, section 2.4). In other words, the triple interviews permitted the 
researcher to go beyond what participants were saying about strategizing. In their own 
duration, the triple interviews allowed ideas to be triggered which led to the identification of 
the six constituent elements of duration, based on the highlighting and then framing of 
strategic attention, and following Bachelard’s recommendation: 
Were we to complete an analysis of an action which has duration, we would see that this analysis is 
expressed in separate ph[r]ases centred on instants of very precise singularity. (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 
731) 
But then, the researcher seemed to be confronted by yet another challenge, another issue to 
solve, identical to that which Bachelard had already “solved”. In fact,  until this point of 
Bachelard’s analysis, and in this research, discontinuity has only been allowed for reasons of 
communication that permit duration to “be broken by what lies outside, by appearance, and by 
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language that claims to describe it. Discontinuities, fragmentation, and negation only appear 
to be devices which help exposition” (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 553). Nevertheless, Bachelard 
went a step further in discontinuity, stating that “we do not feel we have the right to impose a 
continuum when we always and everywhere observe discontinuity” (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 
863): 
… of Bergsonism we accept everything but continuity […] We wish therefore to develop a discontinuous 
Bergsonism the need to arithmetise Bergsonian duration so as to give it more fluidity, more numbers, 
and also more accuracy in the correspondence the phenomena of thought exhibit between themselves 
and the quantum characteristics of reality. (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 559–64) 
From the functional standpoint that we shall adopt, it will be seen that there is nothing more normal or 
more necessary than going to the limit and establishing the relaxation of function, the repose of 
function, the non-functioning of function, since function must obviously often stop function. (Bachelard, 
2000, loc. 570) 
Bachelard’ s argument, especially the idea about connecting philosophy and strategic reality, 
was convincing enough to make the researcher accept a “relaxation” of continuity in 
analysing duration, due to the practicality of orchestrating a connection between duration and 
“the quantum characteristics of reality”. A reality that indeed “shows us a succession that is 
plainly heterogeneous, clearly marked by occurrences of newness and surprise and by breaks, 
cut too by voids” (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 883), as strategic action suggests and anticipates very 
well. 
Might this “relaxation” mean that the researcher is being contradictory with his Bergsonian 
thesis, “for deny[ing] continuity is to reject Bergsonism” (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 883)? In 
reply, the answer would be No, for by relaxing continuity, the researcher is only making some 
concessions to intelligence, in favour of practicality – and Bergson would not deny this 
instrumental use of intelligence. That is to say, paradoxically, the researcher is building an 
instrumental bridge to assure continuity between philosophy and the possibility of using its 
concepts in organizational research. This is only after having struggled to assure continuity 
between an intuitive sense of duration and intelligent communicability. 
Once this problem of a potential paradox of dividing something that is continuous by nature 
was resolved, analysis – a term that Bergson associates with intelligence – of the interviews 
turned to situations in which the constituents of duration were directly or indirectly brought to 
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the participants’ narratives. Naturally, being that these constituents began to be framed when 
the second interviews took place, it was inevitable that their utilization as a conceptual 
framework of duration could be used ab initio only for the third interviews (or the second and 
the last, for two of the interviewees), although duration’s constituents could be used 
afterwards as nodes for the second interviews. 
With this framework in mind, the researcher also revisited some of the single interviews, to 
identify parts that might fit in with the problematic brought by the six constituents (stages). 
This was not a difficult task, since thinking intuitively is to think in duration (Bergson, 2001e, 
p. 1275); and in the interviews used to analyse intuition while strategizing, i.e. while in the 
course of action, managers undoubtedly denoted that they had lived through the stages 
(constituents) of duration. 
 
(4.2.1) Fostering Strategic Attention – Highlighting  
As seen in Chapter 2 (2.4), the salient elements of the Framework of Strategic Duration 
(Figure 5) are composed of three stages: labelling, momentum, and selling. These were the 
concepts used to explore how strategic duration is (re)initiated through strategic attention. 
Labelling (strategic issue) 
It was consensually agreed among interviewees that an examination of the business 
environment in interaction/conversation with correspondent stakeholders and particularly 
through a SWOT analysis, were the main triggers in detecting and labelling some idea/issue 
as strategic. 
Ivy is an engineer and CEO of a leading healthcare company. The company faces the 
challenges of any new entrants to the market, operating in a digitized world, with very well-
informed and demanding customers (that are no longer traditional “patients”). When 
managing amidst a high degree of uncertainty, therefore, sharing traits of Simpson et al. 
(2002), she and her team could serenely “wait until the insights come, resources become 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 134 
 
available […] [while] observing and listening” (p. 1211), but this seems not to be her strategy. 
As she explained, her ultimate strategic role as manager follows that of an S-Curve:57 
“Ten years ago, I was an attacker; I started from scratch and attacked the status quo of the incumbents 
and I had nothing to lose … You know the S-Curve, right? Now I am the incumbent and feel that the 
disruption we are observing in the market is threatening my status quo … And this disruption is not yet 
obvious to my organization … people are still situated in their comfort zone and thus it is not obvious for 
the company that the market is being disrupted by a group of people that, as I was some years ago, have 
nothing to lose … And I am permanently managing this S-Curve … And this implies in the long-run that in 
order to manage this dilemma effectively and to manage the shareholders well … basically, my job is to 
manage these transitions … That is to say, I am the incumbent, but a digital revolution is already ongoing 
[in my market] … For instance, how can I combine incumbency and keep being an attacker without 
damaging my traditional business … How shall I manage these transitions? This is the innovator’s 
dilemma.” (Ivy, Interview 2) 
As she affirms, the role she assumes is one of adaptation along the route of an attacker-
incumbent, which is a reminder of the concept of élan vital, presented in section 2.2.1. Ivy is 
being responsible for taking the company out of its comfort zone, while not jeopardizing its 
traditional positioning.  
In a quote about intuition and its sources presented in section 4.1.2, Ivy also mentions that 
operational personnel in the field of action are the strategic probes she uses to analyse part of 
the SWOT, a posture that illustrates how lower organizational levels may be involved in 
strategy formation at its earliest stages. In this respect, Ivy explained that: 
“The higher the immersion in the SWOT on the part of different organizational levels [and corresponding 
conversations], the lower the possibility that a strategy might be wrong”. (Ivy, Interview 2) 
Ivy’s behaviour illustrates what has already been said in section 2.4.1 concerning selective 
managerial attention where emerging opportunities or threats may arise. Submergence in the 
SWOT is something that happens to managers who have their “radar” switched on; to use a 
word associated with instinct, referred to in section 2.2.3. Nevertheless, not all issues deserve 
the same attention from these (figuratively speaking) “radars”; in fact, a “strategic” rubber-
                                                          
57 An S-Curve is “A type of curve that shows the growth of a variable in terms of another variable, often expressed as units 
of time. For example, an S curve of the growth of company sales for a new product would show a rapid, exponential 
increase in sales for a period of time, followed by a tapering or levelling off. The tapering occurs when the population of 
new customers declines. At this point growth is slow or negligible, and is sustained by existing customers who continue to 
buy the product.” See http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/S-curve.html (accessed 23/5/2017). 
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stamp is recommended for strategists who want to avoid the “operational” becoming 
submerged within the vicissitudes of the everyday life of the company. 
Mark, a senior official responsible for his country’s strategic planning, offers a practical view 
of how he marks the difference between “strategic” and “non-strategic” labels: 
“I label something as ‘strategic’, primarily with my boss … By the way, in August we had a conversation 
specifically about the strategic processes on which we would be working later on. … Naturally, I also 
discuss what is ‘strategic’ with my direct reports and my senior advisors. ‘Strategic’ is the impact I 
foresee in my organization and those who my organization serves … The financial dimension, the 
implementation timetable [which may be extended for several years], the social, economic, and 
territorial impacts of certain processes, are always very important elements [to consider something as 
‘strategic’] … It may be an impact that I consider real or something that is just a perceived impact for 
certain stakeholders, including the media … Strategic processes are those that transform my 
organization or the ecosystems it impacts.” (Mark, Interview 3) 
In this quote, Mark refers to a conversation that took place in August, during the summer, 
maybe at a time when the distance from the urgencies and pressures of everyday life allowed 
intuitions to surge. Naturally, a conversation with Mark’s boss, as well as with his team and 
advisors, was probably not focused on labelling. Nevertheless, the awareness that some 
“ceremony” should take place, in order to focus on certain topics instead of others, is not 
always a practice carried out by strategists. In a complementary view, Miles makes the 
distinction between i) a formal labelling, usually more ceremonially “approved at executive 
committee level” (Interview 3), and ii) the less formal labelling that is ascribed to strategic 
initiatives that derive from the formal/ceremonial, and for which “the degrees of liberty and 
variability are much higher” (Interview 3). For these, and following Ivy’s idea of an S-Curve, 
Miles suggested that when one of the initiatives is saturated – he referred, for instance, to 
“capturing new clients, when the number of potential clients is limited by a certain 
infrastructure” (Interview 3) –it naturally invites new strategic labelling to which resources 
are redirected. 
Mark also recalls another fact of utmost importance in order to illustrate the novelty brought 
about by dynamic realities apprehended in duration. He underlines that execution of a certain 
strategic choice may lead to origination of new strategic labels, which would never have come 
to the surface had they not been preceded by the former: this idea goes back to the constitutive 
power of duration as “change as such” presented in section 2.4, since it is the strategic 
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flow/movement that Mark entered into, which dictated the emergence of a potentially 
unforeseen strategic opportunity. In this regard, Mark gave the example of a decision to sell 
part of the capital to a shareholder from a certain country, anticipating that it might open up 
new markets in that country: 
“There has been a consolidation on the approach to a new shareholder, a Chinese airline company that 
will start to operate between our country and China to complement our commercial offer.” (Mark, 
Interview 2) 
Mark’s observation is a good illustration of how throughout duration, as noted, the execution 
of a certain strategic initiative, in this case to open the company’s capital to new shareholders, 
can impact the labelling of an additional strategic initiative: complementing the airline’s 
commercial offer with new flight destinations based in the country of origin of one of the new 
shareholders. 
Asked during the single interviews about what could trigger change/what triggers a new 
strategic label, participants denoted a wide range of causes that are worth listing here to 
further clarify the concept of labelling used to foster attention towards the company’s SWOT: 
“When organic growth is not enough, it is time for acquisitions … Innovation was a permanent 
preoccupation”... (Jarvis) 
“If we were not attentive to the market, competitors might take our space … Clients first” … (Bond) 
“Internationalization strategy was seen as a way of avoiding dependence be that of a country, a person, 
a product, or whatever” … (Collier) 
“We paid close attention to industry best practices … We began strategic adaptations to retaliate 
against a perceived attack/threat, in order to survive” … (Warren) 
In summary, labelling could be triggered by a need for growth, especially when companies 
are listed on the stock market, a claim that might lead to M&A for several reasons: e.g. when 
organic growth is not enough; through a policy of constant innovation, regardless of the level 
of maturity in the S-Curve; in response to competitors’ movements or because of client need, 
naturally; by internationalization, to avoid dependences that might increase a company’s risk 
because of a shortage of alternatives; by observing presumed best practices or just… to 
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survive, if under attack from a competitor or a financial shark,58 for instance. Again, maybe 
none of these reasons are capable of surprising an experienced strategist or a thoughtful 
academic in strategy; nonetheless, all of these might be suitable to catch a strategist by 
surprise if the labelling stage is disregarded in favour of short-term thinking and even 
“sinking”, or should ab initio management paralysis occur as defined in section 2.3.1. 
Here a note is due regarding the use of expressions such as “best practice”,59 which could also 
embrace the notion of “benchmarking”,60 a term already used by some of the participants. As 
affirmed in section 2.1.2, it is not an objective of this work to evaluate the aptness of practices 
to generate competitive/strategic advantage. The purpose here is to examine practices that 
some of the interviewees presume to be the “best”, but which in different contexts may in fact 
turn out to be the “worst” practices, such as in failing organizations.  
Momentum (issue priority) 
Momentum, referred to earlier as the combination between urgency and feasibility of a certain 
strategic issue/decision and, as the name suggests, has the power to either i) delay a certain 
strategy, or even ii) prevent a certain labelling due to a lack of resources, both of which 
impact on duration’s intensity and endurance, respectively. 
With regard to this, Ferdinand ‒ an engineer that leads the Spanish consulting business unit 
(BU) of a multinational and that struggles to achieve growth ‒ offers a very didactic and sharp 
example of how a peripheral and immaterial dimension of a BU/country – when compared 
with that of the whole Group to which it belongs – can lead to a sort of endemic lack of 
attention and thus to a potentially thinner strategic duration: 
“We do not have too much importance for the Group. The Group is just interested in a sign on the map 
that shows we are present in Spain … It is not a criticism … When you have a business unit that does not 
make a lot of money, that, for the Group, is nothing: either we lose money or make money [since the 
                                                          
58 A shark, considered “a person who unscrupulously exploits or swindles others”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/shark (accessed 27/5/2017). 
59 Best practices in the sense of “Commercial or professional procedures that are accepted or prescribed as being correct or 
most effective”. See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/best_practice (accessed 1/10/2016). 
60 A benchmark is “a standard or point of reference against which things may be compared”. See 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/benchmark (accessed 4/6/2017). 
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turnover is so small] there is no relevant impact … When you have this situation, when you become a sort 
of ‘colony’ – or a ‘system malfunction’ –, which somehow is what we are, then the time dedicated to you 
is not real in terms of time, it is a political time … What we do [what the Group allows us to do] is not 
enough for all the ambition the Group has. So, what happens? Probably we are anchored in an attitude 
of ‘best effort’ rather than for achieving our goals. That is to say, we do what we can, we reach the limit 
of what we can do, structurally, and that is it … [Additionally] we are very difficult to manage for a Group 
that has a much better market positioning … Then, when you put all of this together, it happens that 
they have to treat you in a singular way, like a ‘problem child’ … [But then …] My boss does not have time 
[since he has a lot of countries in his scope of responsibility] and when [finally] he can dedicate some 
time, usually it is no longer opportune … This is the difficulty of multinationals … And when you have very 
centralized multinationals, it might happen that your boss supports you, tells you ‘you are right, we must 
do as you have suggested’ … But, my boss has a boss, with whom you speak less or you speak very little, 
or speak nothing at all … and the boss of my boss has a boss to whom you do not have access … Then, 
when a decision-making process reaches the top [if it reaches at all], to the boss of the boss of my boss’s 
table … probably they are going to say that ‘this is not a priority’ [and you lose momentum] …” 
(Ferdinand, Interview 2) 
Ferdinand, contrary to Melville’s explanation in section 4.1.1 where he affirms “I took the 
(local) strategy in hand for the next ten years”, lives with a sort of implosive situation that 
results from a combination of a lack of attention due to irrelevance, local market complexities 
and specificities, and high-up centralization of the decision-making process. On one hand his 
BU is not important; but, on the other, it is important enough to justify that a significant 
portion of strategic decisions have to be taken at the highest levels at headquarters. This 
incoherence seems to not favour strategic momentum – which, as seen in section 2.4.1, 
combines both urgency and feasibility – since feasibility, notably to approve a different 
human resources policy, is dependent on a decision from higher up where provoking a sense 
of urgency at these upper hierarchical levels is difficult to achieve for a small BU: 
“Sometimes, an initial agreement regarding a certain label is destroyed afterwards [by the shareholder] 
due to a strong discrepancy regarding the sense of urgency or feasibility … Hierarchy can prevent an 
opportune response to changes to the SWOT due to different degrees of management attention and 
communication noise, which may arise as the hierarchy moves away from the field of action.” 
(Ferdinand, Interview 3) 
Ferdinand’s strategic frustration is revealed when he affirms that “we do what we can, but 
what we do is not sufficient to create a strategic disruption” (Interview 2). Miles reinforces 
Ferdinand’s reasons for being uncomfortable about any change in his current strategic frame, 
and possibly sceptical too, by classifying management attention as “being the scarcest 
resource, along with management time” (Interview 3). 
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Ferdinand adds another cyclical restriction to this structural strategic restriction: the annual 
budget, which “limits the actions taken by management for the next twelve-month period” 
(Interview 2) – a view shared by both Mark and Miles. 
Mark adds a different facet of potential drawbacks to this strategic inefficiency, which have 
their origins in politicking: 
“When matters that may affect the resources available are being negotiated … When a growing sense of 
urgency leads to a re-prioritization and re-allocation of resources … When politicking with stakeholders 
who demand concessions.” (Mark, Interview 3) 
From Mark’s perspective, these cases can affect either the sense of urgency or feasibility and, 
in turn, this could affect the labelling. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) offer a very sharp view 
of what concessions might mean, remembering that execution can entail additional 
deliberation: 
Sometimes even judicious execution, however, entails tragic loss, as when the fulfilment of a duty or 
realization of a particular vision of the good requires the sacrifice of an equally compelling duty or good. 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1000) 
From a more optimistic angle, Ramsey – a jurist that became one of the most experienced 
CEOs in his country, and by the time he was interviewed was managing a complex M&A 
between two state-owned companies – notes the following: 
“When certain strategic initiatives are getting better results than foreseen, this unexpected success 
creates the space to reduce the sense of urgency ascribed to other initiatives.” (Ramsey, Interview 2) 
Looking at this in another way, Ramsey points out the possibility that an unexpected success 
might offer management a certain period of time to “catch their breath”, so to speak, 
especially if, as he notes later, the environment is rather more political than it is private: here a 
thicker duration on a certain strategic initiative permits thinner durations on other aspects. 
Warren, the CEO of a small bank, talking about hindering momentum, bets strongly on 
feasibility by clearly defining what they will and will not invest time and resources in:  
“Let’s do this, let’s do these things, let’s not do those; what are we going to do and what are we not 
going to do? Sometimes it is very important, and not always obvious, to say what you should not do ... 
and state it very clearly to people. For instance, I used to say to people: we are not the company’s 
hospital; we are not real estate experts … It is important to assume that we do not know anything about 
certain areas; if we enter into areas we have not mastered, it is easier to make mistakes.” (Warren) 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 140 
 
This quote expresses very well how strategizing is not always about coming up with luminous 
intuitive ideas on how to create a new product/service or how to reposition an older 
product/service in traditional or new markets; there is also a kind of selective competency in 
strategy, which although less romantic, is potentially equally effective: being able to “say no” 
to certain strategic options, thus fostering momentum structurally and not just 
circumstantially. 
Another pause for comment is due here, since momentum is linked to urgency and urgency is 
connected to chronological time. This is not in fact a paradox in relation to the qualitative or 
pure concept of time that underlies duration; for just as a craftsman cannot let the clay dry 
while moulding it, or a blacksmith cannot let the iron cool down as he works it, or in the 
opposing direction, a painter will have to let portions of his painting dry before continuing 
work, undoubtedly, chronological time might well have an impact on the strategic thickness 
of duration. 
Selling (winning sponsorship) 
The selling of a certain issue/idea as a strategy – which Miles recommends should be done 
“through a high-level document” (Interview 3), something that does not overrule the 
additional possibilities of conversations occurring in meeting rooms, workplace corridors, or 
even in a sunny spot during holidays – occurs each time a strategist tries to sell their 
“conviction” (Ramsey, Interview 2), or vision, to key decision-makers. Ramsey offered a very 
interesting view about the moment selling might take place, whether at the very beginning, or 
later while already executing/deciding, according to the level of attention shareholders give to 
their company: 
“In my opinion, the public administration [state owned companies] always works with a strategy that is 
grounded, sometimes almost exclusively, on the will of management; a strategy that ends up being the 
conviction of management. In contrast, in private companies strategy is a central element for the 
relationship between shareholders and management. This creates two different situations: i) in the 
private you have a much more negotiated [ex ante] and quantified strategy, because this sets the logic 
for incentives, bonuses, objectives; ii) in the public you end up being a crucial element of the strategic 
context, since negotiations usually occur at a later time [while strategizing], and contribute to defining a 
restraining context that prevents discussions without limits and instability of objectives, while bringing 
focus to discussions.” (Ramsey, Interview 2) 
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The message that Ramsey conveys here is that when he is faced with distant shareholders for 
which the company’s strategy is not a central element, but from whom the objectives and 
management’s incentives derive, it is he, in his role as CEO, that must undertake the role of 
permanent selling in order to define a context of action. In a political context, where a 
company might be instrumental in reaching certain political promises, it is the management 
team that must create an environment for building normative and strategic references and 
within which the dwelling can happen in a more focused and autonomous way. What is new 
here is that, given the instability that political directions might introduce, Ramsey seems to be 
more interested in selling an area where he can operate with certain “constancy” than he is 
with a strategic idea per se: 
“A simple redrawing of priorities from the shareholder could affect the labelling of certain issues 
motivated by a re-analysis of a company’s environment in light of new criteria.” (Ramsey, Interview 2) 
Here, Ramsey implies that a lot of selling has to be done among shareholders and not just the 
hierarchy, the latter which may change their labelling of a certain topic to “strategic” in 
accordance with a change in their priorities. In such cases however, selling is not confined to 
matters of selling ideas/labels, but also embraces selling momentums, schemes, and 
consensus, which if not reached effectively, could destabilize both the labelling process and 
the strategic objectives, even when the SWOT as such remains stable. Naturally, according to 
this extended conception of selling in order to execute something better, instead of just selling 
ideas, sponsorship is particularly important to create momentum. And naturally this process 
also includes removing barriers that, in turn, in order to re-sell to other strategic actors too, 
must successively capture their attention and commitment. 
Idelle, for whom “the output of leadership is action”, offers a good example of the importance 
of obtaining sponsorship from her reporting line as well as from other stakeholders, both 
during decision making and execution: 
“During the initial stages, we have to guarantee that all reservations regarding the support of certain 
strategic initiatives are eliminated … We have to convey a sense of urgency … You have to share your 
concerns with the team, you have to justify to your team [the reason for a certain strategic initiative] … 
You have, in a certain way, to prove it [right], so the team can be aware [of the importance of the 
strategic initiative] and from that moment on, [allows you] to obtain their commitment ... During 
execution of the action plan … Because the output of leadership is action … Usually, what I do are 
systematic meetings with an extended project-management team … Extended team and cyclical 
meetings … We create a change-management plan which has to give a satisfactory answer to the 
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following goals: make it essential, make it ready, make it happen, make it stick … To do all of this, I am 
personally involved, I cannot delegate this activity … We do bi-weekly meetings and sometimes weekly 
meetings for more important projects … I have to convey the message about the importance of things, 
ensuring that each actor is doing what he is supposed to do, and that all people are still cohesive.” 
(Idelle) 
Idelle focuses her efforts on eliminating reservations by sharing her concerns and explaining 
the reasons for a certain strategic decision to create the necessary sense of urgency, and she 
does this through systematic meetings with her extended management team. Moreover, in her 
efforts to gain team sponsorship, Idelle identifies some frontrunners that will be the next level 
of sellers within the company: 
“You have to identify your frontrunners with whom you have to build direct bridges, that get behind the 
organization and, instead, focus on the project [the strategic initiative], to energize them [selling] and to 
assure that they will energize the others.” (Idelle) 
Jonathan calls this downward selling infiltration “to extend the oil stain”. Mark, for whom 
“internal and external communication with stakeholders are key pillars for successful 
strategizing [including the positive impacts of politicking]”, puts forward a view that is also 
shared by Miles, who remarks that: “selling the idea/issue must be done with the scheme [the 
next stage in strategic duration] in mind”. 
In summary, it can be said that highlighting fulfils the task of taking managers out of their 
dwelling praxis and directing their strategic attention to potential or actual changes in their 
SWOT. This instillation of strategic attention is initially carried out in the first moments 
through a labelling activity that combines issue detection, specifically through real time 
foresight as seen in section 2.1.2, and then by classifying issues as “strategic”. With regard to 
detection, Ivy explained how she uses the practice of following an S-Curve to manage the 
subtle equilibrium between being an attacker and an incumbent; while other participants listed 
what the triggers for strategic attention were. Regarding the classification of what is 
“strategic”, it is important not to allow managers to dive into a trivial and strategically 
inconsequential operational dwelling. As Mark pointed out, financial and calendar magnitude, 
together with the extent of the impact on the organization itself and its business ecosystem, 
could be suitable proxies to classify something as “strategic”. While dwelling towards this 
building label, strategists must be capable of evaluating the degree of urgency and feasibility 
that will determine ‒ regardless of the potential of a certain issue to be considered as 
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“strategic” ‒ whether there is sufficient momentum to consider something to be “strategic” as 
such. With regard to momentum, Ferdinand provided a very comprehensive explanation as to 
how the perceived irrelevancy of a certain BU/country, in the context of a big multinational, 
can hinder momentum. Here, it would seem that a lack of attention prevents highlighting from 
occurring, forming a vicious spiral where duration tapers down to a point; i.e. where strategic 
attention through momentum does not occur for lack of shareholder(s) attention, strategic 
quality is jeopardized, which in turn contributes to maintaining the irrelevancy of the 
BU/country. Against this state of play is the activity of selling: something that is worth noting 
in this regard is that this marketing activity, in addition to senior management, was extended 
and sometimes even emphasized by interviewees to other stakeholders, including 
shareholders, external entities, and the team that is supposed to initiate strategy formulation 
and formation. Initially it might seem that highlighting is associated more with decision-
making than with execution. Nonetheless, considering the degree of execution that was 
perceived in the activities that interviewees said they developed during this duration phase, 
highlighting is definitely something that is apprehended in action/execution, while “sensing 
the ‘span’ or ‘bloc’ [body] of [a new strategic] becoming” (Helin et al., 2014, loc. 337). 
 
(4.2.2) Holding Strategic Attention – Framing 
As concluded in Chapter 2 (2.4), the framing part of the Framework of Strategic Duration 
(Figure 5) is composed of three stages: scheme, politicking, and consensus. These were the 
key concepts used to explore how strategic duration is retained or strengthened through 
strategic attention. 
Scheme (preliminary frame) 
The scheme stage is where strategic vision turns into an actionable plan that is sustained by: 
[A] core ‘idea’ of financial profit or returns on investment […] [and] to the ‘idea’ of competitive 
advantage and for fuelling growth or market expansion, and so on and so forth, which a discourse of 
strategy encompasses. (Samra-Fredericks, 2005, p. 810) 
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The “capitalist ethos” (Samra-Fredericks, 2005, p. 810) aside ‒ strengthened by some of the 
argumentative signatures presented in the literature review concerning duration ‒ it is notable 
that actionable planning will most certainly give rise to a distribution of initiatives among 
certain managers more than others. This therefore suggests that the scheme will have an 
impact both economically and politically, possibly shifting resources and managers’ 
prominence, respectively. These impacts and their causes will be at the centre of the 
politicking phase, which will drive strategic duration to a subsequent stage in which, as seen, 
a certain frame will be enacted that has become the predominant one. 
Making use of one of the eight signatures identified in section 2.4.2 – exemplars – Ivy, as 
seen, defends the appointment of champions, in line with Idelle’s frontrunners, to constitute 
positive references, or examples, to be followed.  
From an opposite position, Idelle defends the example as a sort of negative scheme, relevant 
while politicking, for those who might consider acting as barriers to change against 
management: 
“Resistance to change and barriers become manifest and associated with legal reasons, because it is too 
expensive, or because there is no time, or we lack something … Someone [during implementation] who 
did not alert you to the possibility that they were going to fail … we have to make it a symbolic case so 
that no one else makes the same mistake; people have to know that if someone fails to meet a deadline, 
either by resistance to change or because they give no warning, does not escalate … Everyone else has to 
realize that this cannot occur … We have to make this an example …” (Idelle) 
Although not explicit, one must assume that statements such as, “make it a symbolic case”, 
and “to make this an example” mean to be fired, which is in line with Corwin’s quote 
presented in the introduction to this chapter, where he illustrates what is meant by an image of 
an implacable doer, and shows his admiration for “Neutron Jack” (Jack Welsh). These 
situations demonstrate what “exemplars” and “metaphors” may mean, in the context of the 
eight signatures for a scheme: being fired as a symbol, an “exemplar”, of what might happen 
to those that create barriers to change, and “metaphors”, since Jack Welsh was called 
“Neutron Jack” because of his reputation for firing people; a pseudonym that might reinforce 
what is most probably his “own identity perception that his role was to play the ‘tough guy’” 
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 87). Other signatures might be presented as referents, such as 
catchphrases; i.e. that quoted by Bond – “clients first” – might offer a certain referential 
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behaviour to be either followed or avoided both during formulation and implementation of a 
certain strategy, ascribing an identifiable and communicable duration to it: like a painting that 
differs from another, both of which have different signatures. 
Ferdinand, embodying one of the possible appeals of a principal referred to in section 2.4.2, 
exemplifies how a low-cost scheme, what Jarvis calls a “culture of defeat”, could undermine a 
transformational process based on a plan to achieve high quality, even when dormant; i.e., 
even if not explicitly assumed: 
“You try to upgrade the company’s and the service’s image and there is no budget for that … You try to 
develop positions for talent and there is no talent nor talented management … The main objective is to 
reduce costs … You are in a company that has a low-cost vision and that bets on internal efficiency rather 
than on what foments value creation in all of its facets … You have to fight for it.” (Ferdinand, Interview 
3) 
Ferdinand illustrates quite well the power that a certain oppositional signature, a certain 
oppositional scheme, can have over a duration, based on different strategic options: it 
definitely asphyxiates its thickness. It is like having the wrong building for the intended 
dwelling; in the case of Ferdinand, he was battling with too small and basic a building for a 
much more ambitious intended dwelling, based on the distinctive capacities of “people 
possessing natural aptitude or skill”61, but who, for this same reason, are too expensive to fit a 
cost-based strategy. 
Naturally, apart from those coming from the eight signatures, there are much more concrete 
and measurable schemes, which base their existence on already materialized plans or specific 
projects. As Ramsey notes:  
“When a certain strategy involves the materialization of an investment programme or some other 
strategic initiative that might be transformed into a concrete project, then the scheme is equivalent to 
the plan that is governing the respective project.” (Ramsey, Interview 2) 
According to Ramsey’s quote, the measure for strategic success, for an identifiable duration 
thickness, blends with the degree of completion of the project and any corresponding concrete 
indicators: e.g. # completed buildings; # available functionalities for certain software; # 
                                                          
61 “Talent” refers to “people possessing natural aptitude or skill”. See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/talent 
(accessed 4/6/2017). 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 146 
 
people who have left the company; or # stores in which the new product is available … and so 
forth. 
Lastly, Ferdinand remembers that “politicking could be oriented by personal 
projects/leadership” (Interview 3), coherent with the company’s objective SWOT – in this 
regard, Ivy recognizes that “every leader should have a project people believe in” (Interview 
2) – even though shareholders might not be completely aligned with it. In this case, it is 
interesting to acknowledge that dissension between the personal and the organizational 
strategic view may be a promoter of a winning strategy if the personal framework finally 
wins. It is also worth mentioning, as Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009) note, that practitioners 
may have their own schemas of action/praxis, since “the personal outcomes of strategy praxis 
for an individual may be job enrichment, feelings of power and purpose, capacity for 
influence, and personal advancement” (p. 87); aims which may not necessarily coincide with 
organizational objectives. 
In a broader sense, a scheme represents a sort of electoral program that will help strategists to 
reach a consensus around strategic priorities. But before this scheme becomes “the” reference 
frame, an “election” must first take place, throughout and after politicking. 
Politicking (for the predominant frame) 
The most relevant politicking actions identified by interviewees while strategizing related to 
resistance to change. Corwin refers to people who resist change as “‘defective gears’ … that 
might break the entire machine”. This concern with actions that might block change links 
directly to actions that block duration, taking into consideration, as Simpson (2014) remarks, 
the “distinctive conceptualization of duration in terms of continuity and change rather than the 
mere elapsing of time” (loc. 7651, my italics). 
Idelle was quoted above to illustrate the scheme stage and had already expressed great 
concern with those who fight against change. Here, she charges back in that direction: 
“Yeah … Resistance to change … It is always huge … The best reference, the resistance-to-change 
handbook, is to watch a couple of episodes of Yes Prime Minister … It is always difficult … People raise 
barriers … either because it is not legal, or it is expensive, or there is not enough time, or no matter what 
… The CFO usually resists a bit … During formulation phases, more virtual, resistance is always more 
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difficult to identify … Turning to execution, there is something that I do not support, and sometimes 
comes from higher ranks in the organization: we are in a meeting, and then when we leave some people 
start to talk about doing something that is [already] slightly different from what was agreed during the 
meeting … This puts me out of my mind! … Because a week later things … This entitles someone to … 
Either we are all grown up and professional, or not … People have to talk and raise all the questions 
during the meetings in which the decisions are taken. Once this phase is closed, only if there are 
supervening facts are people allowed to do things not exactly as agreed … And then we have to escalate 
and talk … Then, there are also those people who come with a lot of excuses for not doing what was 
agreed and, when we analyse the situation, after all, we come to the conclusion that they did not have 
the level of commitment necessary to execute what was agreed.” (Idelle) 
Idelle begins by stating that resistance to change, which can be considered as a sort of 
counter-duration, is “always huge”. But what really infuriates Idelle is not the amount of 
resistance but the surreptitious acting. First, people start by not openly saying they are against 
something – they just do “slightly different things”; secondly, people do not say that they are 
not going to execute something – they just “come with a lot of excuses” to justify the 
indefensible: their lack of motivation to do what has been defined. These disguised forms of 
counter-duration, or certain contours of duration not in line with the agreed direction, might 
not be noticed by a strategist who, in good faith, but probably out of innocence, has not 
dedicated significant amounts of time to try to overcome something that ab initio did not 
deserve consideration. 
Regarding more transparent and open ways of going against a certain scheme, Mark, a 
manager and also a politician identified what, according to him, were the main arguments that 
are customarily used against a certain strategic initiative: 
“When someone wants to go against a strategic initiative, risk is always a critical question. The risk 
foreseen within the context underlying a certain decision; or because decisions were not well grounded … 
I would say that clearly there are two levels … i) The actual risk is different from the one foreseen while 
making the decision, like launching a new investment project that begins to show signs that things are 
not as good as predicted and you are missing the shot … ii) You made a decision without having all the 
relevant information to make the right decision. This can happen quite a lot; that is to say, you can be 
confronted with the fact that you took a decision for which you were not prepared or when you did not 
have all the information and, in that sense, you might have missed the shot, you might have taken the 
wrong road … Sometimes you do not have all the relevant information; sometimes you do not carry out 
the right analysis of the information you have in front of you … Then you can also be confronted by 
people that want to stop your decision because they have different priorities or because their priorities 
have changed; someone with a different normative dimension and then different priorities … [You have 
also those who ask for additional studies.] For instance, the municipal councils, main stakeholders of the 
project, that had to give their approval, end up asking for additional studies, for technical confirmation … 
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These studies are already ongoing, but we depend on their results, and thus we have to wait until the 
end of the year ….” (Mark, Interview 3) 
While explaining the common counterarguments, Mark identifies a type of political 
behaviour: an active type, based on the merit of a certain decision; and a passive type, 
explained at the end of the quote and based on asking for an intermediate study – which could 
involve an intermediate activity, decision, authorization, or whatever – but on which the 
possibility of strategy formation depends, and which slows down qualitative strategic time or 
duration. 
To counter these strategic obstructions, Miles suggests that: 
“Sometimes the acquisition of the shares of an equity partner works as ‘a fix’ that permits reaching 
strategic consensus.” (Miles, Interview 2) 
Miles almost declares that it is faster to buy peace than it is to continue in never-ending 
negotiations that might jeopardise momentum. This practical spirit is again revealed by Miles 
when he uses a military metaphor to express the need to set troops marching in the same 
direction to initiate and execute strategic breakthroughs: 
“You have all the troops in line and suddenly you ask them to change direction slightly … Naturally 
depending on the training they have had, some of them start to march in the new direction, but others 
do not, and continue in the wrong direction … And basically, what we have to do is to go after them and 
turn them to march in the same direction.” (Miles, Interview 3) 
Both quotes from Miles illustrate quite well the need to stop politicking and to align in a 
certain strategic direction, framed by a predominant building that will guide dwelling in the 
intended direction. Otherwise, if strategists’ time is not dedicated to fixing these unstable 
buildings, strategic intention will very likely tend to be plagued by strategic randomness or 
strategic anarchy which, as Bachelard notes, must be also avoided: 
[…] While accepting contrary activities, [strategic duration] must refuse a jumbled miscellany of 
activities. (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 877) 
In other words, even if dialectics is recommended – or unavoidable, since, as Lawrence et al. 
(2009) state, “the formation of projects is always an interactive, culturally embedded process 
by which social actors negotiate their paths toward the future” (p. 47, my italics) – in order to 
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generate a (highly likely) more effective collective intelligence through relationalism (see 
section 2.1.2),  this instability must at some point somehow be organized by consensus. 
Consensus (unidirectional efforts) 
Having analysed the need for a stable building/frame that enables duration’s thickness, this 
need for a communal strategic direction might be fulfilled during the consensus stage. In fact, 
consensus implies a combination of real understanding and commitment. Having mentioned 
the difficulties that may arise when different people involved in strategy formation have a 
variety of alternative attention focuses, including the operational day-to-day, Ferdinand 
bounced back to note that: 
“If strategic consensus is merely on paper and not demonstrated by prioritization, then strategic action 
will tend to be interrupted.” (Ferdinand, Interview 3) 
The implications of Ferdinand’s message might be expressed in the following terms: either 
consensus is truly sought and achieved or, in the event that it had not been sought or cannot be 
reached, it can be even more damaging. In fact, while in the first case strategists know that 
there is a problem to solve if a certain strategic direction and duration are to be successfully 
formed, in the second case false-consensus will act as an invisible enemy. 
Ivy introduced a positive side to all of this, however, by revealing the half-dozen principles 
she uses in order to maximize the probability of consensus: 
“i) agreement on the methods [and criteria] used; ii) to involve operational people-in-the-field and the C-
Suite from the outset; iii) to have an enlightening framework, which will facilitate consensus for smaller 
strategic loops or initiatives; iv) a readjustment of the strategic roadmap if required to accommodate 
synchronization among different initiatives as necessary; v) constant regard as CEO as to how to canalize 
egos in the best strategic direction; and vi) a well-oiled executive committee.” (Ivy, Interview 2) 
Ivy raises some very interesting points: i) implying that ground-rules based on methods 
(which might include criteria), must be laid out before the start of strategic formation and 
formulation; ii) expressing the importance of being close to the field; iii) talking about an 
inspiring vision…; iv) … later fine-tuned during execution; v) emphasizing the role of the 
CEO as an attentive coach; and vi) showing pride in having a “well-oiled” executive 
committee: 
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“I have a well-oiled executive committee. Things are agreed on the spot, since everyone is seeing the 
impact that things have on each other … Well, this is an executive committee well-oiled …. We use to be 
a start-up and we have become used to working together after sixteen years … We do not even need to 
talk… We look at each other and we know what the other is thinking … It is an executive committee that 
has worked together for sixteen years, which is something very uncommon …” (Ivy, Interview 2) 
Miles, too, mentioned that it was crucial to have “mutual trust among people involved in 
strategy formation” (Interview 3). Nevertheless, both Ivy and Miles could be forgetting that, 
as noted in section 2.4.2, consensus might sometimes not be as good as imagined or 
perceived, especially during the formulation of strategy since, as Bachelard affirms: 
“There can no longer be any doubt that dialectic and not continuity is the fundamental schema […]. In 
other words, the contradictory interplay of functions is a functional necessity.” (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 
877, my italics)  
In fact, the need for dialectics was maybe what inspired Ivy to recruit someone from a 
different sector when she wanted to move on with a disruptive digital strategy, as presented in 
section 4.1.2. 
Coherent with the idea that consensus might not be something to pursue blindly, when trying 
to demonstrate the importance of consensus, Mark made a point that raised an apparent 
discursive incoherence while distinguishing strategic failure from operational failure, once a 
consensus is reached: 
“If the required resources – human, financial, etc. – as well as the consensus of the relevant stakeholders 
have been obtained but the strategy still does not move forward, then the problem is no longer strategic 
but operational: the problem is due to a dimension of operationalization, including correspondent 
planning and controlling, affecting the capacity to execute, the capacity to do [and this requires 
additional action].” (Mark, Interview 3) 
When Mark says that “the problem is no longer strategic”, this is somehow contradictory with 
the already-noted position he held when he described reviewing his strategic direction/plan 
should he be confronted with new facts that would definitely prevent achievement of initial 
objectives, or represent an insurmountable change in the position of stakeholders; i.e. even 
when consensus is reached, the strategy that is about to be or that is being followed, could still 
prove no longer to be the right one if supervening acts or facts show otherwise. What Mark’s 
question probably alerts us to is that consensus might be just circumstantial, even though not 
being so circumstantial that we should fall into Ferdinand’s trap of false-consensus. 
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Warren seems not to share this opinion about a potentially ephemeral consensus. Once more 
he demonstrates his practical spirit by calling out the need to have the right resources to 
execute (including collective commitment), something he had already expressed regarding 
momentum. Warren also used the expression “to have everyone on board” in other parts of 
his narrative, which he revealed was peremptory, saying that if consensus to pursue a certain 
strategic direction cannot be reached, he would prefer to abandon it as a strategic option and 
thus stop a strategic initiative immediately: 
“When one of the key people in the process was not in agreement, we stopped the process; we did not 
want to go against the tide. There were a lot of people involved in the execution; and the decision had to 
be adapted to our standards. For instance, we had already analysed an opportunity for which IT was 
extremely important; so for us that [required complexity] did not fit.” (Warren) 
From the quote, however, it can be deduced that what might stop a certain strategic idea is not 
only a problem of consensus but, as mentioned, also a question of momentum related to the 
structural as well as to the circumstantial potential lack of resources. Nevertheless, even if this 
is the case, Warren shows that he is prone to sticking to building/structural positions, albeit 
not stubbornly, rather than just dwelling swinging in the wind. 
While highlighting was considered a critical claim for strategic attention, capable of removing 
managers from inconsequent dwellings and of engaging them in a certain strategic direction 
and duration, framing, as the name suggests, is connected more to the choice of a certain 
building that ascribes a specific driving force to duration. Framing, as noted, is developed in 
dialectics, i.e. it reflects a dialectic conception of duration (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 130) coupled 
with various political activities in an ongoing dance, brought to block or foster schemes of 
reference that will be considered as the building within which strategic dwelling occurs. 
Consensus was seen as a key element to create common collective duration, as long as it does 
not jeopardize dialectics and it focuses on its two main objectives: creating a shared 
understanding of strategic vision/objectives and commitment towards their execution, be they 
for global strategic change or, in the case of shorter cycles, for strategic initiatives. The 
framing part of duration helps managers to acknowledge that the supposed chasm between 
decision and execution corresponds to strategizing “without a well-ordered dialectic, without 
rhythm, [without which] life and thought cannot be stable and secure” (Bachelard, 2000, loc. 
161). This is something quite different from the immobilization of a plan followed by a more 
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or less disordered/more or less individualist effort to abide by it. Framing creates strategic 
thickness and also creates tension, in the sense of a certain stiffness brought about by the 
building it creates which, nonetheless, would not be as rigid or artificial so as to create 
Bergsonian laughter or social punishment for artificiality, as presented in section 2.2.2. 
 
(4.2.3) Relationship between highlighting and framing 
Taken all together it could be said that highlighting relates more, although naturally not 
wholly, to decisional-dwelling, and framing more to executional-building, despite the fact that 
interactivity between the different stages is a common feature of strategizing – interactivity 
that, as implied several times in this project, avoids a classical view of execution after 
decision. 
Each stage involves a dynamic of its own. Living, and dynamically incarnate, each implies a 
deep-diving exercise of certain duration as a necessary condition for feeding strategy 
formation. In other words, strategic duration, in all its different facets, is unavoidable while 
strategizing. In fact, nobody labels an issue as strategic without entering into its very 
dynamism, as explained above; nobody determines the sense of urgency and feasibility that 
justifies the choice of momentum without entering into this very dynamism; nobody can 
intend to hit the target, that is, to implement a certain strategic initiative without 
understanding it and showing commitment towards it; and so forth … 
The behaviours/actions presented above that happened or did not happen, affecting strategic 
duration while strategizing, are definitely not something that a strategist defines in their 
office, like someone writing a book in their mind. Instead, strategizing implies a 
conversational non-stop movement/continuous execution/persistent duration, in living time. It 
cannot be repeated often enough that an image of strategy formation, composed of multiple 
duration cycles and interactions and iterations from labelling to consensus, might replace the 
broken-line concept of a decision being followed with a more-or-less faithful execution after 
an almost mystic formal gap.  
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 153 
 
At this stage, and taking into consideration that some of the illustrated activities and 
behaviours, for the analysis of both intuition and duration, might be considered obvious by a 
well-informed manager or academic, some clarification is due, not least because “we can be 
blind to the obvious, and we are also blind to our blindness” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 24); i.e. the 
obvious might not be always perceived or grasped. 
By means of a chess game analogy, the researcher will try to illustrate the different levels of 
obviousness based on the difference between detached moves vs. enchained moves in 
duration. In fact, the movement of a bishop or a pawn in a chess game may seem quite 
obvious once learned, and this is noticeable particularly when watching children play chess. 
However, the struggle of a chess game is not about the movement of its pieces as seen 
discretely, move by move. Rather, the difficulty of a chess game is seen instead in the 
duration, in the sequence of calculated moves that lead to the victory. What is more, chess 
players are frequently referred to as “calculating” in the sense that the good players, the 
strategic players, are capable of anticipating and memorizing long combinations of possible 
attacks and defences. What at first sight seemed obvious is, on the contrary, in reach of only a 
very few, especially if time enters into play by measuring the delay between moves. 
Contrary to this context of calculus, managers’ moves are sometimes comparable to “childish 
chess play” because if not tensioned in duration, i.e. if managers are not paying attention to 
the coming-to-be and passing-away of its flaw, their actions are disengaged and dispersed. 
But is it childish or, instead, is it a fact of social life that managers must simply learn to cope 
with? Consider, for instance, managers who accept the order to start a turnaround without the 
clear and formal support of their shareholder(s); when it was flagged up that a degree of 
management paralysis persisted despite its obvious impact on market positioning; a strategic 
conversation was held with the wrong people; and so forth … Are these obvious mistakes? If 
so, why do they persist? One line of investigation could draw on the Strategy-as-Practice 
literature and particularly the area concerned with the difference between practices and praxis 
examined in section 2.1.2, as well as with practitioners’ preparation, interests, and motivation. 
As Whittington (2006) well exemplifies by describing the potential reasons for a failed 
“strategy process workshop”: 
First, there is the group of senior managers involved in the workshop. Apart from the chief executive, 
these were not board members, yet it was repeatedly affirmed that it was the board that made the 
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decisions in the organization […]. The workshop may have simply engaged the wrong practitioners. 
(Whittington, 2006, p. 623) 
In fact, apart from the effect of duration itself, in the social sciences and particularly in 
management ‒ where, for instance, politicking may assume a crucial role ‒, the obvious is 
sometimes misleading. This remark, if not anticipated, would probably tolerate notions such 
as evident strategic practices, considered as obvious answers/solutions to certain strategic 
issues; that is, clearly assuming consequentialism, and thus being incoherent with what has 
already been explained about potential competitive advantage in section 2.1.2, and about 
presumed best practices in section 4.2.1. 
Additionally, the literature is not always in agreement, even for topics where common sense 
would say no major disagreement should be foreseen. Take the stage of consensus described 
in the framing part of the conceptual framework of duration; as Dooley et al. (2000) point out: 
[Even though] One of the accepted beliefs among strategic management researchers is that strategic 
decision consensus among decision-makers facilitates decision implementation speed and 
implementation success […] Contrary to our expectations, however, decision commitment serves to 
slow implementation speed. (p. 1237) 
One of the reasons put forward by Dooley and his co-authors for this not-so-obvious-
conclusion has to do with another apparently obvious idea that “it takes [a] long [time] to do 
something well [hallmark of more committed teams] […] rather than [to] ‘just do’” (2000, p. 
1251). 
Watts, in a clear allusion to the non-deterministic facet of the social sciences, notices that 
“we’re actually much better planning the flight of an interplanetary rocket than we are 
managing the economy, merging two corporations, or even predicting how many copies of a 
book will sell” (Watts, 2011, loc. 130): 
‘Situations’ involving corporations, cultures, markets, nation-states, and global institutions exhibit a very 
different kind of complexity from everyday situations. And under these circumstances, common sense 
[neighbour of the obvious] turns out to suffer from a number of errors that systematically mislead us; 
[…] ‘things we didn’t know at the time’ but which seem obvious in hindsight [in retrospection]. (Watts, 
2011, loc. 139–43) 
With these remarks regarding the common-sense mistakes made about the obvious, this 
section finishes as it started by alerting readers to “the pressure for managers to ‘get it right’” 
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(Hay, 2014, p. 516) in the context of duration, considered the close relative of intuition, the 
latter supposed to be opposed to rationality. But does this prompt managers to acknowledge 
their human condition make them any lesser strategists, in the sense of being able to direct 
effort towards a desired future? That does not seem to be the case. If managers are considered 
as agents and agency is defined as … 
A temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but 
also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the 
present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the 
moment). (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 47, my italics) 
… then it is not so difficult to understand that i) not only is the capacity of agents/managers 
mentioned twice, which means they must have the ability to imagine future possibilities and 
go after them, taking into account the possibilities of the current momentum, but also that ii) 
duration, considered an unstoppable flow that spirals and dissolves the past, present, and 
future in a dialectic of strategy formation, which follows a stepped-continuum of forward and 
backward movements that intuitive managers are capable of transforming into an ongoing 
dance. And this view, brought by duration, is somewhat distant from the heroic and unfailing 
machine-manager that seems to always get it right. 
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5. Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summarized view of the research, making explicit both i) its key 
contributions, centred in the complementarity of both building and dwelling world views and 
the importance of Bergsonian intuition and duration for strategizing, and ii) its contributions 
for practice and academia, while also pointing towards some areas for future research. 
 
(5.1) Key Contributions 
This section begins by analysing the legitimacy of the strategic question underlying this work 
– How can the formal gap between strategic decision and execution be reduced? – 
acknowledging that the assumption of the existence of a supposed gap might still be 
controversial even after reaching the conclusions that will be explained in this chapter. 
After this digression, this section will answer the strategic question as such, following the 
research questions (RQ) presented in Chapter 3 – the methodology and methods –, to 
understand: 
• RQ1 – How do the usually-considered “opposite” pairs – building vs. dwelling, 
intelligence vs. intuition, thought vs. action, and decision vs. execution – combine 
while strategizing? 
• RQ2 – What is the importance of intuition to strategizing and how is this revealed? 
• RQ3 – How does strategy formation evolve over a certain period of time, through 
specific stages, along which a specific duration is produced? 
Consequently, the key contributions of this project will be organized around i) the pairs, 
presented in section 1.2 and Figure 4 of Chapter 2, which served as the basis for analysing the 
literature review on Strategy-as-Practice and on intuition; ii) intuition, both in its Bergsonian 
sense and from more recent perspectives; and iii) duration, the application of which to 
strategy could be considered the most innovative outcome of the current research, both in 
relation to Bergson and in the development of the Framework of Strategic Duration presented 
in Figure 5 of section 2.4. 
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(5.1.1) Questioning the strategic question 
The more radical, argumentative, reader might say that the strategic question is a false 
problem because there is no such gap between strategic decision and execution, and thus it 
does not require an answer. Moreover, they might even ironically compare the question to one 
presented by Bachelard (2000), in which he uses the word “tormented” to express the state of 
mind in which individuals find themselves facing a supposed vacuum: “Let us look briefly at 
the psychology of a scientific mind tormented by the idea of vacuum, of void and emptiness” 
(2000, loc. 597). 
To prevent the possibility of neutralizing the strategic question, the word “formal”, used in the 
sense of academic or ceremonial, was added, ab initio, to make the notion of a formal gap an 
allowable misconception about the existence of this chasm, different to that experienced in 
practice, and thus to make the question and corresponding answer possible. 
Naturally, this same argumentative reader could insist that, from reading the passages in 
which voice has been given to the interviewees, it is difficult to conclude that less academic or 
ceremonial practitioners also discard the idea of a gap, because the embedded idea that 
implementation follows decision is still predominant in most of their narratives. 
Although this is a strong argument, an acknowledgement that could raise the pertinent 
question as to why such experienced CEOs continue to nurture such a potentially misleading 
conception regarding the meaning of corporate strategy, a counter-argument, based exactly on 
the differences between dwelling and building, might well be used here. In fact, it was noted 
above that the notion of a gap may not correspond to what managers experience while 
strategizing/dwelling. But this is quite different from what managers answer/narrate, when 
asked about something that they have to put into words while thinking about a structured 
answer. This structure, building, is exactly what could make them fall into a possible 
misconception about the gap, since their academic scheme concerning strategy most probably 
cultivated the idea of a rational model as taught in schools. 
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It is from this position that the researcher considers a question that assumes the existence of a 
gap as valid, considering both i) that the term “formal” ascribes it in an academic and 
ceremonial sense and ii) that it is most probably embedded in the academic language game 
that the interviewees used to narrate their practises while participating in an academic project. 
This second point, concerning the interviewees, was actually one of the reasons why the 
researcher refrained from developing an explicit critical analysis around the implicit gap 
underlying the participants’ answers: as the researcher maded explicit at the start of the 
interviews, although the research was exactly about this gap, it was not envisaged that 
interviewees would be focused on denying the gap or even considered it would be appropriate 
to make such a remark. 
Admitting to the existence of a formal gap, either formal or implicitly narrated as such, there 
is no option but to answer the question concerning how to reduce it. 
 
(5.1.2) Answering the strategic question 
As noted, answering the strategic question by way of the three research questions presented in 
Chapter 3 implied a focus on i) the dynamics among building and dwelling pairs, addressing 
research question 1; ii) the threefold benefits of intuition for strategizing, addressing research 
question 2; and iii) the thickness of strategic duration, addressing research question 3. 
The dynamics among building (architectural) and dwelling (practical) pairs, addressing research question 1 
What had begun as a vision of complementarity among the building (architectural) and 
dwelling (practical) pairs, earlier represented in Figure 4, Chapter 2, during the CEO 
interviews, started to give rise to a more dynamic and interdependent view among i) thought, 
intelligence, and decision, and ii) action, intuition, and execution, represented in Figure 6: 
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Figure 6 ‒ Dynamics and interdependency among building and dwelling pairs 
 
The way in which this dynamism and interdependency occurs may be explained as follows … 
Intuition is immanently experiential, in the sense that it is from experience that strategists 
collect the different patterns that will be engraved in their pictorial and mechanical memories; 
which, consequently, will be advantageous to digest the huge amounts of information that will 
be used in analytical thought. In turn, by “intertuition”, intelligence provides the frameworks 
that will permit the generation of effective intuitions, since ideas do not come from a vacuum. 
The relationship between intelligence and intuition, in part, reproduces the interactions 
between the building and dwelling views of strategizing. Indeed, both pairs end up being used 
to analyse the first set of interviews around intuition, and in particular research question 1 (see 
Chapter 3), following the insights collected during the literature review. In fact, the 
relationship between these pairs is not that surprising, since for Strategy-as-Practice building 
is associated with practices in the sense of the tools they provide for/while strategizing (see 
section 2.1.2), which is a function that Bergson defends specifically for intelligence (see 
section 2.2.2). On the other hand, praxis and intuition both have in common the affinity with 
execution and action that are depicted in Figure 6 (see sections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, and 2.3). The 
interweaving between intelligence and intuition that, through analogy with building and 
dwelling, in part, form the dynamics between the concepts at the top and bottom of Figure 6, 
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embody the meaning of “intertuition”: and this is exactly why this neologism was created as a 
symbol for this project. What “intertuition” brings as novelty is the reunifying of concepts 
that, according to a Bergsonian perspective, only intelligence has analytically separated and 
which in this reassembling originates a new concept of a more industrialized and effective 
strategic intuition (see sections 1.2, 2.2.2, and 4.1.1). 
From the research findings, different illustrative examples help to understand the interactions 
between intelligence vs. intuition and the related concepts building vs. dwelling, thus 
highlighting some of the conclusions presented so far. The titles of these illustrative examples, 
presented in detail in section 4.1.1, are somewhat elucidative of the practical substance of 
these pairs: 
• Jonathan – From intelligence for formulating to intuition for executing; 
• Jarvis – Learning from the experience of others; 
• Lowell – The building edge of an intervention and the frame of intelligence; 
• Martina – The building of the headquarters; 
• Melville – A model to foster the intuitive and to come closer to execution of solutions; 
• Idelle – Different buildings for different dwellings; 
• Collier – Intelligence and culture as frames of intuition; 
• Martina and Mark – A strategic plan to avoid free dwelling and improvisation. 
Returning to an explanation of Figure 6, it can be acknowledged that, aside from the use of 
intelligence as a tool, which supposedly ascribes effectiveness to intuition, through reflection, 
intuition is also activated and nourished during execution. While executing, i.e. while 
pursuing a mark/a vision, which results from a deliberative strategic decision, strategists 
come across emergent strategic facts. These will lead, in turn, through relationalism, i.e. by 
interacting with other internal and external practitioners, to occasionally “mindless” and 
improvised new decisions. These decisions will be thoughtful, subject to a selection process, 
giving rise to new marks for strategic direction, which may include corrective action. 
The illustrative examples mentioned above also incorporated the notion that a mark, which 
could range from a broad strategic vision to a detailed strategic initiative, but derived from a 
deliberated decision, was needed to ascribe univocal direction to teams in the field; a 
conclusion that had already flourished from the literature review (see section 2.1.1). 
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Notwithstanding, participants implicitly recognized the importance of the field of action (e.g. 
see the cases of Jonathan and Jarvis mentioned above) to emergent strategy, through 
relationalism, i.e. by interaction with other people who are directly or indirectly involved in 
the strategizing, or pre-strategizing process (i.e. before the creation of a “strategic” label), (see 
sections 2.1.1, 2.4.1, 4.1, and 4.2.1). The illustrative examples provided by interviewees 
regarding the interactions between the thought vs. action and decision vs. execution pairs are 
grouped into the following fragments of section 4.1.2: 
• Experience (action) as intuitive thinking and accumulated knowledge; 
• Execution as the substance of decision (and strategy); 
• Bringing the field of action closer to execution. 
The role of action should naturally be emphasized, in order to complete the explanation of 
Figure 6 and thus the Bergsonian interactions between intelligence and intuition. In fact, it is 
in action, strategizing, although even only by experimental or trial-and-error actions, that 
practitioners sympathize/enter into contact with, elements of the practical field that will 
generate intuitions, and in so doing, progressively, in duration, craft their thoughts, allowing 
them to leverage their hands-on posture while exposed to micro-activities. In turn, through a 
reflective/meditative posture that synthesizes and interacts with solutions generated in the 
academic or practical world, i.e. appealing to, and developing education, managers will 
undertake actions that hopefully take into consideration the precedent takeaways and 
contribute to future learning. The interaction between thought and action, primordial to the 
philosophical theories of Bergson, was explained in detail in the literature review (see section 
2.3.1) and was always embedded in the interview answers, although the dynamic mechanisms 
between both had never been explicitly assumed by participants. 
Figure 6 also expresses one of the most important contributions of this project, by putting 
Action as the first element (reading from right to left in the Dwelling zone) of the view of 
strategizing underlying this project: one that, according to Bergsonian theory, says that 
thinking intuitively is to think in duration, which departs from a notion of movement/action 
(Bergson, 2001e, p. 1275). The importance of both intuition and duration for strategizing are 
synthetized hereafter. 
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The threefold benefits of intuition for strategizing, addressing research question 2 
Figure 6 depicts three direct connections with intuition – intelligence, execution, and action – 
that synthesize the types of benefits potentially brought to the concept of strategy by this key 
concept of Bergsonian theory. These benefits were already noted in section 2.3 and can be 
summarized as follows:  
• Fast digestion of huge amounts of information – linked to intelligence; 
• Humanize decision making, bringing it close to execution – linked to execution; 
• Foster creative and “truly new” strategies – linked to action and duration. 
Section 2.2.1 explained that in a world marked by Volatility-Uncertainty-Complexity-
Ambiguity (VUCA), time-consuming, rational approaches must be complemented with a 
more practical and intuitive decision-making mode that, by taking an educated trial-and-error 
stance (see also section 2.3.2), could combat management paralysis by analysis (see also 
section 2.2.3). In this context, as some interviewees noted (e.g. Melville and Collier) patterns 
of intuition must be used to digest and condense large chunks of information in a preliminary 
information analysis  that will be subject to a more rational, although timely, treatment of 
information later on. 
One important contribution of intuition, in the sense of practical thought, is the fact that 
implementation would be easier to undertake if the decision-making method were already 
close to practice/execution. This impact was noted by Melville, when he was describing his 
method to define quick action plans, presented in section 4.1.1. That was why, he said, he 
asked more experienced people to work together with more junior executives who showed 
promise career-wise. This note motivated a further addition to the literature review on the 
humanization of decisions brought by intuition, and specifically to the discovery of the work 
of Sinclair et al. (2009). 
Lastly, one of the most frequently referenced benefits of intuition throughout this work is its 
capacity to create the “truly new”, capable of surprising clients and competitors and thus to 
create a potential competitive strategy/advantage. As already noted, the “truly new” is 
referenced to Dane and Pratt (2009, p. 10). However, notwithstanding, Bergson had already 
noted the radical new (2001e, p. 1276) and absolutely new (2005, p. 206) to mark the 
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difference between the capacity of intuition on the one hand and intelligence on the other, 
considering that the latter, according to the philosopher, simply rearranges pre-existent 
elements (Bergson, 2001g, p. 1275). One of the best illustrations of what the creation of the 
“truly new” means while strategizing is patent in one of Ivy’s comments, where she refers to 
the recruitment of a person from a sector in which consumer experience was much closer to 
the Digital era than she considered was typical of the healthcare sector these days. 
Naturally, Bergson is clear when he affirms that this capacity to create the “truly new” is 
something that is propelled by intuition. According to Bergson, this means invention, the 
creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new (Bergson, 2005, p. 206), 
thus making an almost inseparable combination of the two concepts of intuition and duration. 
The thickness of strategic duration, addressing research question 3 
Considering the importance of action to intuition and to strategy, as mentioned above, it was 
inevitable that duration, which as stated, departs from movement (action) and is the propeller 
of intuition, has become the most important concept of this project. 
As explained extensively in several parts throughout this work, duration measures qualitative 
time rather than chronologically the days, hours, minutes, or other units of time. The image of 
the painter painting a canvas, explained in purposefully long quotes in section 4.2, in which 
part of both the object painted and the painter him/herself becomes part of a picture, which 
has been qualitatively formed along a certain “duration of this belonging, […] the trace of 
which is the painting” (Helin et al., 2014, loc. 246), is a good analogy to explain what 
strategic duration could mean – a trace – and what the strategist (the painter) does while 
strategizing: “tracing a line” (Colombo, 2009, p. 262). 
In the analogy with the painter, they, who has a real or imaginary vision of what to paint, will 
most probably not ask themself if the final canvas corresponds to that vision, especially 
because it would be difficult to see how much of the vision is in the canvas and how much the 
creation of the painting formed the virtual vision. Notwithstanding, the acute arguer might 
ask: ‘And what if the painter is a portraitist?’ Even so, “the portrait will surely resemble the 
model and will surely resemble also the artist; but the concrete solution brings with it that 
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unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art” (Bergson, 2005, p. 3777, my 
italics). In fact, in any work of art, the “unforeseeable nothing”, i.e. what cannot be predicted 
and rationally explained, seems to be the sine qua non condition in order for it to be 
considered art at all. 
In this context, if a painter, or specifically a portraitist, should try to measure the gap between 
their vision/model and the final canvas, would this make sense? No, because what makes a 
painting a work of art is exactly the “unforeseeable nothing”. Similarly, would it make sense, 
therefore, if strategists tried to measure the gap between their initial vision and their final 
strategy? Probably not, because what makes a strategist is their “receptive capacity so [they] 
can abide with the world, belong to it or stay with it, and direct the forces of the event in an 
intensive process of becoming that creates by differentiating the quality of the new” (Helin et 
al., 2014, loc. 251–55, my italics), this being “the new”, the “unforeseeable nothing” of 
strategy, in respect to which the strategy must activate and maintain its “receptive capacity” 
while “being-in-the-world” (Blattner, 2006; Dreyfus, 1991; Heidegger, 2014). 
In this work strategic duration has been visualized as a line and strategizing seen as tracing a 
line, the thickness of which represents strategic quality since the time of duration is 
qualitative. On the other hand, the strategist’s “receptive capacity” has been linked to strategic 
attention, this being the effort the manager has to exert in order to transform thought into 
action, seen throughout in the Bergsonian formula action = thought + effort (see section 
2.3.1). In section 2.4 and further in section 4.2, the way managers foster attention 
(highlighting) and keep it (framing) was explained in depth. 
Considering these assumptions, it is time now to explain how the thickness of strategic 
duration can be measured, and how this image might replace the prevailing one, which 
represents strategic achievement as something that occurs after the black hole that follows 
strategic decision-making. 
In fact it was during the interviews that the idea of duration as a line being traced began to 
take practical shape. Picture the line’s thickness and length associated with strategic intensity 
and endurance—the intensity/quality/progression of strategy over a certain, imagined, time 
period, as though someone had actually had a certain chronological time to trace the longest 
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and thickest line possible. This geometry is something continuously taking shape along the 
different constituents/stages of the Framework of Strategic Duration (Figure 5, section 2.4). 
Should one of the six elements of the hexagon represented in Figure 5 be smaller, i.e. 
partially, or even totally disregarded, and what if strategic duration were to become thinner? 
This image is represented in Figure 7 (below) by a geometric cross-sectional62 view of the 
“interior” of duration: 
Momentum 
(urgent x feasible)
Politicking 
(power contests)
Scheme 
(and rhetoric)
Consensus 
(understanding x 
commitment)
Foster
ATTENTION
Keeping
FRAMING
HIGHLIGHTING
Labelling
(stakeholders/
SWOT)
Selling 
(sponsorship)
 
Figure 7 ‒ Geometric representation of a cross-sectional view of strategic duration 
According to this figure, duration could be compared with the interior of a bone, the thickness 
of which would determine the strength of strategic formation is. Nevertheless, given the 
contradictory idea of a bone’s rigidity, when compared with strategizing, it is preferable to 
imagine the interior of a spiral,63 which also more closely represents the forward and 
backward movement of the pen, the steps between stages, as mentioned in section 4.2. Having 
this geometrical image in mind, a very brief explanation is due to illustrate how, in a case of a 
lack of strategic attention some of the constituents of duration might be partially or 
completely disregarded, and how this would create strategic thinness or fragility. 
                                                          
62 Cross-sectional in the sense of “Exposed by making a straight cut through a solid form, especially at right angles to an 
axis” see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cross-sectional (accessed 10/6/2017). 
63 The spiral is defined as a “winding in a continuous and gradually widening (or tightening) curve, either around a central 
point on a flat plane or about an axis so as to form a cone.” See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/spiral 
(accessed 4/12/2016). 
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When a strategist does not pay attention to the company’s SWOT and does not label any 
issues/opportunities as “strategic”, they risk plunging self, team, and organization into an 
erratic dwelling that transforms strategy into improvisation; this is typical of a company 
trapped in institutional navel-gazing. This is opposed to the other type of company managed 
by “‘real time foresight’, i.e. the discovery of opportunities and threats still in the making and 
the translation of this discovery to action at the right time” (Cunha et al., 2012, p. 267). In the 
opposite direction, if something that is not “strategic” is labelled as if it were, then managers, 
submerged in non-essential operational activities, run the risk of losing their chronological 
time together with a destruction of their qualitative strategic time. During interviews on 
duration, all the participants recognized the label as crucial for strategizing. Deserving of 
emphasis in this regard are the passages where Ivy – whose formal role, besides being the 
CEO, is being head of strategy – explains how she manages her company’s S-curve, and 
Mark’s explanation of the basis by which he would label something as “strategic” (see section 
4.2.1). 
Failing to pay attention to momentum is similar to disregarding either feasibility or urgency, 
both even, with regard to a virtual or actual strategic issue; i.e. a strategic issue might be 
discovered in the business ecosystem, but the strategist still needs to evaluate whether there is 
the right momentum to move forward with the formation of a particular strategy or strategic 
initiative in order to deal with it. With regard to feasibility, Warren – showing permanent 
cost/benefit reasoning – offers a quite elucidative illustration of what could be called 
structural feasibility (see section 4.2.1). He states that he prefers to precisely delimit the kind 
of market segments or strategic positioning that will be out of bounds to his bank, which he 
bases on internal analysis of a lack of resources, to match what is required, in order to 
potentially be competitive on entering these segments, or to adopt a certain market 
positioning. Concerning urgency, Ferdinand – who did not refrain from showing a certain 
strategic resignation to the peripheral position of the Business Unit he manages – offered a 
remarkable example about what it means to be “non-relevant” for a big multinational. He 
illustrates this with a negative correlation between the sense of urgency in the field and the 
(lack of) urgency registered at the highest levels of a decisional pyramid, thus hindering 
momentum. At the other end of the scale, almost all interviewees conveyed “a culture with a 
strong sense of urgency” (Spence, 2009, loc. 114), particularly when, according to them, 
Paulo Morgado (N0561081) Document 5 – p. 167 
 
execution had begun; this follows Kotter’s (2008) idea that managers should “behave with 
urgency every day” (p. 97). This perspective seems unsurprising, considering that, as Davis et 
al. (2010) note, “research shows a hard link between speed and business results” (p. 9). What 
is more, a lack of a sense of urgency might even lead to management paralysis (see sections 
2.3.1 and 4.2.3), which is exactly contrary to movement/action and thus duration. 
The selling stage, leveraged, according to participants, by frequent moments of 
communication, proved to be crucial, and not only in order to obtain senior management and 
other internal and external stakeholders’ sponsorship. This could be seen as a quite obvious 
conclusion were it not for the fact that many participants, experienced CEOs, recalled the 
importance of paying attention to those “details” that sometimes might be disregarded. For 
instance, Ramsey, the only interviewee whose academic studies were in law, gave the 
example of the need to be constantly selling not only ideas while dwelling, but to also be 
building strategic spaces; this is especially important for companies such as the state-owned 
ones, he said, where the shareholder is distant. And Idelle emphasized the need to sell 
strategic initiatives to the team, thus she advocated not just selling to her boss and 
stakeholders, but also using what she called frontrunners as marketers/ambassadors for 
execution (see section 4.2.1). Returning to the assertion that the need for selling/sponsorship 
might be considered obvious, even in spite of a potential disregard for certain details, the 
researcher has not judged it as being so obvious: take into account the heroic rational postures 
illustrated in the introduction to Chapter 4, where the over-confident potential to discard any 
type of comfort offered by others, suggests an attitude that later on can often lead to 
unexpected blockages that compromise strategic duration. Additionally, Mark, who offered 
important insights into “a global ‘nexus’ of practices” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2015, p. vi), noted 
that the selling stage should also include correct and comprehensive identification of relevant 
stakeholders, that vary according to the matters being discussed – correspondence that is not 
always evident. 
Entering into the frame of strategic attention, it is worth mentioning what Miles, who always 
exhibited a very reasoned posture, noted: that when a strategist is in the selling phase, they 
should already have a scheme in mind. A scheme is a preliminary frame, a preliminary 
strategic building that needs to be discussed, and, later, consensually accepted. A scheme may 
take the form of i) a strategic vision, plan, initiative, or project, according to the level of 
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strategic detail, or ii) other elements that might be raised as referents, which were exemplified 
by the eight signatures presented in section 2.4.2. Assuming use of a vision/plan to provide 
strategic direction is one of the most common features of strategy theory, with the greatest 
emphasis given to the referents/schemes that can be active during strategy formation (various 
buildings for various dwellings). Idelle, symbolizing the posture of a tough manager, noted 
the possibility of someone being fired if they systematically raised barriers to change; and she 
described how this action might constitute an example (a referent) to others. Ferdinand, whose 
narrative exposed various aspects of strategic blockage brought about by adverse-buildings, 
mentioned how the reminiscence of a low-cost culture (first referent) could block strategic 
duration for a new positioning that privileges quality. Not having these frames of where to go 
and why in mind, appealing both to the positive and the “not-to-do” referents, most certainly 
hinders the “intensive (passionate) process of receiving the situation so that one belongs to it” 
(Helin et al., 2014, loc. 252), similar to what would happen with a painter who did not have a 
vision/model before them, and who might thus thin down duration. 
Nevertheless, this project, although noting the importance of building effective and useful 
dwellings, has never suggested that there can be any advantage in a rigid/immutable plan. 
This artificiality, according to Bergson, could become laughable (see section 2.2.2). Indeed, 
Mark – who from his position as a politician illustrated very well the vicissitudes of the 
politicking constituent of duration – acknowledges his willingness to change direction should 
maintaining it be no longer feasible, especially due to a change of priorities from critical 
stakeholders (see the introduction to Chapter 4). That is to say, a scheme, a frame, is not 
fixed: It strives by politicking and its underlying dialectics, as seen, constitute one of the 
major features of duration (see section 4.2.), a sort of spiralled-ping-pong mode of 
progressing. Politicking has a lot to do with conversation and its potentiality to create 
emergent strategies (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.3.2) or to test intuitive decisions, namely by 
playing devil’s advocate. But some of the interviewees also highlight a supposedly shadier 
facet, that of an active resistance to change. Idelle, a participant that supplied very interesting 
examples about barriers to change, mentions the “slightly different” actions in contrast to 
what was agreed, which are sometimes difficult to detect; and Miles, who revealed a 
particular focus on execution, using a military metaphor, talked about troops that begin to 
march in different directions. It was also implicit in every interview that, specifically so as not 
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to hinder momentum, there is a time at which discussions must stop and consensus must be 
reunited, specifically to accomplish defined targets in a timely manner. 
Consensus around dominant strategic frames/building, when considered within the context of 
politicking – i.e. not rejecting creative dialectics – generates unidirectional efforts based on 
“the shared understanding of strategic priorities among managers at the top, middle, and/or 
operating levels of the organization” (Kellermanns et al., 2005, p. 721, my italics). This stage, 
if prior considerations are taken into account, is critical for duration’s thickness because it 
reunites individual durations around a common purposeful strategic direction. Among 
interviewees, consensus was considered vital for strategizing, including as Mark noted, with 
external stakeholders of the company. It represents a sort of stability pact, which is obviously 
different from an immobility pact, during which an intersection of common willingness 
culminates in joint efforts, and thus, according to the formula action = thought + effort, 
concludes in joint action. Ivy, one of the participants whose profile from her interview most 
closely matches the image of a doer, explained her principles to foster consensus, but 
emphasized that the complicity among the various members of her executive committee was 
the most important guarantee of achieving it. For another participant, Warren, who denoted a 
very right-to-the-point style of management, consensus was of such importance to 
strategizing that if this constituent of strategic duration was not guaranteed among 
management and shareholders, he preferred not to move forward with the envisaged strategic 
option (see section 4.2.2). 
All in all, it is important to retain the belief that strategic duration demands equilibrium of 
forces among its different constituents. As the cross-sectional circle of Figure 7 tries to 
illustrate geometrically, an excess of one constituent can neither endanger nor compensate for 
the normal development of another. For instance, endless politicking, leading to management 
paralysis, will most probably hinder momentum. This explains why strategic activity implies 
a certain tension, in the sense that all the constituents could be in play at the same time, with 
momentary different intensities, and thus require a comprehensive attention that presents 
substantial differences in regard to an alternative single-mindedness on purposeful model 
development. 
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Additionally, the reader probably grasped the link between the framing stages – scheme, 
politicking, and consensus – and a predominance in defending a certain frame/building while 
dwelling. This should take the reader back to Figure 6, and to the importance of “intertuition” 
as the bridge between the building and dwelling world views. That is why both duration and 
intuition are emphasized in that Figure. 
It is exactly this view of comprehensive attention to the different constituents of duration and 
the link to the dynamic between building and dwelling pairs that may be seen as the major 
contributions of this project. This will be addressed hereafter. 
 
(5.2) Contributions of this project and further areas for research 
A project at doctoral level must bring both i) a “practical or applied impact for a particular 
user-group or community, or for practitioners or policy makers” and ii) a “theoretical impact 
through increasing our understanding of a particular issue or creating new understandings” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 290). In consideration of this, the following two sections introduce 
the potential impact of this work for managers/practitioners and academia. 
 
(5.2.1) Practical contributions 
Apart from being shy or ill-informed about “intuitive competence” (Richards, 2004, loc. 
1148), managers’ ideas about strategy seem to be blocked. Where managers learn, where they 
go to be inspired, covers a range that varies from i) a positioning school based on models to ii) 
heuristics and “best sellers” of authors purporting to be Gurus. This perspective erroneously 
excludes the contributions of the discipline of Strategy-as-Practice that, in a comprehensive 
mode, is capable of shedding light “inside the black box of the firm” (Nelson, 1991, p. 65) 
and on how managers strategize. 
The current work, while illuminating the dynamic combination between apparently opposite 
elements belonging to the architectural as well as practical views of strategizing, changes the 
focus on managers as rational heroes, to offer a more humanized approach that sees managers 
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as professionals who have to deal with the “complexities of the lived experiences” (Hay, 
2014, p. 509) while strategizing. 
In this context, leveraging the Bergsonian concepts of intuition and duration, while not 
relieving intelligence – by “intertuition” – it is hoped that the current work will bring some 
comfort to managers: they are allowed to make mistakes, so long as these are made through 
educated action. Bergson himself would not deny managers themselves the right to laugh at 
the excesses of artificiality, the models, plans, rules … and so forth, which some might intend 
to impose on them while strategizing. 
Here an analogy can be used to explain further this idea that discards the view of the plan-
gap-implementation way of doing strategy. The IT industry in the here and now happens to 
privilege agile development, by which smaller and faster cycles of software development, 
executed in an incremental and iterative way, replace traditional complete planning, followed 
by big-bang code development and deployment. The agile manifesto, chasing better methods 
of software development, values … 
individuals and interactions over process and tools; working software over comprehensive 
documentation; customer collaboration over contract negotiation; responding to change over following 
a plan. (Mancuso, 2015, pp. 12–13, my italics) 
What is more, as Westerman et al. (2014) state, “regardless of industry or geography, 
businesses will become much more digitized in the future” (p. 5); i.e. today’s business 
ecosystem is immersed in the digital era, the defiance towards which is vividly illustrated by 
the following image offered by Dawson et al. (2016): 
In July 2015, during the championship round of the World Surf League’s J-Bay Open, in South Africa, a 
great white shark attacked Australian surfing star Mick Fanning. Right before the attack, Fanning said 
later, he had the eerie feeling [instinct] that ′something was behind me.’ […] Just two years earlier, off 
the coast of Nazaré, Portugal, Brazilian surfer Carlos Burle rode what, unofficially, at least, ranks as the 
largest wave in history. […] These days, something of a mix of the fear of sharks and the thrill of big-
wave surfing [dwelling] pervades the executive suites we visit, when the conversation turns to the 
threats and opportunities arising from digitization. (pp. 1–2) 
This era is characterized by the importance of social networks, mobility/accessibility 
(potentiated by the proliferation of mobile devices), massive generation and analysis of data, 
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big data, cloud platforms, the internet of things (IoT), and 3D printing – which “includes 
technology outside a company’s control” (Raskino & Waller, 2015, p. 6). 
Ten years ago Tomlinson (2007) arrived at this dynamic view of constantly being in action, 
rather than being caught in a mistaken discrete separation between moments of decision 
followed by moments of execution,  acknowledging that an increasing “culture of 
instantaneity” (loc. 1908), so typical of actuality and its digital footstep, was provoking the 
“‘closure of the gap’ that had historically separated now from later, here from elsewhere, 
desire from satisfaction” (loc. 1911). In this context: 
Strategy and execution are closely integrated and influenced by each other. This means that strategy is 
constantly being challenged and could likely change during execution. (Short & Soejarto, 2016, p. 5) 
Bearing in mind that strategists are not expected to behave as model rational heroes, capable 
of surfing any digital wave that appears in these turbulent times, this work offers a 
comprehensive study to elucidate managers on how to be purposeful in action which, 
completing the analogy of actually surfing on troubled waters, is comparable to Bergsonian 
swimming (see section 2.2.1). 
 
(5.2.2) Theoretical contributions and future research 
The author’s ambition to offer an all-inclusive perspective on how to apply Bergsonian theory 
to strategizing, as Figure 1 of the Introduction might suggest, was somewhat restrained due to 
space limitations and the need to explain in detail the very elusive concepts of intuition and 
duration. Consequently, some aspects of the Bergsonian framework applied to strategy, such 
as leadership and culture, were virtually left out. 
Additionally, the author has taken the bold and challenging step of applying philosophical 
ideas to concrete practice, i.e. choosing to reunite popularly considered opposite world views. 
In some sense, what Bergsonian ideas do is sensitize managers and academia to certain issues, 
summarized in section 5.1, that they might not have considered in other approaches: it may 
help them see things differently. 
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However, in order to have application, philosophical ideas still need to be translated into 
substantive management theory, which is what the author has partially attempted to do here. 
So, recognizing the challenges involved in exploring intuition and especially duration, this 
study points to ideas that others might take up. 
In this context, continuing to investigate the application of duration to organizational theory 
and particularly to strategy, also leveraging its connections with leadership and culture, as this 
study has touched upon, could constitute recommendations for future areas of research. 
All in all, despite the challenges of applying the work of Bergson to strategy, this project has 
proved illuminating in showing the importance to corporate strategy of action and duration. In 
this regard, the observation of French scriptwriter and film director, Michel Audiard’s 
(1920‒85) comes to mind: “A seated intellectual will go less far than a walking [in action] 
idiot.” In turn, his French compatriot, Bergson, probably would not have rejected the 
following formulation: either strategy is educated action or it is nothing at all. 
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APPENDIX 1 ‒ Participant Information and Consent Form (1 interview) 
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APPENDIX 2 ‒ Participant Information and Consent Form (3 interviews) 
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APPENDIX 3 ‒ List of Qualitative Interviews Performed 
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APPENDIX 4 ‒ Examples of questions for single interviews 
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APPENDIX 5 ‒ Examples of questions for triple interviews 
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